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Abstract: This paper reports on the latest version of the worldwide governance 
indicators, covering 213 countries and territories and measuring six dimensions of 
governance since 1996 until end-2005: voice and accountability, political stability and 
absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and 
control of corruption. The latest indicators are based on hundreds of variables and reflect 
the views of thousands of citizen and firm survey respondents and experts worldwide. 
Although global averages of governance display no marked trends during 1996-2005, 
nearly one-third of countries exhibit significant changes—for better or for worse—on at 
least one dimension of governance. Three new features distinguish this update. (1) We 
have moved to reporting estimates of governance on an annual basis. In this update we 
provide new estimates of governance for 2003 and 2005, as well as minor backward 
revisions to our biannual historical data for 1996-2004. (2) We are for the first time 
publishing the individual measures of governance from virtually every data source 
underlying our aggregate governance indicators. The ready availability of the individual 
data sources underlying the aggregate governance indicators is aimed at further 
enhancing the transparency of our methodology and of the resulting aggregate 
indicators, as well as helping data users and policymakers identify specific governance 
challenges in individual countries. (3) We present new evidence on the reliability of 
expert assessments of governance which, alongside survey responses, form part of our 
aggregate measures of governance. The aggregate and underlying individual 
governance indicators, a new nontechnical booklet describing the data and analysis, and 
a number of Web-based tools for analysis of the data are available at 
www.govindicators.org. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
  This paper presents the latest update of our aggregate governance indicators.
1 
The indicators measure six dimensions of governance: voice and accountability, political 
stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of 
law, and control of corruption.   They cover 213 countries and territories for 1996, 1998, 
2000, and annually for 2002-2005.  The indicators are based on several hundred 
individual variables measuring perceptions of governance, drawn from 31 separate data 
sources constructed by 25 different organizations. We assign these individual measures 
of governance to categories capturing key dimensions of governance, and use an 
unobserved components model to construct six aggregate governance indicators in each 
period. We present the point estimates of the dimensions of governance as well as the 
margins of errors for each country and period.   
 
  We begin by describing the data used to construct this round of the governance 
indicators in Section 2.  As discussed in more detail below, we have added one new 
data source in this round.  In the interests of greater comparability over time, we have 
included it in our past estimates as well, and also dropped a few minor data sources we 
have used in the past but are no longer regularly available.   We have also made minor 
changes to the scaling of our indicators in earlier years in order to make over-time 
comparisons of the aggregate indicators more robust to year-to-year changes in the 
composition of the sample of countries included in the indicators.  These revisions have 
resulted in minor changes to our historical biannual data for 1996-2004, and so the new 
dataset described here supersedes previous releases.  Going forward we plan to 
continue to update our governance indicators on an annual basis, in order to enable a 
more timely monitoring of governance worldwide.  While we recognize that in many 
countries year-over-year changes in governance are small, by moving to annual data we 
aim to assist users to spot and monitor those cases where there are substantial changes 
in the short term.  
 
                                                 
1 This paper is the fifth in a series of estimates of governance across countries.  Each of these 
papers has reported on data updates as well as new empirical results using the governance 
indicators Documentation of the previous rounds of the indicators and analytical findings can be 
found in Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobatón (1999a,b, 2002), and Kaufmann, Kraay, and 
Mastruzzi (2004, 2005, 2006).  Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2004) contains a complete 
description of the statistical methodology underlying the indicators.  2
  An important innovation with this round of the governance indicators is that we 
are now able to fully report data from virtually all of our underlying individual sources (on 
the web), alongside our aggregate indicators, as we have obtained permission from the 
institutions generating the data to do so.  This new feature will be valuable to users 
interested in unbundling our aggregate indicators for particular countries in order to 
better understand the factors contributing to our estimates of levels and changes over 
time in governance.  Moreover, even within each of our aggregate governance 
indicators, the underlying measures provide a wealth of information on different specific 
sub-dimensions of governance.  By making the underlying data readily available we 
hope to help users identify -- and act upon -- specific governance challenges identified 
by these indicators in individual countries.  
 
  As in the past, we complement our estimates of governance for each country 
with estimates of margins of error that indicate the unavoidable uncertainty associated 
with measuring governance across countries.  These margins of error have declined 
over time with the addition of new data sources to our aggregate indicators, and are 
substantially smaller than for any of the individual data sources.   We continue to 
encourage users of the governance indicators to take these margins of error into 
account when making comparisons of governance across countries, and within countries 
over time.  We also encourage other producers of governance indicators to be similarly 
transparent about the imprecision of all types of measures of governance.  Our 
aggregate indicators are sufficiently informative that many cross-country comparisons of 
governance can result in statistically -- and practically -- significant differences.  In fact, 
using our 2005 indicators, we show that around 60 percent of all cross-country 
comparisons reveal strongly significant differences, and we also find that nearly one-
third of the countries in our sample experience a significant change in at least one 
dimension of governance between 1996 and 2005.  However, in other cases users will 
find that confidence intervals for governance based on our reported margins of error will 
overlap, indicating that comparisons are neither statistically -- nor practically -- 
significant.   
 
  We emphasize, however, that the margins of error we report are not unique to 
our aggregate indicators, nor are they unique to perceptions-based measures of 
governance on which we rely:  measurement error is pervasive among all indicators of  3
governance and institutional quality, including individual indicators as well as so-called 
‘objective’ or fact-based ones -- if these are available at all.  Unfortunately, typically little 
if any effort is placed in estimating, let alone reporting, the substantial margins of error in 
any other source of governance and/or investment climate indicators – objective or 
subjective, aggregate or individual.  A key advantage of our measures of governance is 
that we are explicit about the accompanying margins of error, whereas in most other 
cases they are at best left implicit, and often ignored entirely. 
 
  In the third section of this paper we consider in detail a particular critique of 
expert assessments of governance (which account for 23 of our 31 data sources).  
Some of these expert assessments are produced by commercial risk rating agencies, 
others by governments and multilateral organizations, and yet others by non-
governmental organizations.   We analyze whether each of these data sources provides 
independent estimates of governance, and if not, the extent to which one set of expert 
assessments is influenced by the views of other experts.  Here we make three points.  
First, finding evidence of such correlated perception errors is intrinsically difficult.  A high 
correlation in the rankings of two expert assessments could in principle be due either to 
highly correlated perceptions errors, or alternatively it could due to the fact that both data 
sources are actually measuring cross-country differences in governance well.  Second, 
under certain reasonable assumptions that we detail below, we can solve this 
identification problem and separate out the extent to which expert assessments make 
correlated errors.  When we do this, we find at best very weak evidence of correlated 
perception errors, suggesting that this critique of expert assessments has little empirical 
basis.  Third, we note that even if expert assessments do contain correlated perception 
errors, this does not imply that we should discard such data sources entirely.  Even with 
correlated errors, expert assessments do contain information about cross-country 
differences in governance and this information can usefully add to our aggregate 
governance indicators. 
 
  We conclude the paper by summarizing the key findings in this fifth installment of 
the Governance Matters series and noting the policy implications of our work. 
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2.  Description of the 2005 Data Update 
 
  In this section we briefly describe the update of our governance indicators for 
2005, as well as some minor backwards revisions to the biannual indicators for 1996-
2004.  This year we report data for 2003, in order to create a panel of annual 
observations covering 2002-2005.  We also for the first time will be distributing on the 
web the bulk of data from the individual indicators of governance that underlie our 
aggregate indicators.  We therefore also describe how this data from the individual 
indicators can be used to aid in the interpretation of the aggregate indicators. 
 
  Our methodology has not changed from past years, and a detailed discussion 
can be found in Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2004).  As before we construct 
indicators of six dimensions governance: 
 
1.  Voice and accountability (VA), the extent to which a country’s citizens are able to 
participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, 
freedom of association, and free media 
2.  Political stability and absence of violence (PV), perceptions of the likelihood that 
the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent 
means, including political violence and terrorism 
3.  Government effectiveness (GE), the quality of public services, the quality of the 
civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the 
quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the 
government’s commitment to such policies 
4.  Regulatory quality (RQ), the ability of the government to formulate and implement 
sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector 
development 
5.  Rule of law (RL), the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the 
rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, the police, 
and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence 
6.  Control of corruption (CC), the extent to which public power is exercised for 
private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as 
“capture” of the state by elites and private interests. 
   5
 
  In brief our methodology consists of identifying many individual sources of data 
on perceptions of governance that we can assign to these six broad categories.  We 
then use a statistical methodology known as an unobserved components model to 
construct aggregate indicators from these individual measures.   These aggregate 
indicators are weighted averages of the underlying data, with weights reflecting the 
precision of the individual data sources.  Crucially our methodology also generates 
margins of error for the estimates of governance for each country, which need to be 
taken into account when making comparisons of governance across countries and over 
time.  We provide details on this approach in the remainder of this section. 
 
2.1  Data and Methodology 
 
  As in past years we rely on a large number of individual data sources that 
provide us with information on perceptions of governance.  These data sources consist 
of surveys of firms and individuals, as well as the assessments of commercial risk rating 
agencies, non-governmental organizations, and a number of multilateral aid agencies.  A 
full list of these sources is presented in Table 1.  For the 2005 round of the data, we rely 
on a total of 276 individual variables measuring different dimensions of governance.  
These are taken from 31 different sources, produced by 25 different organizations.  
Appendices A and B provide a detailed description of each data source, and document 
how we have assigned individual questions from these data sources to our six aggregate 
indicators.  Almost all of our data sources are available annually, and we use the data 
only the most recent year in our aggregate indicators.  In a few cases, as noted in 
Appendix B, we use data lagged one or two years if current data are not available.
2 
 
  In this round of the governance indicators we have added one new data source, 
the United States State Department's Trafficking in People Report.  It provides country 
narratives and numerical rankings of countries' policy efforts to prevent trafficking in 
                                                 
2 We never use lagged data when current data are available, in order to ensure that our indicators 
are as timely as possible.  In this respect our approach differs from Transparency International's 
Corruption Perceptions Index, which in each year uses data from the current and two previous 
years for some of its sources (GCS, WCY and PRC), although peculiarly it does not follow the 
same practice for three other annually-available sources (FHT, MIG, and WMO).  As a result the 
2005 Corruption Perceptions Index is based on 2005 data from only 10 data sources.  In contrast 
our Control of Corruption Index is based on 19 data sources, all of which refer to 2005.  6
people.  Countries are ranked into three tiers, beginning in 2001.  We use this tier 
classification as an ingredient for our Rule of Law indicator, which contains a number of 
other measures of the prevalence of criminal activity.   In addition, a few of the data 
sources that we have used in the past have either been discontinued, or have not been 
updated and do not appear likely to be updated in the future on a regular basis. These 
include the Opacity Factor produced by Price-Waterhouse-Coopers, the 
USAID/Vanderbilt University Democracy Surveys, the Fundar rankings of budget 
transparency in Latin America, and the African governance indicators produced by the 
UN Economic Commission for Africa.
3  To improve the comparability of our estimates of 
governance over time by having a somewhat more balanced set of sources in each 
period, we have dropped these measures and recalculated our historical estimates 
based on this slightly smaller set of data sources.  Finally, we have made a number of 
minor revisions and corrections to the past underlying indicators for 1996-2004.  




  Our data sources reflect the perceptions of a very diverse group of respondents.  
Several are surveys of individuals or domestic firms with first-hand knowledge of the 
governance situation in the country.  These include the World Economic Forum’s Global 
Competitiveness Report, the Institute for Management Development’s World 
Competitiveness Yearbook, the World Bank’s business environment surveys, and a 
                                                 
3 In the 2004 update of the governance indicators we relied on data from 37 sources produced by 
31 organizations. Our number of organizations falls by six of our deletion of four sources, one of 
which was produced by two organizations (the Latin America surveys produced by USAID and 
Vanderbilt University), and also because Global Insight which produced the DRI ratings in 2004 
has since also acquired World Markets Online, another of our sources.  The number of sources 
falls by six because (i) we have dropped four sources, (ii) we now count three separate Gallup 
surveys performed in different years as one source, (iii) we no longer separately count the GCS 
survey of Africa in 1998 as a separate source but merge it with the GCS for all other countries in 
that year, and (iv) we add one new source as described in the text, for a net change of six.   
4 The correlation between our revised and updated estimates is greater than 0.99 for all but four 
of the series affected by our backward revisions.  Our revised data for GE in 1996 is correlated 
with the old data at 0.98.  In 2004 our main revision was to use the final 2004 CPIA scores, which 
were unavailable at the time of the release of the 2004 indicators.  This had a slightly greater 
effect on our estimates for PV, RQ, and CC, whose correlations with the old indicators range from 
0.96 to 0.97.   In only one small territory did our revisions result in a change in an estimate of 
governance that was statistically significant (in the sense of the 90% confidence intervals for the 
two estimates not overlapping).   This is for the small island state of Tuvalu (which has very few 
sources) for CC in 2004, where our revisions resulted in a significant improvement for that 
country.   
  7
variety of global polls of individuals conducted by Gallup, Latinobarometro, and 
Afrobarometro.  We also capture the perceptions of country analysts at the major 
multilateral development agencies (the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, the African Development Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and the 
World Bank), reflecting these individuals’ in-depth experience working on the countries 
they assess.  Other data sources from NGOs (such as Amnesty International, Reporters 
Without Borders, and Freedom House), as well as commercial risk rating agencies (such 
as the Economist Intelligence Unit and DRI-McGraw Hill) base their assessments on a 
global network of correspondents typically living in the country they are rating. 
 
  As in our past work, we combine the many individual data sources into six 
aggregate governance indicators.  The premise underlying this statistical approach 
should not be too controversial – each of the individual data sources we have provides 
an imperfect signal of some deep underlying notion of governance that is difficult to 
observe directly.  This means that as users of the individual sources, we face a signal-
extraction problem – how do we isolate the informative signal about governance from 
each individual data source, and how do we optimally combine the many data sources to 
get the best possible signal of governance in a country based on all the available data?  
The statistical procedure we use to perform this aggregation, known as the unobserved 
components model, is described in detail in our past work (see for example Kaufmann, 
Kraay and Mastruzzi (2004)).  The main advantage of this approach is that the 
aggregate indicators are more informative about unobserved governance than any 
individual data source.  Moreover, the methodology allows us to be explicit about the 
precision – or imprecision – of our estimates of governance in each country.   As we 
discuss in more detail throughout the paper, this imprecision is not a consequence of our 
reliance on subjective or perceptions data on governance – rather imprecision is an 
issue that should be squarely addressed in all efforts to measure the quality of 
governance. 
 
  An important innovation this year is that we have obtained permission from the 
majority of our data sources to report the underlying indicators that go into our aggregate 
indicators.  The sources we have made available on our website are noted in Table 1.  A 
number of our data sources, such as Freedom House and the Heritage Foundation have 
always been publicly available through the publications and/or websites of their  8
respective organizations.  Several of our other sources provided by commercial risk 
rating agencies and commercial survey organizations have only been available for a fee.  
In the interests of greater transparency, these organizations have kindly agreed to allow 
us to report their proprietary data in the form in which it enters our governance 
indicators.   As discussed in detail in Appendix A and B, we in some cases use a simple 
average of multiple questions from the same source as an ingredient in our governance 
indicators.  On our website we report either the individual question, or the average of 
individual questions, from each source that enters into our governance indicators.  All 
the individual variables have been rescaled to run from zero to one, with higher values 
indicating better outcomes.  
 
  The only data sources we have not been able to obtain permission to publicize 
fully are the World Bank's Country Policy and Institutional Assessment, and the 
corresponding internal assessments produced by the African Development Bank and the 
Asian Development Bank.  We do note however that starting in 2002 the World Bank 
has begun publishing limited information on its CPIA assessments on its external 
website.  For the years 2002-2004 the overall CPIA ratings are reported by quintile for 
the low-income countries eligible to borrow from the International Development 
Association (IDA), the soft-loan window of the World Bank.  For the data covering 2005, 
the individual country scores for the IDA allocation factor, a rating that reflects the CPIA 
as well as other considerations, has now become publicly available.  The African 
Development Bank's CPIA ratings are also publicly available by quintile only since 2004, 
and the Asian Development Bank has committed to publicly disclosing its ratings starting 
in 2005.
5   
 
  Finally, we have this year slightly altered our presentation of the aggregate 
indicators in order to make them more comparable over time.  In our aggregation 
procedure, we assume that the distribution of governance across countries follows a 
normal distribution in each period, with mean zero and standard deviation of one.  This is 
simply a convenient choice of units for governance, and would be entirely innocuous 
were it not for two considerations.  First, as we have discussed in our previous work, it is 
                                                 
5 For the African Development Bank see 
http://www.afdb.org/pls/portal/docs/PAGE/ADB_ADMIN_PG/DOCUMENTS/OPERATIONSINFOR
MATION/AFDB_2004_RATINGS_FINAL.PDF, and for the Asian Development Bank see 
http://www.adb.org/Documents/Reports/ADF/2005-adb-cpa.pdf.  9
possible that there are trends in world-wide averages of governance, either 
improvements or declines.  If this is the case, it would inappropriate to rescale the mean 
of governance to zero in each period as we do.  However, as we have documented in 
the past, and also later in this paper, we do not find much evidence from our underlying 
individual data sources that there are trends in global averages in governance.  As a 
result, we think the assumption of a constant global average of governance in our 
aggregate indicators is reasonable. 
 
  The second consideration is that the sample of countries covered by our 
governance indicators has expanded since 1996, and quite considerably for some of our 
indicators (see Table 2 and the accompanying discussion in the next subsection).  If the 
new countries added each year were broadly representative of the worldwide distribution 
of governance, this too would pose no special difficulties.  However, for some of our 
indicators, we find that countries added in later years score on average somewhat higher 
than countries that were continuously in the sample.  This in turn means that it would be 
inappropriate to impose a global average governance score of zero in earlier periods for 
the smaller set of countries for which data is available, since our earlier estimates did not 
include the better-than-average performers added later.  It also means that some 
countries in our aggregate indicators in the earlier years showed small declines in some 
dimensions of governance over time that were driven by the addition of better-
performing countries in later years. 
 
  We address this issue with a simple re-scaling of the aggregate governance 
indicators.  We take our 2005 indicators which, depending on the governance 
component, cover between 203 and 213 countries as representative of the world as a 
whole, as a benchmark.  Consistent with our choice of units for governance, the 
estimates for 2005 have zero mean and standard deviation of one across countries.  We 
next consider the countries that were added in 2005 relative to 2004.  We then adjust the 
world-wide average score in 2004 so that it would have a mean of zero had we included 
the 2005 scores for those countries added in 2005 relative to 2004.  As a specific 
example consider Political Stability and Absence of Violence, where between 2004 and 
2005 we have added 6 countries, mostly small islands in the Caribbean.  Their average 
score in 2005 is 1.07 which is considerably above the world average of zero.  We 
therefore slightly lower the scores of all of the 207 countries in 2004 by a factor of 0.03 in  10
order to improve the comparability of their scores with 2005.
6  We then continue 
backwards in time in the same way to adjust the 2003 data.  In particular, we look at the 
entrants to the sample in 2003 relative to 2005, and compute the average score for 
these countries, using either the 2004 estimates if they are available, or else the 2005 
estimates if the country shows up in the sample only in 2005.  We then again adjust the 
2003 estimates so that a hypothetical sample consisting of the 2003 adjusted scores as 
well as either the 2004 or 2005 scores of the entrants, whichever is closer to 2003, 
would have a mean of zero.  We continue in this way back to 1996.  
 
  Four points are worth noting about this new adjustment.   
 
•  Since we adjust the scores for all countries in a given year and indicator by the 
same amount, this adjustment has no effect on the relative positions of countries 
on that indicator in that year.  It does however make countries' scores more 
comparable over time, since the adjustment is designed to remove the effect of 
adding new countries on the scores of countries already in the sample.   
•  As a consequence of this adjustment, global averages of the adjusted data show 
moderate trends over time, mostly improvements.  The most extreme case is that 
of Political Stability and Absence of Violence where the average across all 
countries in the sample improves from -0.15 in 1996 to 0 in 2005.  It is important 
to remember though that this improvement does not reflect an average 
                                                 
6 The adjustment factor for the mean is simply  ( ) 1 T 1 T T T N / N N y − − − ⋅ −  where NT is the number of 
countries with data in period T and  T y  is the average score of the additional countries in period 
T.  The higher is the average score of the new entrants and/or the more new entrants there are, 
the more we lower the mean in the previous period.   This ensures that a hypothetical sample 
consisting of our year T-1 adjusted scores for all countries combined with the year T scores for 
the countries added in year T relative to T-1 would have a mean of zero and standard deviation of 
one. We also adjust the standard deviation of the year T scores to ensure that the standard 
deviation of this hypothetical sample would be one.  We do this by multiplying the scores (and the 









⎛ + − − , where VT is the variance across countries in our 
estimates of governance in year T for the new entrants to the sample in period T.  The greater is 
the dispersion in the scores of new entrants, the more we need to reduce the dispersion of scores 
in the previous years.  The adjustments to the standard deviation are in all cases quite small, 
ranging from 0.96 to 1.08 with a mean adjustment factor of 1 (i.e. no adjustment at all).  The 
adjustments to the means are somewhat higher, particularly in earlier periods where we had 
smaller samples, and range from -0.20 to 0.01.  The interested reader can retrieve all of these 
adjustment factors simply by calculating the mean and standard deviation of our governance 
indicators in each period.   11
improvement for all countries in the world.  Rather it reflects the changing 
composition of our sample since the new entrants during this period have had 
above-average performance in this dimension of governance.  In fact, there is no 
evidence of any significant improvement in the world average for the country 
sample that has been consistently covered over time, as we discuss in more 
detail below. 
•  This rescaling of the aggregate indicators is perfectly consistent with the 
unobserved components model that we use to construct the aggregate indicators 
in each period.  In particular, rescaling the mean and standard deviation of the 
aggregate indicators in the way that we do is equivalent to imposing slightly 
different means and standard deviations of governance as a choice of units in 
each of the periods.  And as we have argued this changing choice of units is an 
appropriate way to correct for changes in the composition of countries covered 
by the indicators over time. 
•  Finally, for some purposes it is useful to look just at countries' percentile ranks 
rather than their scores on our governance indicators.  Without similar 
adjustments these percentile ranks too would not be fully comparable over time 
as they too would be influenced by new entrants.  Thus, we also perform such 
adjustment to the percentile ranks, and when we report countries' scores in the 
form of percentile ranks on our website, we compute the percentile ranks based 
on a sample consisting of the actual data we have for that indicator and year, 
combined with imputed data from the nearest year as described above.  
 
2.2  Estimates of Governance 1996-2005 
 
  In Appendix C we report the aggregate governance indicators, for all countries, 
for each of the six indicators.  The aggregate indicators, as well as almost all of the 
underlying indicators, are available at www.govindicators.org.  The units in which 
governance is measured follow a normal distribution with a mean of zero and a standard 
deviation of one in each period. This implies that virtually all scores lie between -2.5 and 
2.5, with higher scores corresponding to better outcomes.
7   This also implies that our 
aggregate estimates convey no information about trends in global averages of 
                                                 
7 For a handful of cases, individual country ratings can exceed these boundaries when estimates 
of governance are particularly high or low.  12
governance, but they are of course informative about changes in individual countries’ 
relative positions over time.  Below we discuss the information conveyed by some of our 
individual indicators regarding trends over time in global averages of governance. 
 
  Table 2 summarizes some of the key features of our governance indicators. In 
the top panel we show the number of countries included in each of the six indicators and 
seven periods. In 2005 the Political Stability and Absence of Violence indicator covers 
the largest set of 213 countries, with the other sources covering between 203 and 210 
countries.
8  Over time, there has been a steady increase in the number of sources 
included in each of our indicators. This increase in the number of data sources is 
reflected in an increase in the median number of sources available per country, which, 
depending on the governance component, ranges from four to six in 1996, and from 
seven to eleven in 2005. Thanks to the increase in sources, the proportion of countries 
in our sample for which our governance estimates are based on only one source has 
also declined considerably, to an average of only 7 percent of the sample in 2005.   
 
  An important consequence of this expanding data availability is that the margins 
of error for the governance indicators have declined, as shown in the final panel of Table 
2.   Depending on the governance component, in 1996 the average (for all countries) of 
the standard error
9 ranged from 0.28 to 0.40.  In 2005 the standard error ranges from 
0.17 to 0.21 for five of our six indicators, while for Political Stability it is 0.28. These 
declines in margins of error illustrate the benefits in terms of precision of constructing 
composite indicators based on an expanding number of data sources incorporating as 
much information as possible.  Of course, since our aggregate indicators combine 
information from all of these sources, they have greater precision than any individual 
underlying data source.   Looking across all seven time periods, the median standard 
                                                 
8 A few of the entities covered by our indicators are not fully independent states (Puerto Rico, 
Hong Kong, West Bank/Gaza, Martinique, and French Guyana). A handful of very small 
independent principalities (Monaco, San Marino, and Andorra) are also included. For stylistic 
convenience all 215 entities are often referred in this paper as “countries”. 
9 As described in detail in Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2004), the output of our aggregation 
procedure is a distribution of possible values of governance for a country, conditional on the 
observed data for that country.  The mean of this conditional distribution is our estimate of 
governance, and we refer to the standard deviation of this conditional distribution as the “standard 
error” of the governance estimate.    13
error of the individual data sources for the governance indicators was substantially 
higher at 0.58, with a 25th percentile of 0.44 and a 75th percentile of 0.85.
10 
  
  Despite this increase in precision as a benefit of aggregation relative to individual 
data sources, and as emphasized in our previous papers, the margins of error for the 
aggregate governance indicators remain non-trivial.  We illustrate this point in Figure 1. 
In the two panels of Figure 1, we organize countries in ascending order according to 
their point estimates of governance in 2005 on the horizontal axis, and on the vertical 
axis we plot the estimate of governance and the associated 90% confidence intervals. 
These intervals indicate the range in which it is 90 percent likely that the true 
governance score falls.
11  We do this for two of the six governance indicators, political 
stability, and control of corruption.  The size of these confidence intervals varies across 
countries, as different countries appear in different numbers of sources with different 
levels of precision. The resulting confidence intervals are substantial relative to the units 
in which governance is measured.  From Figure 1 it should also be evident that many of 
the small differences in estimates of governance across countries are not likely to be 
statistically significant at reasonable confidence levels, since the associated 90 percent 
confidence intervals are likely to overlap. For many applications, instead of merely 
observing the point estimates, it is therefore more useful to focus on the range of 
possible governance values for each country (as summarized in the 90% confidence 
intervals shown in Figure 1), recognizing that these likely ranges often overlap for 
countries that are being compared with each other.
12  
 
  This is not to say however that the aggregate indicators cannot be used to make 
cross-country comparisons.  To the contrary, there are a great many pairwise country 
                                                 
10 In an earlier paper (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2004)) we showed how to obtain margins 
of errors for other objective measures of governance and found that they were as large, or larger 
than those of our individual subjective measures.  This underscores the fact that all efforts to 
measure governance involve margins of error, often non-trivial. 
11 A x% confidence interval for governance can be obtained as the point estimate of governance 
plus or minus the standard error times the (100-x)/2
th percentile of the standard normal 
distribution.  For example, the 90% confidence intervals we report throughout the paper are the 
point estimate plus or minus 1.64 times the standard error. 
12 Of course, asking whether 90% confidence intervals overlap or not corresponds to a hypothesis 
test at a significance level that is more stringent than 10%.  The assumptions underlying our 
statistical model imply that the standard error of the difference between two country scores is the 
square root of the sum of the squared standard errors of the two sources, which is always smaller 
than the sum of the two standard errors themselves.  It is more convenient -- and more 
conservative -- for users to simply inspect confidence intervals and see whether they overlap.  14
comparisons that do point to statistically significant, and likely also practically 
meaningful, differences across countries.  Our 2005 Control of Corruption indicator for 
example covers 204 countries, so that it is possible to make 20,706 pairwise 
comparisons of corruption across countries using this measure.  For 64 percent of these 
comparisons, 90% confidence intervals do not overlap, signaling quite highly statistically 
significant differences across countries.  And if we lower our confidence level to 75 
percent, which may be quite adequate for many applications, we find that 74 percent of 
all pairwise comparisons are statistically significant.  The benefit of improved precision of 
aggregate indicators with increased data availability over time can also be clearly seen 
from this calculation.   Consider our 1996 Control of Corruption indicator, which was 
based on a median of only four data sources per country, as opposed to a median of 
eight sources in 2005, implying substantially higher margins of error in 1996.  Of the 
11,476 possible pairwise comparisons in 1996, only 45 percent are significant at the 
90% confidence level, and only 58 percent at the 75 percent confidence interval.   
 
  We can also use this calculation to illustrate the benefits of making comparisons 
based on aggregate indicators that are more informative than individual indicators.  
Again for Control of Corruption in 2005, consider one of our individual data sources, DRI, 
which has an estimated standard error of 0.52, corresponding to the median of the 
standard errors of all of our sources for corruption in 2005.  Note that this is of course 
much higher than the standard error of the typical country in the aggregate indicator in 
2005, which is 0.19.  Had we based our estimates of governance on just this one data 
source, only 39 percent of cross-country comparisons would have been significant at the 
75 percent level, and only 20 percent at the 90 percent level.  Although rarely 
acknowledged explicitly, all other measures of governance are subject to margins of 
error as well, which in our past work we have shown to be at least as large as those we 
calculate for our individual and aggregate indicators.  This underscores the need for 
caution in making cross-country comparisons with any type of governance indicator. 
 
2.3  Changes over Time in Governance at the Country Level 
 
  We now turn to the changes over time in our estimates of governance in 
individual countries.  In Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2005) we provided a detailed 
analysis of how to perform statistical inference on changes over time in the aggregate  15
governance indicators.  Here we simply provide a brief description of changes over time 
based on the latest update of the indicators.   Figure 2 illustrates these changes for two 
selected governance indicators over the period 2002-2005, Political Stability and 
Absence of Violence/Terrorism, and Control of Corruption.  In both panels, we plot the 
2002 score on the horizontal axis, and the 2005 score on the vertical axis.  We also plot 
the 45-degree line, so that countries above this line correspond to improvements in 
governance, while countries below the line correspond to deteriorations in governance.   
The first feature of this graph is that most countries are clustered quite close to the 45-
degree line, indicating that changes in our estimates of governance in most countries are 
relatively small over the three-year period covered by the graph.  A similar pattern 
emerges for the other four dimensions of governance (not shown in Figure 2), and, not 
surprisingly the correlation between current and lagged estimates of governance is even 
higher when we consider shorter time periods than the three-year period shown here. 
 
  In Figure 2 we have labeled those countries for which the change in estimated 
governance over the 2002-2005 period is sufficiently large that the 90% confidence 
intervals for governance in the two periods do not overlap.
13   Examples of such more 
substantial changes in governance between 2002 and 2005 include significant declines 
in Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism in Thailand, Bolivia and 
Bangladesh, and improvements in Georgia.  For Control of Corruption countries such 
Turkey and Georgia see significant improvements.   Countries such as Kenya, Liberia, 
Ukraine, and Iraq all improve substantially on Voice and Accountability, while Singapore 
and Russia register declines.    
 
  In Table 3 we provide more detail on all of the large changes in our six 
governance indicators over the period 2002-2005.   The first three columns report the 
level of governance in the two periods, and the change.  The next three columns report 
on how the underlying data sources move for each case.  In the column labeled “Agree” 
we report the number of sources available in both periods which move in the same 
direction as the aggregate indicator. The columns labeled “No Change” and “Disagree” 
                                                 
13 While this is not a formal test of the statistical significance of changes over time in governance, 
it is a very simple and transparent rule of thumb for identifying large changes in governance.  In a 
Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2005, 2006) we have shown in more detail how to assess the 
statistical significance of changes in governance, and that this simple rule of thumb turns out to 
be a fairly good approximation.  16
report the number of sources on which that country’s score does not change or moves in 
the opposite direction to the aggregate indicator. For each country we also summarize 
the extent to which changes in the individual sources agree with the direction of change 
in the aggregate indicator by calculating the “Agreement Ratio”, or “Agree” / (“Agree” + 
“Disagree”). 
 
  The agreement ratio is quite high for countries with large changes in governance. 
Averaging across all countries and indicators, we find an average agreement ratio of 0.8 
for the period 2002-2005, as reported in Table 3.    This provides some confidence that 
for countries with large changes in our governance estimates, these changes are most 
often being driven primarily by changes in underlying sources rather than by the addition 
or deletion of sources.   In fact, for these large changes there are only two cases where 
the agreement ratio is 50 percent or less.  These cases are small Caribbean island 
economies that had only two data sources in 2002, and the addition of a new data 
source in 2005 resulted in a substantial change in these countries rankings.  As can be 
seen from Table 3, such cases where the addition of a data source for a country 
significantly affects a country's score are quite rare.
14   
 
  It is also worth noting that the agreement ratios for large changes in governance 
are substantially higher than the agreement ratios for all changes in governance.  This 
can be seen in Table 4 which computes the same agreement ratio, but for all countries 
over the period 2002-2005.  The agreement ratio averages 62 percent, compared with 
80 percent for large changes, suggesting that for the more typical smaller changes in our 
governance estimates, there is relatively more disagreement across individual sources 
about the direction of the change than there is for large changes.  These examples 
underscore the importance of carefully examining the factors underlying changes in the 
aggregate governance indicators in particular countries.  In order to facilitate this, on our 
website users can now retrieve the data from the individual indicators underlying our 
aggregate indicators and use this to examine trends in the underlying data as well as 
changes over time in the composition of data sources on which the estimates are based. 
 
                                                 
14 The only other cases for which this occurs are the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu, where the 
addition of these countries to our data source WMO resulted in a large changes in these 
countries scores (as can also be seen in Figure 2)  17
  While the number of countries experiencing highly significant changes in 
governance over the relatively short period between 2002 and 2005 is small, we do note 
that over longer periods, a much greater number of countries experience significant 
changes in governance.  Our aggregate indicators now span a 10 year period from 
1996-2005.  Over the course of this decade, we find that on average, about 8 percent of 
countries experience changes that are significant at the 90 percent confidence level on 
each of the six indicators.  Looking across all six indicators, 31 percent of countries 
experience a significant change at 90 percent confidence level in at least one of the six 
dimensions of governance over this period.  We also note that the 90 percent confidence 
level is quite high, and for some purposes a lower confidence level, say 75 percent, 
would be appropriate for identifying changes in governance that are likely to be 
practically important.  Not surprisingly this lower confidence level identifies substantially 
more cases of significant changes:  19 percent of countries experience a significant 
change on each indicator on average, and fully 60 percent of countries experience a 
significant change on at least one dimension of governance.   
  
  As we have noted above, in some cases the addition of sources over time does 
have a significant impact on the changes in our aggregate indicators.  In our previous 
paper (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2005)) we showed however that this was 
unusual.  The same is true for the latest set of changes that we calculate.  We can 
decompose the change over time in the aggregate indicator between 1996 and 2005 for 
a country into two components:  the change based on a common set of sources, and the 
remainder.  We then calculate the share of the variance of changes in the aggregate 
indicator that is accounted for by changes in the balanced indicator.  Averaging across 
our six indicators we find that 85 percent of the variation in changes in the aggregate 
indicators can be accounted for by changes in the common set of data sources, 
suggesting that the inclusion of exclusion of particular sources plays a relatively small 
role in explaining these changes. 
 
2.4  Trends in Global Governance 
  
  We next review the available evidence on trends in global averages of 
governance over the expanded time period that we now cover.  As we have already 
noted, our aggregate governance indicators are not informative about trends in global  18
averages because we assume that world averages of governance are zero in each 
period, as a choice of units.  While the aggregate indicators are of course informative 
about the relative performance of individual (or groups of) countries, in order to assess 
trends in global governance we need to return to our underlying individual data sources. 
 
  In Table 5 we summarize trends in world averages in a number of our individual 
data sources.   Most of the sources in this table are polls of experts, with data extending 
over the whole period 1996-2005.  Other than expert polls, only one of them, GCS, is a 
survey with sufficiently standard format to enable comparisons over this period of time.   
The first column reports the number of countries covered by the source in each of the 
periods shown, and the next five columns present the average across all countries of 
each of the sources in each of the indicated years. The underlying data have been 
rescaled to run from zero to one, and for each source and governance component, we 
report the score on the same question or average of questions that we use in the 
aggregate indicator. The next five columns report the standard deviation across 
countries for each source. The final columns reports t-statistics associated with a test of 
the null hypothesis that the world average score is the same in 1996 as in 2005, in 1998 
as in 2005, and in 2002 as in 2005.  
 
  The picture that emerges from Table 5 is sobering.  There is very little evidence 
of statistically significant improvements in governance worldwide.   Over the longest 
period 1996-2005 the 18 changes reported here are divided exactly in half into 9 
improvements and 9 declines in global averages, many of them quite small.  There are 
just six cases of statistically significant changes at the 10 percent level or better (t-
statistics greater than 1.64 in absolute value), and these are split between two 
improvements and four declines.  It is not clear how much importance ought to be 
ascribed to these trends in world averages based on individual indicators. On the one 
hand, these statistics represent the only information we have on trends over time, and so 
they should be taken seriously. On the other hand, it is also clear that there is substantial 
disagreement among sources about even the direction of changes in global averages of 
governance.   For now we cautiously conclude that we certainly do not have any 
evidence of any significant improvement in governance worldwide until end-2005, and if 
anything the evidence is suggestive of a possible deterioration - at the very least in 
dimensions such as regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption.   19
3.  Are Perception Errors Correlated among Expert Assessments of Governance? 
 
  In this section of the paper we consider two common critiques of the expert 
assessment individual data sources we use as inputs to our aggregate governance 
indicators.  One concern is that the experts producing these assessments share a 
common set of preconceptions or prejudices about cross-country patterns of 
governance.  If these prejudices are reflected in the assessments that they produce, this 
will introduces systematic errors into the data.  A closely related possibility is that experts 
base their assessments solely on the assessments of other experts, rather than on their 
own view of governance in a country.
15 
 
  Both of these concerns are potentially serious, because they imply that the errors 
made by individual sources in their estimates of governance will be correlated across 
sources.  Intuitively this means that our observed data from these various sources will be 
less informative about governance than if the errors were not correlated.  Moreover, 
these concerns have implications for how we weight different data sources when we 
construct our aggregate indicators.  Recall that our aggregate indicators are weighted 
averages of the underlying individual indicators.  The weights are proportional to our 
estimates of the precision of each indicator.  We in turn infer the precision of each 
source from its correlation with other sources.  In particular, if there are no correlations 
among the errors made by different sources, then sources that are more highly 
correlated with each other should be more precise.  We thus assign greater weights to 
sources that tend to be highly correlated with each other. 
 
  This neat logic would however break down if we allow for the possibility that the 
errors made by our different sources might be correlated with each other.  This is an 
issue that has concerned us since we began constructing governance indicators using 
this methodology.  In Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobatón (1999) we showed how the 
standard errors of our governance estimates would increase if we simply assumed that 
the errors from different sources were correlated.  We now examine in more detail the 
consequences of (a) shared prejudices, and (b) experts looking at each others' scores, 
                                                 
15 We do not discuss further here other potential biases in expert assessments.  In Kaufmann, 
Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2004) we devise a test for and reject the hypothesis of ideological biases in 
expert assessments.  In Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2006) we document the relative 
unimportance of biases arising from "halo effects".  20
for our governance estimates, using two specific examples.  These examples suggest to 
us that while these two possible sources of correlated errors are plausible a priori, 
quantitatively they do not appear to be too important in terms of their effect on our 
indicators. 
 
3.1  Shared Prejudices 
 
  We first consider the case of shared prejudices.  A simple way to capture this 
possibility is with this small variation on our basic empirical model: 
 
(1)  ( ) ( ) j k jk k k j k k jk p 1 g y ⋅ λ + ε ⋅ λ − ⋅ σ + ⋅ β + α =  
 
where yjk is the governance indicator provided by source k for country j, and gj is the 
unobserved true level of governance in country j.  The only difference from our basic 
model is that the error term now consists of a weighted average of an idiosyncratic part, 
εjk, and a component that is common across sources, pj.  We interpret the former as 
source-specific perceptions errors and assume that they are uncorrelated across 
sources.  We interpret the latter as capturing the unobserved common "prejudices" 
shared by sources.   For example, a common criticism is that expert assessments 
produced by commercial risk rating agencies focus exclusively on the business 
environment faced by foreign investors.  We normalize pj to have mean zero and 
standard deviation one.  To make the problem interesting, we need to assume that pj 
captures the part of respondents' prejudices that is uncorrelated with actual governance.  
Accordingly we assume that pj and gj are uncorrelated.  Thus for example one can think 
about pj as capturing the component of the business environment for foreign investors 
that is uncorrelated with true governance.
16   The new parameter λk captures the weight 
placed by source k on these prejudices in coming up with its governance score for a 
country.  Finally, we also normalize the variance of the idiosyncratic component of the 
error term, εjk, to have mean zero and variance one.  This means that as we change the 
parameter λk, the variance of the overall error term remains constant and equal to σk
2.  
                                                 
16 Another interpretation is the possibility of "halo" effects that we have discussed in previous 
work (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2005, 2006)), whereby respondents give good 
governance scores to rich countries simply because they are rich.  Under this interpretation pj 
would capture the part of halo effects that is uncorrelated with true governance.  21
Note also that when λk=0 we retrieve our original basic model in which we assume that 
perception errors are independent across sources and have variance equal to σk
2. 
 
  In order to incorporate the effects of shared prejudices on our estimates of 
governance, we first need to obtain estimates of the parameter λk for each source, i.e. 
an estimate of the importance of shared prejudices in source k's assessment of 
governance.  Unfortunately we cannot estimate this model in general, because the 
statistical model in Equation (1) is not identified.  Intuitively, the problem is that if we 
observe a high correlation between two data sources, we have no way of knowing if this 
is because they both place a high weight on common prejudices, i.e. they both have a 
high value of λk, or whether instead both sources have a low variance of the error term, 
i.e. σk
2 is low for the two sources. 
 
  In order to make progress we therefore need to impose some identifying 
assumptions.  As an illustration we do this for the case of K=3 data sources which allows 
us to obtain very intuitive closed-form solutions for all of the relevant parameters as 
functions of the observed correlations in the data.  We impose two key identifying 
assumptions.  The first is that the variance of the overall error term is the same for all 
three sources, i.e. σk
2=σ
2 for k=1,2,3.  This is mostly for convenience because it provides 
us with a natural benchmark:  if shared prejudices play no role, then we would weight the 
three sources equally in our estimates of governance since the signal-to-noise ratio 
would be the same in all three.  
 
  The second assumption is more important.  We assume that two of the three 
sources share some common prejudices but the third source does not.  In particular we 
assume that λ1=λ2=λ  and λ3=0.  This assumption is based on the following interpretation 
of our two main types of data sources:  expert assessments, and surveys of firms or 
individuals.  It seems plausible that expert assessments might be prone to some form of 
"group-think" in which their shared preconceptions of countries affect their estimates of 
governance.  At the same time, such "group-think" is less likely to be present in survey 
data where respondents are less likely to have access to the ratings provided by 
commercial risk rating agencies. 
  22
  With these identifying assumptions in hand we can now obtain an estimate of the 
importance of shared perceptions based on the observed correlations in the data.  
Define R as the average correlation between each of the two expert assessments and 
the survey, i.e. R=(R13+R23)/2 and define R* as the correlation between the two expert 
assessments, i.e. R*=R12, where Rjk is the observed correlation between source j and 
source k.  After some algebra (detailed in Appendix D) we can estimate the two key 











= λ  
 
The intuitions for these two expressions are very straightforward.  The higher is R* 
relative to R, i.e. the higher is the correlation among expert assessments relative to the 
typical correlation between an expert assessment and the survey, the higher is our 
estimate of λ.  This is because we would attribute the relatively high correlation among 
expert assessments as reflecting the influence of shared prejudices on their governance 
ratings.   The observed correlation between the expert assessments and the survey, R, 
provides us with information about the overall noise-to-signal ratio all three sources.  The 
higher are these correlations, the more informative are all three data sources, i.e. the 
smaller is σ. 
 
  How does the presence of shared prejudices unrelated to true governance affect 
how we should construct our aggregate governance indicators?  The simple example we 
have been discussing provides a useful illustration.  If the expert assessments were not 
influenced by shared prejudices, i.e. if λ=0, then our assumption that the variance of the 
overall error terms is the same, i.e. σk
2=σ
2 for k=1,2,3 implies that we would weight all 
three sources equally.  In the other extreme case where the error terms of the two expert 
assessments are perfectly correlated, i.e. if λ=1, then it is possible to show that the 
optimal estimate of governance would consist of a simple average of the survey and an 
average of the two expert assessments.  In other words, if shared prejudices are not 
important, then the survey and the two expert assessments should all receive weights of 
one-third in the estimate of aggregate governance.  If on the other hand shared 
prejudices dominate, then it is optimal to treat the two expert assessments as if they 
were just one source, and given our assumption of equal variances, to weight this one  23
source equally with the survey.  Crucially, however, we note that the possibility of 
correlated errors among expert assessments does not imply that we should discard 
these data sources altogether.  Rather, it means that we should continue to use them 
because even in the limiting case of perfectly correlated errors, collectively they still 
provide some information about unobserved governance. 
 
  This re-weighting of the survey is shown graphically in the top panel of Figure 3, 
which plots the weight of the survey in the aggregate indicator for alternative values of λ.  
When common prejudices play no role, the weight on the survey is equal to one-third.  
As we move to the opposite extreme where λ=1, i.e. where the error term is dominated 
by common prejudices, then the weight on the survey should be 0.5.
17   
 
  In Table 6 we provide a sense of how important shared prejudices are 
quantitatively in our dataset.  For our expert assessments we consider our five major 
data sources provided by commercial risk rating agencies (DRI, EIU, MIG, PRS, and 
WMO).  For our survey we take GCS, which is our only very large cross-country survey 
of firms.  In the top panel we report the two correlations of interest.  We first report R* 
which is the average pairwise correlation between these five expert assessments, for 
each of our six governance aggregates for the past four years.   We also report R, which 
is the average pairwise correlation of each of these five expert assessments with the 
survey.  In the bottom panel we report the estimates of λ implied by these correlations.  
The first thing to notice is that for four of our six indicators (PV, GE, RL and CC) R* and 
R are very similar to each other, and often R*<R implying that the expert assessments 
are on average actually more correlated with the survey than they are with each other.  
This pattern of R*<R is inconsistent with shared prejudices, and so for these we have no 
positive estimate of λ.  And in many cases R* is only slightly larger than R, implying very 
small values of λ.   
 
  For two of the six aggregates, VA and RQ, we find that the expert assessments 
tend to be much more highly correlated with each other than with the survey, implying 
more substantial estimates of λ.  We should however be a bit cautious in taking these 
                                                 
17 Clearly the importance of shared prejudices also matters for the precision of our estimates of 
governance.  In the extreme case where λ=1 the standard error would be the same as if we had 
only two instead of three sources.  24
results at face value.  Consider for example VA.  The GCS survey questions we use 
here focus on the extent to which firms are informed by government of regulations, 
which is a very narrow dimension of accountability, while the expert assessments 
capture much broader notions of democratic accountability.  This may explain the 
relatively low correlation of the expert assessments with the survey.  To see how 
important this is, we took one specific question from the GCS about firms' perceptions of 
press freedom, and compared it with two expert assessments of press freedom (RSF, 
and a specific press freedom rating from FRH).  As shown in the row labeled "Press 
Freedom", we find that the correlation between FRH and RSF is much closer to the 
average correlation of both of these with the survey, implying a much lower estimate of λ 
and suggesting a much smaller role for shared prejudices among the expert 
assessments.
18  Overall this example suggests that the role of shared prejudices in 
expert assessments in at most minor. 
 
  As noted above, in this example finding positive estimates of λ as we have in 
some cases in Table 6 suggests that it would be appropriate to slightly decrease the 
weight placed on the expert assessments in our aggregate indicators.  We do not make 
this adjustment to our benchmark governance indicators.  This is because our estimate 
of the role of shared prejudices that we report here is very much in the spirit of an 
illustrative example, rather than as a definitive analysis.  We have made several 
simplifying assumptions in order to generate these estimates as transparently as 
possible, and these may or may not be appropriate for our aggregate indicators that rely 
on our full dataset.   However, we do note that a modest reduction in the weight of expert 
assessments in our aggregate indicators suggested by this example is unlikely to have 
major systematic effects on our estimates of governance.  This is because, as we have 
mentioned earlier, the expert assessments on which we rely are in most cases quite 
strongly correlated with other data sources:  recall that the average value of the 
                                                 
18 One possible objection to this exercise is that the GCS surveys firms, and it could be that such 
respondents share a common set of business-oriented prejudices with commercial risk rating 
agencies.  To assess this we would need to have a large cross-country survey of individuals.  
Unfortunately we have only limited information to address this issue, with two of our regional 
surveys of individuals, Latinobarometro and Afrobarometer, covering only very small samples of 
countries.  One possibility is to look at the Gallup survey we use that covers a somewhat larger 
set of 62 countries.  In 2004 and 2005 we have survey questions on corruption from this source.  
These are typically quite highly correlated with expert assessments at about 0.7, while the expert 
assessments are correlated only slightly more about 0.8 in the same set of countries.  This again 
suggests at most a modest importance of shared prejudices.  25
correlation of an expert assessment with the survey in Table 6 is 0.74.  This means that 
even if we moderately shift the weights in our aggregate indicator away from the expert 
assessments, the resulting aggregate indicator will still be highly correlated with our 
benchmark assessments that do not allow for shared prejudices. 
 
  To investigate this point in more detail, we have recalculated our six governance 
indicators for all seven periods, weighting all of the components equally, rather than 
precision-weighting based on the benchmark assumption of uncorrelated errors.
19  This 
in practice substantially reduces the weights applied to expert assessments from 
commercial risk rating agencies.  The average (across the 42 indicators) correlation 
between the equally-weighted indicators and our benchmark indicators is 0.99.  In only 
three cases is the correlation less than 0.99, and the minimum correlation is 0.97.  This 
clearly shows that how we weight our underlying data sources does not practically affect 
our estimates of governance in the vast majority of cases. The main benefit however of 
weighting sources by their precision is that it yields somewhat smaller standard errors, 
allowing for more precise inference about cross-country differences and changes over 
time in governance.  On average, the standard error of our equally-weighted indicators is 
about 10 percent higher than in our benchmark indicators. 
 
3.2  Do Sources Update Based on Past Discrepancies? 
 
  We now turn to the possibility that our expert assessments at least in part base 
their estimates of governance on the assessments of other experts.  As noted earlier, we 
can interpret the previous example as one case of this.  Here we consider a different 
example in which expert assessments update their ratings based on past differences 
between them.  In particular, suppose that we have two expert assessments that 
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19 In particular, we estimate the parameters of the unobserved components model imposing the 
restriction that the variance of the error term is the same across sources.  This in turn implies an 
equal weighting of sources.  See Equations (1)-(3) in Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2004).  26
where y1jt and y2jt denote the estimate of governance provided by sources 1 and 2 at 
time t for country j, and gjt denotes the unobserved true level of governance in country j 
at time t.  The perception errors made by the two sources consist of two parts.  First, we 
assume that each source updates its estimates of governance in period t based on the 
difference between itself and the other source in the previous period.  For example, if 
source 2 rated country j much higher than source 1 in period t-1, then we assume that in 
period t source 1 revises its estimate of governance upward, and source 2 revises its 
estimate of governance downward.  The strength of this updating is captured by the 




  In order to assess how important this kind of updating is, we need estimates of 
the λ's.    One approach might be to estimate a cross-sectional regression of the 
assessments of each source on the lagged difference between the two sources.  This 
however is unlikely to lead to consistent estimates of the λ's, since the error term in such 
a regression, gjt+ε1jt is likely to be correlated with the past discrepancies between 
sources, y2jt-1-y1jt-1, for two reasons.  The first is that unobserved governance gjt might be 
correlated with the past discrepancies between sources, y2jt-1-y1jt-1.  Moreover, if the 
idiosyncratic component of the error terms is correlated over time, there will by 
construction be a correlation between ε1jt and y2jt-1-y1jt-1.   
 
  A more direct approach is to look at the difference between the two sources, 
which is:   
 
(4)  ( ) jt 2 jt 1 1 jt 2 1 jt 1 2 1 jt 2 jt 1 y y ) ( y y ε − ε + − ⋅ λ + λ − = − − −  
 
Note that the difference between the two sources will follow an autoregressive process 
with a negative coefficient on the lagged difference.  In particular, if source 1 rates 
country j higher than source 2 in the previous period, we would expect that in the current 
                                                 
20 Note here that we have suppressed differences across sources in the α's and β's which capture 
differences in scales of measurement across sources.  We do this purely for notational 
convenience.  In the empirical application we remove the scales from our variables by expressing 
them as percentile ranks.  27
period the difference between the two sources will be smaller, if this kind of updating is 
important.   
 
  Equation (4) suggests two empirical tests.  The first is that if this type of updating 
based on past discrepancies is important, we should expect to see discrepancies decline 
over time, and as a result, the correlations among sources should be increasing over 
time.
21  This first implication can readily be checked.  The top two panels of Table 7 
show the pairwise correlations between our three main commercial risk rating agencies 
available over the full time span of our governance indicators, for 1996 and 2005.  The 
third panel reports the change over this period in each of the pairwise correlations.  
These changes over time in correlations are not large, even over the decade-long period 
covered in the table.  The median change is only 0.03, and none of the observed 
changes would be significant at the 90 percent confidence level.  Moreover, overall the 
changes are quite evenly divided between seven declines and nine increases.  This 
evidence suggests to us that there is no evidence of a systematic increase over time in 
the correlation among expert assessments.  This in turn casts doubt on the hypothesis 
that these expert assessments update their estimates based on past discrepancies with 
each other.     
 
  Another implication of Equation (4) is that this type of updating would be a force 
towards creating a negative correlation over time in the pairwise differences in country 
assessments.  We explore the empirical validity of this implication next.  The simplest 
case to consider is when the idiosyncratic error terms in Equation (3) are independent 
over time.  In this case, the autocorrelation over time of the differences in scores 
between pairs of sources is simply -(λ1+λ2).  In this simple case we could just look at the 
autocorrelation of differences between sources and test whether it is negative.  This 
would then constitute evidence of updating based on past discrepancies.  The first three 
columns of Table 8 report the correlation over time in the pairwise difference in country 
rankings between 1996 and 2005, for our three main commercial risk rating agencies.  
The first thing to note is that these correlations are almost always positive, and average 
around 0.25.  This does not appear to be consistent with the updating hypothesis, which 
                                                 
21 This will be true as long as the idiosyncratic error terms are not too correlated over time -- as 
discussed further below.  28
would be a force for negative correlations over time in pairwise differences in country 
rankings. 
 
  There is however a complication introduced by the possibility that the 
idiosyncratic error terms, ε,  themselves might be correlated over time.  If these error 
terms are very persistent, then pairwise differences in country rankings would also be 
very persistent, and this would obscure any negative correlation over time arising from 
the updating based on past discrepancies.  In order to test for the importance of 
updating, we need to correct for this effect.  After some algebra, it is possible to show 










2 1 1 jt 2 1 jt 1 jt 2 jt 1 λ + λ ⋅ ρ −
λ + λ −
⋅ ρ + λ + λ − = − − − −  
 
where ρ is the unobserved correlation over time in the idiosyncratic component of each 
source's error term, i.e. ρ=CORR(ε1jt, ε1jt-1)= CORR(ε2jt, ε2jt-1).  This expression is quite 
intuitive.  As already noted, if ρ=0, the correlation over time of the differences is just        
-(λ1+λ2).  If on the other hand there is on average no updating based on past 
discrepancies, i.e. λ1+λ2=0, then the correlation of differences over time is just the 
autocorrelation of the idiosyncratic errors, ρ.  Finally, if the error terms are perfectly 
persistent, ρ=1, then the observed differences in scores would be perfectly correlated as 
well, regardless of any updating that might be present. 
 
  Given the observed correlations over time in differences between sources 
reported in Table 8, together with assumptions about the autocorrelation of the 
idiosyncratic errors, ρ, we can use Equation (5) to back out an estimate of λ1+λ2 which 
summarizes the importance of updating based on lagged discrepancies between 
sources.  We do this in the last two columns of Table 8.   The fourth column reports our 
assumptions on ρ, the correlation over time of the idiosyncratic error terms.  These are 
based on estimates we derived in Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2005), and average 
                                                 
22 To derive this expression first use recursive substitution to write y1jt-y2jt as a moving average of 




2).  Finally use this to calculate the autocorrelations of y1jt-y2jt.  29
0.42 across our six indicators, indicating a substantial degree of persistence.
23  The final 
column reports the estimates of λ1+λ2.  Overall these estimates are quite small, 
averaging only 0.17.  While we do not know how to attribute this total over the two 
sources being considered, absent better information it seems reasonable to divide it 
equally, implying a value of λ1=λ2=0.085.  This in turn implies that on average less than 
10 percent of the initial difference between two expert assessments would be eliminated 
through this process of updating based on past discrepancies.  Moreover, it is important 
to remember that Table 8 refers to correlations calculated over a decade between 1996 
and 2005.  Thus, our estimates suggest that this process of updating is so gradual that 
over the course of a decade it results in a reduction of only 10 percent of initial 
differences between sources.  Considering this together with the evidence in Table 7 
showing no significant trends in the pairwise correlations among expert assessments, 
we conclude that the evidence that expert assessments revise their country rankings 
based on past discrepancies with other assessments is very weak indeed.   
 
  We conclude the discussion of interdependence between expert assessments 
with a final example.  Knack (2006) has argued that one of the expert assessments on 
which we rely, PRS, has in the case of corruption made systematic changes in its 
methodology in order to ensure that it is more correlated with the Transparency 
International Corruption Perceptions Index.  Since the latter is an amalgam of many 
different assessments of corruption, including several other expert assessments, Knack 
(2006) argues that this is an example of one expert assessment basing its views on 
those of other expert assessments rather than on its own information.  In particular, 
Knack (2006) documents that the correlation of the ICRG corruption rating with the 
Transparency International measure increases from 0.72 to 0.91 following what he refers 
to as a "massive recalibration" that occurred in October of 2001. 
 
  We do not find this critique of the PRS measure compelling because it does not 
appear to be systematically true.  Several of the many different PRS ratings that we use 
have indeed had methodological breaks in the past, like the one for corruption that 
Knack (2006) focuses on.   If the objective of such breaks is to generate new ratings that 
                                                 
23 These estimates are only suggestive, as they not fully consistent with the statistical model 
considered here.  In particular, they are based on a model which does not allow for error terms to 
be correlated across sources.  It is not clear whether this restriction would bias our estimates of ρ 
up or down.  30
are more correlated those of with other experts, as suggested by Knack (2006), then we 
should systematically expect increases in correlations with other experts when 
comparing the period before and after the methodological break.  In contrast, we should 
see no change in the correlation of PRS with other expert assessments for series that 
did not have methodological breaks. 
 
  In Table 9 we examine the 10 governance indicators produced by PRS that we 
use as an input to our aggregate governance indicators.  For each of these series we 
look at the number of countries whose scores change from month to month on the 
monthly PRS data.  We identify series with methodological breaks by looking for sharp 
increases in the number of countries whose scores change in a particular month.  This 
method clearly turns up cases of methodological breaks.  In the case of corruption, for 
example, in a typical month only 1.4 percent of countries in the PRS sample change 
scores relative to the previous month, while in October of 2001 41 percent of the 
countries in the sample change scores.  As shown in Table 9, the main methodological 
breaks occur in 1997 and in 2001.  Importantly for us, not all series have breaks in both 
periods.  In 1997 for example we detect methodological breaks in the PRS series 
"Democratic Accountability" which we map to VA, and "Bureaucratic Quality" which we 
map to GE, while the remaining 8 PRS series do not have breaks in 1997.  Similarly in 
2001 there are five series with breaks and five series without breaks. 
 
  In the columns of Table 9 we report the correlations of the PRS series with our 
two other major expert assessments, DRI and EIU, in the years before and after the 
break.   For corruption, for example, we report the correlation of PRS rating with the 
corruption ratings provided by DRI and EIU, in 2000 and in 2002.  We do this for all 10 
PRS indicators, separating those with and without methodological breaks.  We then ask 
whether there is any evidence that the PRS indicators with methodological breaks are 
more likely to see their correlations with other expert assessments increase than those 
series without breaks.  The answer appears to be no.  Consider for example the 
comparison of correlations with PRS in 2000 and 2002.  For the five PRS series with 
methodological breaks, the median change in the correlation of each of these with DRI 
and EIU is just 0.01, and in only about half of the cases is the change in correlation 
positive.  The median change in the correlation with DRI and EIU for series without 
methodological breaks is almost exactly the same, at -0.01.  Similarly in 1997, we do not  31
see much in the way of systematic evidence that PRS series with methodological breaks 
are more likely to become more correlated with other expert assessments.  Based on 
this systematic look at the behavior of the PRS indicators around the time of 
methodological breaks, we do not find it plausible to argue as does Knack (2006) that 
PRS has exploited methodological breaks in the past to increase their correlation with 
the ratings of other expert assessments. 
 
 
4.  Conclusions 
 
  In this paper we have reported on the latest update of our aggregate governance 
indicators.  With this update we have (a) moved to an annual frequency for reporting, (b) 
for the first time made available virtually all of the individual indicators underlying the 
aggregate indicators, and (c) provided new evidence on the reliability of expert 
assessments of governance that form part of our aggregate indicators.  It is our hope 
that more timely annual reporting as well as access to individual indicators will make the 
aggregate indicators more useful to users in academic and policymaking circles.   
 
  We nevertheless emphasize to all users the limitations of these measures of 
governance, which are shared by virtually all efforts to measure governance across 
countries and over time.  The aggregate indicators we construct are useful for broad 
cross-country and over time comparisons of governance, but all such comparisons 
should take appropriate account of the margins of error associated with the governance 
estimates.  These margins of error are not unique to our perceptions-based measures 
but are present -- if not explicitly acknowledged -- in any effort to measure governance.  
They naturally reflect the inherent difficulty in measuring something as complicated and 
multifaceted as governance.  However, we have shown the feasibility of using the 
aggregate indicators to make comparisons of governance across countries and over 
time, subject to appropriate consideration of margins of error.  In fact, for 2005 we have 
seen that fully 60% of all cross-country comparisons result in highly-significant 
differences, and that nearly one-third of countries have experienced substantial changes 
in at least one dimension of governance between 1996 and 2005. 
  32
  We also caution users that the aggregate indicators can in some circumstances 
be a rather blunt tool for policy advice at the country level.  We expect that the provision 
of the underlying data will help users in identifying -- and acting upon -- more specific 
aspects of governance that may be problematic in a given country.  And we also 
encourage using these aggregate and individual indicators in conjunction with a wealth 
of possible more detailed and nuanced sources of country-level data on governance in 
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Table 1:  Sources of Governance Data 
 
Country Represe
Source Publication Code Type Public Coverage -ntative 1996 1998 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005
A f r i c a n  D e v e l o p m e n t  B a n k C o u n t r y  P o l i c y  &  I n s t i t u t i o n a l  A s s e s s m e n t sA D B P o l l N o 5 0 xxxxx
Afrobarometer Afrobarometer Survey AFR Survey Yes 18 x xxxx
A s i a n  D e v e l o p m e n t  B a n k C o u n t r y  P o l i c y  &  I n s t i t u t i o n a l  A s s e s s m e n t sA S D P o l l P a r t i a l 2 6 xxxxx
Bertelsmann Foundation Bertelsmann Transformation Index BTI Poll Yes 119 x x
B r o w n  U n i v e r s i t y ' s  C e n t e r  f o r  P u b l i c  P o l i c y G l o b a l  E - G o v e r n a n c e E G V P o l lY e s 1 9 2 x xxxx
B u s i n e s s  E n v i r o n m e n t  R i s k  I n t e l l i g e n c e B u s i n e s s  R i s k  S e r v i c e B R I P o l lY e s 5 0 xxxxxxx
B u s i n e s s  E n v i r o n m e n t  R i s k  I n t e l l i g e n c e Q u a l i t a t i v e  R i s k  M e a s u r e Q L M P o l lY e s 1 1 5 x xxxxxxx
Columbia University State Capacity Project CDU Poll Yes 108 x x x x x
E c o n o m i s t  I n t e l l i g e n c e  U n i t C o u n t r y  R i s k  S e r v i c e E I U P o l lY e s 1 2 0 x xxxxxxx
European Bank for Reconstruction & Development Transition Report EBR Poll Yes 27 x x x xxxx
Freedom House Countries at the Crossroads CCR Poll Yes 30 x x
F r e e d o m  H o u s e N a t i o n s  i n  T r a n s i t i o n F H T P o l lY e s 2 7 xxxxxxx
Freedom House Freedom in the World FRH Poll Yes 192 x x x x xxxx
G a l l u p  I n t e r n a t i o n a l V o i c e  o f  t h e  P e o p l e  S u r v e y G A L S u r v e y Y e s 6 9 xxxx
G l o b a l  I n s i g h t G l o b a l  R i s k  S e r v i c e D R I P o l lY e s 1 1 1 x xxxxxxx
Global Insight Business Conditions and Risk WMO Poll Yes 202 x xxxx
Heritage Foundation Economic Freedom Index HER Poll Yes 161 x x x x xxxx
IJET Travel Intelligence Country Security Risk Assessment IJT Poll Yes 167 x x x
Institute for Management and Development World Competitiveness Yearbook WCY Survey Yes 49 x x x xxxx
International Research & Exchanges Board Media Sustainability Index MSI Poll Yes 19 xxxx
L a t i n o b a r o m e t r o L a t i n o b a r o m e t r o  S u r v e y s L B O S u r v e y Y e s 1 8 xxxxxxx
M e r c h a n t  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  G r o u p G r e y  A r e a  D y n a m i c s M I G P o l lY e s 1 5 9 x xxxx
Political & Economic Risk Consultancy Corruption Survey PRC Survey Yes 10 x x xxxx
P o l i t i c a l  R i s k  S e r v i c e s I n t e r n a t i o n a l  C o u n t r y  R i s k  G u i d e P R S P o l lY e s 1 4 0 x xxxxxxx
R e p o r t e r s  W i t h o u t  B o r d e r s R e p o r t e r s  W i t h o u t  B o r d e r s R S F P o l lY e s 1 6 5 x xxxx
S t a t e  D e p a r t m e n t T r a f f i c k i n g  i n  P e o p l e  R e p o r t T P R P o l lY e s 1 4 9 x xxxxx
S t a t e  D e p a r t m e n t  /  A m n e s t y  I n t e r n a t i o n a l H u m a n  R i g h t s  D a t a s e t H U M P o l lY e s 1 9 2 x xxxxxxx
W o r l d  B a n k B u s i n e s s  E n t e r p r i s e  E n v i r o n m e n t  S u r v e y B P S S u r v e y Y e s 2 7 xxxxx
World Bank World Business Environment Survey WBS Survey Yes 80 x x x
W o r l d  B a n k C o u n t r y  P o l i c y  &  I n s t i t u t i o n a l  A s s e s s m e n t sP I A P o l l P a r t i a l1 3 6 xxxxxxx
World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Report GCS Survey Yes 117 x x x x xxxx   37
 













1996 193 179 181 183 168 152 176
1998 192 166 184 185 186 184 183
2000 192 166 187 188 188 187 185
2002 199 186 202 197 197 197 196
2003 201 186 202 197 197 197 197
2004 207 207 208 204 208 204 206
2005 208 213 210 203 208 204 208
Median Number of Sources Per Country
1996 4 4 4 4 6 4 4
1998 4 4 4 4 7 5 5
2000 5 6 6 5 9 7 6
2002 7 7 8 7 11 8 8
2003 7 7 8 7 11 8 8
2004 8 8 9 8 12 8 9
2005 8 7 9 8 11 8 9
Proportion of Countries with Only One Data Source
1996 15 18 22 15 7 18 16
1998 14 10 19 13 11 18 14
2000 14 6 7 7 5 7 8
2002 10 10 5 7 7 8 8
2003 10 9 5 7 7 7 7
2004 6 6 8 8 8 8 7
2005 6 7 9 8 8 7 7
Average Standard Error
1996 0.28 0.40 0.30 0.37 0.28 0.34 0.33
1998 0.26 0.32 0.36 0.41 0.27 0.29 0.32
2000 0.26 0.34 0.27 0.40 0.23 0.26 0.29
2002 0.22 0.27 0.23 0.23 0.19 0.21 0.23
2003 0.19 0.28 0.23 0.21 0.18 0.20 0.22
2004 0.18 0.26 0.23 0.22 0.19 0.21 0.21
2005 0.17 0.28 0.20 0.20 0.19 0.19 0.21 38
 
 


















UNITED ARAB EMIRATES -1.08 -0.49 -0.59 4 1 1 0.80 2 0
RUSSIA -0.85 -0.45 -0.40 8 0 3 0.73 2 1
SINGAPORE -0.29 0.50 -0.79 4 1 2 0.67 3 0
IRAQ -1.47 -2.15 0.69 6 0 0 1.00 1 0
KENYA -0.12 -0.69 0.57 5 1 1 0.83 3 1
LIBERIA -0.92 -1.57 0.65 5 0 0 1.00 1 1
UKRAINE -0.26 -0.68 0.43 6 2 1 0.86 2 1
SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO 0.12 -0.30 0.42 7 1 0 1.00 3 0
Political Stability
BANGLADESH -1.65 -0.73 -0.92 4 0 3 0.57 1 1
BOLIVIA -1.15 -0.21 -0.95 5 0 2 0.71 0 0
IRAQ -2.82 -1.80 -1.01 4 1 1 0.80 1 0
TOGO -1.22 0.03 -1.24 3 0 0 1.00 2 0
THAILAND -0.55 0.31 -0.86 7 0 2 0.78 1 1
ANGOLA -0.82 -1.66 0.84 6 0 0 1.00 1 1
GEORGIA -0.80 -1.83 1.03 2 1 1 0.67 2 1
Government Effectiveness
ZIMBABWE -1.42 -0.81 -0.61 6 0 3 0.67 2 0
* ST. KITTS AND NEVIS 1.00 -0.27 1.28 0 0 2 0.00 1 0
* ST. VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES 1.07 -0.20 1.27 1 0 1 0.50 1 0
SLOVAK REPUBLIC 0.95 0.46 0.49 9 1 0 1.00 2 0
Regulatory Quality
VENEZUELA -1.15 -0.57 -0.58 6 1 2 0.75 1 0
* VANUATU 0.05 -1.23 1.29 2 0 0 1.00 1 0
IRAQ -1.61 -2.30 0.69 4 0 1 0.80 0 0
Control of Corruption
GEORGIA -0.57 -1.07 0.50 5 0 2 0.71 2 1
TURKEY 0.08 -0.45 0.52 8 2 1 0.89 2 1
* SOLOMON ISLANDS 0.02 -1.35 1.37 2 0 0 1.00 1 0
* VANUATU 0.26 -0.81 1.07 1 1 0 1.00 1 0












Sample Agree No Change Disagree
Agree / (Agree + 
Disagree)
Voice and Accountability 199 2.28 1.32 1.35 0.63
Political Stability 186 2.17 0.73 1.25 0.63
Government Effectiveness 196 2.56 1.30 1.74 0.60
Regulatory Quality 196 2.54 0.97 1.54 0.62
Rule of Law 196 2.62 3.22 1.53 0.63
Control of Corruption 196 2.18 2.17 1.16 0.65
Average 195 2.4 1.6 1.4 0.63
SIGNIFICANT CHANGES (90%) 
Agree No Change Disagree
Agree / (Agree + 
Disagree)
Sample
Voice and Accountability 8 5.6 0.8 1.0 0.88
Political Stability 7 4.4 0.3 1.3 0.94
Government Effectiveness 4 4.0 0.3 1.5 0.94
Regulatory Quality 3 4.0 0.3 1.0 0.92
Rule of Law 0 .. .. .. ..
Control of Corruption 4 4.0 0.8 0.8 0.84
Average 4 4.4 0.5 1.1 0.91 40
 
 




[Quasi Balanced Sample]* ** ***
   World Average    Std. Dev. Across Countries








EIU 115 0.41 0.42 0.42 0.46 0.45 0.30 0.32 0.31 0.28 0.28 1.15 0.89 -0.19
FRH 190 0.552 0.565 0.569 0.582 0.59 0.31 0.31 0.30 0.30 0.30 1.33 0.90 0.38
GCS (Press Freedom / Parliament) ** 97 .. .. .. 0.57 0.55 .. .. .. 0.15 0.15 .. .. -0.81
PRS * 140 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.67 0.25 0.27 0.27 0.26 0.26 1.26 1.34 1.18
WMO 186 .. .. .. 0.55 0.57 .. .. .. 0.26 0.25 .. .. 0.53
Political Stability
EIU 115 0.54 0.51 0.56 0.54 0.56 0.29 0.30 0.30 0.28 0.27 0.53 1.33 0.43
GCS (cost of terrorism) ** 97 .. .. .. 0.66 0.67 .. .. .. 0.17 0.14 .. .. 0.44
PRS * 140 0.70 0.76 0.78 0.75 0.74 0.13 0.14 0.11 0.12 0.11 2.54 -1.79 -0.94
WMO 186 .. .. .. 0.67 0.67 .. .. .. 0.24 0.22 .. .. 0.10
Government  Effectiveness
EIU 115 0.39 0.45 0.44 0.38 0.37 0.30 0.24 0.24 0.29 0.31 -0.46 -2.33 -0.40
GCS (infrastructure quality) ** 97 0.49 0.52 0.54 0.53 0.50 0.22 0.21 0.25 0.24 0.23 0.55 -0.53 -0.80
PRS * 140 0.58 0.51 0.54 0.54 0.53 0.24 0.21 0.29 0.29 0.28 -1.47 0.80 -0.24
WMO 186 .. .. .. 0.56 0.57 .. .. .. 0.23 0.23 .. .. 0.36
Regulatory Quality
EIU 115 0.42 .. .. 0.51 0.54 0.25 .. .. 0.25 0.24 3.77 .. 1.08
GCS (burden of regulations) ** 97 0.44 0.48 0.42 0.30 0.34 0.15 0.15 0.12 0.13 0.11 -5.17 -7.59 2.60
H E R I T A G E  * * * 1 5 5 0 . 5 00 . 4 80 . 4 90 . 5 00 . 5 1 0.30 0.31 0.31 0.29 0.18 0.39 0.94 0.23
WMO 186 .. .. .. 0.58 0.59 .. .. .. 0.25 0.25 .. .. 0.35
Rule of Law
EIU 115 0.47 0.50 0.48 0.52 0.51 0.27 0.30 0.30 0.26 0.26 0.96 0.36 -0.38
GCS (cost of organized crime / quality of 
police / independent judiciary) ** 97 .. 0.65 0.62 0.56 0.55 .. 0.21 0.23 0.21 0.19 .. -3.45 -0.43
H E R I T A G E  * * * 1 5 5 0 . 5 00 . 4 80 . 4 60 . 4 40 . 4 4 0.30 0.31 0.31 0.29 0.28 -1.87 -1.12 -0.18
PRS * 140 0.72 0.62 0.65 0.62 0.64 0.23 0.26 0.23 0.24 0.21 -3.31 0.50 0.75
QLM 115 0.45 0.45 0.46 0.46 0.44 0.29 0.29 0.30 0.30 0.30 -0.07 -0.23 -0.34
WMO 186 .. .. .. 0.58 0.59 .. .. .. 0.23 0.23 .. .. 0.38
Control of Corruption
EIU 115 0.35 0.34 0.33 0.35 0.33 0.31 0.32 0.31 0.32 0.35 -0.29 -0.23 -0.33
GCS (bribe frequency)** 97 .. 0.66 0.69 0.64 0.63 .. 0.29 0.25 0.22 0.18 .. -0.86 -0.35
PRS * 140 0.59 0.51 0.47 0.41 0.41 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.19 0.20 -7.08 -3.85 0.33
QLM 115 0.39 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.38 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 -0.35 -0.54 -0.51
WMO 186 .. .. .. 0.52 0.53 .. .. .. 0.27 0.26 .. .. 0.32
*  PRS Country coverage in 1996: 130, all other periods 140.
** GCS Country coverage in 1996: 58; in 1998: 59; in 2000: 75; 2002:80; 2003-2005: 97.




Table 6:  Shared Prejudices in Expert Assessments 
 
Correlations Among Experts (R*) and Correlations with Survey (R)
2002 2003 2004 2005
Voice and Accountability R* 0.85 0.85 0.86 0.84
R 0.66 0.65 0.61 0.74
Political Stability R* 0.74 0.78 0.79 0.76
R 0.73 0.76 0.78 0.80
Government Effectiveness R* 0.74 0.78 0.79 0.76
R 0.73 0.76 0.78 0.80
Regulatory Quality R* 0.68 0.72 0.73 0.72
R 0.52 0.61 0.64 0.60
Rule of Law R* 0.75 0.78 0.80 0.78
R 0.79 0.78 0.80 0.81
Control of Corruption R* 0.77 0.80 0.82 0.80
R 0.79 0.83 0.83 0.82
Press Freedom R* 0.79 0.83 0.82 0.83
R 0.80 0.79 0.79 0.77
Implied Estimates of λ
2002 2003 2004 2005
Voice and Accountability 0.57 0.56 0.64 0.40
Political Stability 0.03 0.09 0.05 ..
Government Effectiveness 0.03 0.09 0.05 ..
Regulatory Quality 0.32 0.28 0.26 0.30
Rule of Law .. .. .. ..
Control of Corruption .. .. .. ..
Press Freedom .. 0.17 0.16 0.28  
 









Voice and Accountability .. .. 0.82
Political Stability 0.71 0.59 0.66
Government Effectiveness 0.81 0.67 0.79
Regulatory Quality 0.70 0.56 0.55
Rule of Law 0.82 0.72 0.72
Control of Corruption 0.83 0.65 0.75
2005
dri-eiu dri-prs eiu-prs
Voice and Accountability .. .. 0.80
Political Stability 0.81 0.62 0.54
Government Effectiveness 0.74 0.62 0.84
Regulatory Quality 0.64 0.79 0.78
Rule of Law 0.84 0.70 0.77
Control of Corruption 0.81 0.70 0.84
Change
dri-eiu dri-prs eiu-prs
Voice and Accountability .. .. -0.02
Political Stability 0.10 0.03 -0.12
Government Effectiveness -0.07 -0.06 0.05
Regulatory Quality -0.06 0.23 0.23
Rule of Law 0.02 -0.02 0.05
Control of Corruption -0.03 0.06 0.09
Summary of Changes
dri-eiu dri-prs eiu-prs overall
Median Change -0.03 0.03 0.05 0.03
C h a n g e s < 0 3227
C h a n g e s > 0 2349
Note:  Sample size = 103 for VA and 87 for remaining indicators.





Table 8:  Serial Correlation of Pair-wise Differences in Country Rankings 
 
Difference in Ranks
(Correlation of 1996 with 2005)
dri-eiu dri-prs eiu-prs average R Average ρ Implied (λ1+λ2)
Voice and Accountability 0.32 0.32 0.51 0.21
Political Stability 0.15 0.42 0.52 0.36 0.40 0.04
Government Effectiveness 0.21 0.23 0.09 0.18 0.35 0.18
Regulatory Quality 0.28 0.10 -0.06 0.11 0.33 0.23
Rule of Law 0.35 0.58 0.31 0.41 0.54 0.16
Control of Corruption 0.19 0.34 0.10 0.21 0.38 0.18





Table 9:  Methodological Breaks in PRS Indicators 
 
1996 1996 1998 1998 Change Change
DRI EIU DRI EIU DRI EIU
Series With Breaks in 1997
Democratic Accountability (VA) .. 0.83 .. 0.75 .. -0.08
Bureaucratic Quality (GE) 0.67 0.79 0.68 0.62 0.01 -0.18
    Median Change -0.08
    Fraction Increase 0.33
Series Without Breaks in 1997
Military in Politics (VA) 0.72 0.73 .. 0.02
Internal Conflict (PV) 0.62 0.60 0.74 0.77 0.12 0.17
External Conflict (PV) 0.33 0.43 0.51 0.51 0.19 0.08
Ethnic Tensions (PV) 0.50 0.56 0.61 0.66 0.11 0.10
Government Stability (PV) 0.04 0.14 0.02 0.10 -0.02 -0.04
Investment Profile (RQ) 0.56 .. 0.54 .. -0.02 ..
Law and Order (RL) 0.72 0.71 0.74 0.77 0.03 0.05
Corruption (CC) 0.64 0.75 0.69 0.68 0.04 -0.07
    Median Change 0.05
    Fraction Increase 0.71
2000 2000 2002 2002 Change Change
DRI EIU DRI EIU DRI EIU
Series With Breaks in 2001
Internal Conflict (PV) 0.68 0.78 0.76 0.75 0.08 -0.03
External Conflict (PV) 0.50 0.51 0.44 0.48 -0.06 -0.03
Government Stability (PV) 0.09 0.19 0.19 0.20 0.10 0.01
Investment Profile (RQ) 0.55 0.68 0.13
Corruption (CC) 0.75 0.75 0.74 0.84 -0.02 0.09
    Median Change 0.01
    Fraction Increase 0.56
Series Without Breaks in 2001
Military in Politics (VA) 0.71 0.70 -0.01
Democratic Accountability (VA) 0.75 0.79 0.05
Ethnic Tensions (PV) 0.46 0.52 0.37 0.44 -0.09 -0.08
Bureaucratic Quality (GE) 0.75 0.82 0.73 0.86 -0.02 0.04
Law and Order (RL) 0.74 0.70 0.71 0.70 -0.03 0.00
    Median Change -0.01
    Fraction Increase 0.38
Note:  Break in series identified by fraction of countries that change from month to month in PRS
Series identified as having breaks have 40 percent or more of countries change in a single month
Series identified as having no breaks have less than 18 percent of countries change in a single month.
Correlations based on common sample of 97 countries
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TABLE A1.  African Development Bank (ADB) 
 
A1: African Development Bank (ADB)
http://www.afdb.org/
The African Development Bank (ADB) is a major development bank in Africa. Established in 1963 in order to
promote economic and social development, the Bank has grown into a $33 billion, multinational development
bank, with 52 African countries and 24 other shareholders.  
The African Development Bank develops its own "Country Policy and Institutional Assessments" for its own client
sample. Similarly to the World Bank's CPIA, the ADB Indicators annually assess the quality of African
Development Bank borrowers’ policy and institutional performance in areas relevant to economic growth and
poverty reduction.   Data is publicly disclosed only on a limited basis.
In the table below we list the variables included in each of the governance indicators.  We use data from 2000, 
and from 2002-2005.
 
2005 2004 2003 2002 2000 1998 1996
Voice and Accountability
NA .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Political Stability
NA .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Government Effectiveness
Policies to improve efficiency of public sector X X X X X .. ..
Budget Management X X X X X .. ..
Efficiency of Public Expenditures X X X X X .. ..
Management of public debt X X X X X .. ..
Regulatory Quality
Trade policy X X X X X .. ..
Competitive environment X X X X X .. ..
Labor Market Policies X X X X X .. ..
Rule of Law
Property rights X X X X X .. ..
Control of Corruption
Anti-corruption policies .. X X X X .. ..
Transparency / corruption X X X X X .. ..




















































The Afrobarometer is a joint enterprise of Michigan State University (MSU), the Institute for Democracy in South
Africa (IDASA) and the Centre for Democracy and Development (CDD, Ghana). The Afrobarometer Series,
launched in October 1999, reports the results of national sample surveys on the attitudes of citizens in selected
African countries towards democracy, markets and other aspects of development. The objective of the
Afrobarometer is to collect, analyze and disseminate cross-national, time-series attitudinal data for up to a dozen
new democracies on the African continent.
In the table below we list the variables included in each of the governance indicators.  We use data from the 
2000, 2002 and 2005 Surveys. 2003 and 2004 data were drawn from 2002 survey.  
 
2005 2004 2003 2002 2000 1998 1996
Voice and Accountability
How much do you trust the parliament? .. X X X .. .. ..
Overall, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in your 
country? .. X X X X .. ..
Free elections X. .. .. .. .. .. .
Political Stability
NA .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Government Effectiveness
What proportion of the country's problems do you think the government 
can solve? .. X X X .. .. ..
Based on your experiences, how easy or difficult is it to obtain 
household services (like piped water, electricity or telephone)? XXXX. .. .. .
Based on your experiences, how easy or difficult is it to obtain an 
identity document (such as birth certificate, driver's license or passport)?
XXXX. .. .. .
Government handling of health services X. .. .. .. .. .. .
Government handling of education system X. .. .. .. .. .. .
Regulatory Quality
NA .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Rule of Law
Over the past year, how often have you or anyone in your family feared 
crime in your own home? .. X X X .. .. ..
Over the past year, how often have you or anyone in your family had 
something stolen from your house? .. X X X .. .. ..
Over the past year, how often have you or anyone in your family been 
physically attacked? .. X X X .. .. ..
How much do you trust the courts of law? .. X X X .. .. ..
How much do you trust the police? .. X X X X .. ..
Based on your experiences, how easy or difficult is it to obtain help from 
the police when you need it? XXXX. .. .. .
Control of Corruption
How well would you say the current government is handling the fight of 
corruption in the government? .. X X X .. .. ..
How many elected leaders (parliamentarians) do you think are involved 
in corruption? XXXX. .. .. .
How many judges and magistrates do you think are involved in  X X X X .. .. ..
How many government officials do you think are involved in corruption? X X X X X .. ..
How many border/tax officials do you think are involved in corruption? XXXX. .. .. .















































TABLE A3.  Asian Development Bank (ASD) 
 
A3: Asian Development Bank (ASD)
http://www.adb.org/
The Asian Development Bank is a multilateral development finance institution dedicated to reducing poverty in
Asia and the Pacific. Established in 1966, the ADB - headquartered in Manila and with 26 offices worldwide - is
currently owned by 63 member countries, mostly from the region.
The Asian Development Bank develops its own "Country Policy and Institutional Assessments" for its own Client
sample. Similarly to the World Bank's CPIA, the ASD Indicators annually assess the quality of Asian
Development Bank borrowers’ policy and institutional performance in areas relevant to economic growth and
poverty reduction.  Data is publicly disclosed only on a limited basis.
In the table below we list the variables included in each of the governance indicators.  We use data from 2000, 
and from 2002-2005.  
 
2005 2004 2003 2002 2000 1998 1996
Voice and Accountability
NA .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Political Stability
NA .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Government Effectiveness
Competence of civil service XXXXX. .. .
Budget Management XXXXX. .. .
Efficiency of Public Expenditures XXXXX. .. .
Management of public debt XXXXX. .. .
Regulatory Quality
Trade policy XXXXX. .. .
Competitive environment XXXXX. .. .
Factor and products markets .. X X X X .. ..
Rule of Law
Property rights XXXXX. .. .
Control of Corruption
Anticorruption and Accounting Institutions XXXXX. .. .
















































TABLE A4:  Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI) 
A4: Bertelsmann Tranformation Index (BTI)
http://www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de/atlas.0.html?&L=1
Founded  by Reinhard Mohn in 1977 and headquartered in Berlin, the Bertelsmann Foundation is a non-profit 
organization dedicated to identifying social problems and challenges early on in order to develop and implement 
model solutions. 
Starting in 2004, the Foundation began publishing the Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI), a global 
ranking that analyzes and evaluates development and transformation processes in 116 countries. The 
Bertelsmann Transformation Index provides the international public and political actors with a comprehensive 
view of the status of democracy and a market economy as well as the quality of political management in each of 
these countries.
The goal of a consolidated market-based democracy constitutes the BTI’s normative framework. The 
BTI analyzes the status of both democratization and market liberalization as it evaluates actors’ performance in 
managing these changes. The quantitative data collected for the Bertelsmann Transformation Index 2003 is 
outlined in two parallel indices: the Status Index and the Management Index. The Status Index (SI)  shows the 
development achieved by 116 states on their way toward democracy and a market economy. States with 
functioning democratic and market-based structures receive the highest scores. The Management Index (MI) 
reveals the extent to which governments and political actors have been consistent and determined in their pursuit 
of a market-based democracy. Those states showing progress in the last five years and in which transformation 
has resulted from astute management receive the highest scores. 
In the table below we list the variables included in each of the governance indicators. We use data from 2004,
drawing 5 variables from the Management Index and 6 variables from the Status Index.
 
2005 2004 2003 2002 2000 1998 1996
Voice and Accountability
Political Participation (SI) X X .. .. .. .. ..
Institutional Stability (SI) X X .. .. .. .. ..
Political and Social Integration (SI) X X .. .. .. .. ..
 
Political Stability
NA .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Government Effectiveness
Consensus Building (MI) X X .. .. .. .. ..
Governance Capability (MI) X X .. .. .. .. ..
Effective Use of Resources (MI) X X .. .. .. .. ..
Regulatory Quality
Price Stability (SI) X X .. .. .. .. ..
Competition (SI) X X .. .. .. .. ..
 
Rule of Law
Rule of Law (SI) X X .. .. .. .. ..
Private Property (SI) X X .. .. .. .. ..
Control of Corruption
NA .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
















































TABLE A5.  Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS)  
 
A5: Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS)
http://www.worldbank.org/eca/governance
The Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) was developed jointly by the World Bank and the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.  In its first round conducted in 1999-2000, it surveyed over 4,000 firms 
in 22 transition countries  that examined a wide range of interactions between firms and the state. In its second round 
conducted in 2002, the survey covered over  2,100 firms in 27 countries. In its second round conducted in 2005, the survey 
covered almost 10,000 firms in 27 countries.
In the table below we list the variables included in each of the governance indicators.  We use data from 2005/6, 2002/3 and 
1999/2000 surveys. 2003 and 2004 data were drawn from the 2002 survey.
 
2 0 0 52 0 0 42 0 0 32 0 0 22 0 0 01 9 9 81 9 9 6
Voice and Accountability
NA .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Political Stability and Lack of Violence
NA .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Government Effectiveness
How problematic are telecommunications for the growth of your business  X X X X .. .. ..
How problematic is electricity for the growth of your business. X X X X .. .. ..
How problematic is transportation for the growth of your business. X X X X .. .. ..
 
Regulatory Quality
Information on the laws and regulations is easy to obtain X X X X .. .. ..
Interpretations of the laws and regulations are consistent and predictable .. X X X .. .. ..
Unpredictability of changes of regulations X X X X .. .. ..
How problematic are labor regulations for the growth of your business. X X X X .. .. ..
How problematic are tax regulations for the growth of your business. X X X X .. .. ..
How problematic are custom and trade regulations for the growth of your business. X X X X .. .. ..
Rule of Law
How often is following characteristic associated with the court system: Fair X X X X .. .. ..
How often is following characteristic associated with the court system: affordable X X X X .. .. ..
How often is following characteristic associated with the court system: enforceable X X X X .. .. ..
How often is following characteristic associated with the court system: Honesty X X X X .. .. ..
How often is following characteristic associated with the court system: Quickness X X X X .. .. ..
Are property rights adequately protected X X X X .. .. ..
How problematic is organized crime for the growth of your business. X X X X .. .. ..
How problematic is judiciary for the growth of your business. X X X X .. .. ..
How problematic is street crime for the growth of your business. X X X X .. .. ..
Control of Corruption
How common is for firms to have to pay irregular additional payments to get things done X X X X .. .. ..
Percentage of total annual sales do firms pay in unofficial payments to public officials X X X X .. .. ..
How often do firms make extra payments to influence the content of new legislation X X X X .. .. ..
Extent to which firms' payments to public officials impose costs on other firms XXXXX. . . .
How problematic is corruption for the growth of your business. X X X X .. .. ..















































TABLE A6:  Business Environment Risk Intelligence (BRI, QLM) 
 
A6: Business Environment Risk Intelligence (BRI)
http://www.beri.com
BERI S.A. is a private source of analysis and forecasts of the business environment in developed and developing
countries. The firm was founded in 1966 and is headquartered in Geneva, Switzerland.  
BERI has two services that include variables of interest for the purpose of this paper: The Business Risk Service,
and the FORELEND or Lender Risk Rating. Both services are supervised by Dr. F.T. Haner, founder and senior
editor. A number of analysts review various data sources and produce initial draft reports, relying on an
international network of sources for intelligence in the field. BERI convenes two permanent panels of about 105
experts from all over the world. These panels provide country ratings and qualitative observations on the basis of
these initial reports. One panel assesses political conditions, and the other offers perspectives on the business
operating environment. These ratings are constructed using the Delphi method, in which panelists are also
supplied with the ratings they produced in previous assessments as well as the panel average score for each
measure.
BERI monitors 50 countries three times per year, assessing 57 criteria separated into three indices. The Political
Risk Index (PRI) focuses on sociopolitical conditions in a country. Diplomats and political scientists rate the
present condition of eight causes and two symptoms of political risk, using a scale from 7 (no problem) to 0
(prohibitive problem). The Operation Risk Index (ORI) identifies major bottlenecks for business development,
rating 15 criteria on a scale of 0 (unacceptable conditions) to 4 (superior conditions). The R factor assesses a
country’s willingness to allow foreign companies to convert and repatriate profits and to import components,
equipment and raw materials. It is composed of 4 sub-indices, one of which assesses the quality of legal
framework in terms of statutory laws and actual practice.  
BERI also produced a different set of indicators, the Quantitative Risk Measure in Foreign Lending (QLM),
measurings the qualitative risk factors in credit exposure in 115 countries using a scale from 0 (high risk) to 100
(low risk). In the table below we list the variables included in each of the governance indicators. We use BERI's




















































2005 2004 2003 2002 2000 1998 1996
Voice and Accountability
NA .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
 
Political Stability
Political Risk Index: External Causes of Political Risk: Dependence 
on/Importance to a Hostile Major Power XXXXXXX
Political Risk Index: External Causes of Political Risk: Negative Influences of 
Regional Political Forces XXXXXXX
Political Risk Index: Internal Causes of Political Risk: Social Conditions: Wealth 
Distribution, Population XXXXXXX
Political Risk Index: Internal Causes of Political Risk: Fractionalization of political 
spectrum and the power of these factions. XXXXXXX
Political Risk Index: Internal Causes of Political Risk: Fractionalization by 
language, ethnic and/or religious groups and the power of these factions. XXXXXXX
Political Risk Index: Internal Causes of Political Risk: Restrictive (coercive) 
measures required to retain power. XXXXXXX
Political Risk Index: Internal Causes of Political Risk: Organization and strength 
of forces for a radical government. XXXXXXX
Political Risk Index: Symptoms of Political Risk: Societal conflict involving 
demonstrations, strikes, and street violence.
XXXXXXX
Political Risk Index: Symptoms of Political Risk: Instability as perceived by non-
constitutional changes, assassinations, and guerilla wars.
XXXXXXX
Government Effectiveness
Operation Risk Index: Bureaucratic delays XXXXXXX
Regulatory Quality
NA .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
 
Rule of Law
Operation Risk Index: Enforceability of contracts XXXXXXX
Direct Financial Fraud, Money Laundering and Organized Crime (QLM) * XXXXXXX
Control of Corruption
Political Risk Index: Internal Causes of Political Risk: Mentality, including 
xenophobia, nationalism, corruption, nepotism, willingness to compromise.
XXXXXXX
Indirect Diversion of Funds (QLM) * XXXXXXX
* country coverage:  115 countries

















































TABLE A7:  Columbia University (CUD) 
 
A7: State Capacity Survey (CUD)
http://www.columbia.edu
The State Capcity Survey was developed in 1999 under the direction of Marc Levy of the CIESIN at Columbia
University, resulting in a set of 31 multiple-choice questions and three open-ended questions. The survey asks
questions in five broad categories: political context, state legitimacy, human resources and organizations,
institutions, and overall capacity. Data were obtained on 108 and 97 countries from assessments completed by
164 experts during 2000 and 2002, respectively.
In the table below we list the questions included in each of the governance indicators. We use data from the 2000 
and 2002 surveys. 2003 and 2004 data were drawn from the 2002 survey.  
2005 2004 2003 2002 2000 1998 1996
Voice and Accountability
For the most part, is the state seen as legitimately representing its citizens? . .XXXX. .. .
To what extent does the state and/or its allied groups engage in repression of its citizens? . .XXXX. .. .
In carrying out internal security tasks, to what extent does the state rely on tactics commonly 
considered illegitimate in the international community? . .XXXX. .. .
Political Stability
Assess the degree to which the decline or collapse of central political authority posed a threat to 
political stability in this country. . .XXXX. .. .
Assess the degree to which political protest posed a threat to political stability in this country. . .XXXX. .. .
Assess the degree to which ethno-cultural and/or religious conflict posed a threat to political 
stability in this country.
. .XXXX. .. .
Assess the degree to which external military intervention posed a threat to political stability in this 
country. . .XXXX. .. .
Government Effectiveness
Rate the administrative and technical skills of the country’s civil service (occupying middle and 
higher management roles). . .XXXX. .. .
Rate the efficiency of the country’s national bureaucracies overall. . .XXXX. .. .
Rate the efficiency of the country’s local-level government bureaucracies overall. . .XXXX. .. .
Rate the effectiveness of coordination between the central government and local-level government 
organizations. . .XXXX. .. .
Rate the state’s ability to formulate and implement national policy initiatives.
Rate the state’s effectiveness at collecting taxes or other forms of government revenue. . .XXXX. .. .
Does the central government produce a national budget in a timely manner? . .XXXX. .. .
Do local governments produce budgets in a timely manner? . .XXXX. .. .
Rate the state’s ability to monitor socioeconomic trends, activities, and conditions within its borders . .XXXX. .. .
Rate the state’s ability to create, deliver, and maintain vital national infrastructure. . .XXXX. .. .
Rate the state’s ability to respond effectively to domestic economic problems. . .XXXX. .. .
Rate the state’s ability to respond effectively to natural disasters. . .XXXX. .. .
Regulatory Quality
NA .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Rule of Law
Rate the state’s adherence to the rule of law, considering the country as a whole. . .XXXX. .. .
Control of Corruption
Rate the severity of corruption within the state . .XXXX. .. .
To what extent do the country's primary political decision makers engage in patterns of nepotism, 
cronyism and patronage? . .XXXX. .. .
To what extent do the country's civil service (occupying middle and higher management roles) 
engage in patterns of nepotism, cronyism and patronage? . .XXXX. .. .
To what extent do patterns of nepotism, cronyism and patronage undermine the state's ability to 
exercise the basic functions of government effectively? . .XXXX. .. .
To what extent do patterns of nepotism, cronyism and patronage distort broad patterns of economic 
development? . .XXXX. .. .















































TABLE A8:  Country Policy and Institutional Assessments (CPIA) 
 
A8: Country Policy & Institutional Assessment (CPIA)
http://www.worldbank.org
The Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) annually assesses the quality of World Bank borrowers’
policy and institutional performance in areas relevant to economic growth and poverty reduction. Country
assessments began in the World Bank in the late 1970s to help guide the allocation of lending resources. The
methodology has evolved over time, reflecting lessons learned and mirroring the evolution of the development
paradigm. While in earlier years assessments focused mainly on macroeconomic policies, they now include other
factors relevant to poverty reduction, such as social inclusion, equity and governance.  
The CPIA consists of equally weighted criteria representing the policy dimensions of an effective poverty
reduction and growth strategy. The criteria are grouped in four clusters. Cluster A, Economic Management,
covers economic policies. Cluster B, Structural Policies, covers a broad range of structural policies: trade policies,
financial depth, market competition, and environmental sustainability. Cluster C, Policies for Social Inclusion and
Equity, focuses on social equity and broad-based growth, and aims to capture the extent to which a country's
policies and institutions ensure that the benefits of growth are widespread, contribute to the accumulation of social 
capital, and direct public programs to poor people and reduce their vulnerability to various kinds of shocks.
Cluster D, Public Sector Management and Institutions, aims to capture key aspects of good governance, a vital 
For each of the criteria, countries are assessed on a scale of 1 (low) to 6 (high). The ratings are prepared by the
World Bank's country economists and focus on the quality of the country's current policies and institutions, which
are the main determinants of the present prospects for aid effectiveness. The rating assigned for each criterion
reflects a variety of indicators, observations, and judgments: ratings are based on country knowledge obtained
from country dialogue and the Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) process, the available body of economic and
sector work (ESW), project preparation and supervision, and project and CAS monitoring and evaluation. 
In the table below we list the variables included in each of the governance indicators. We use data for 1996, 1998, 
2000, and 2002-2005.  
 
2005 2004 2003 2002 2000 1998 1996
Voice and Accountability
NA .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Political Stability and Lack of Violence
NA .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Government Effectiveness
Management of external debt X X X X X X X
Management of development programs .. .. X X X X ..
Quality public Administration / Public expenditure management X X X X X X X
Budget Management XXXXXXX
Efficiency of Public Expenditures XXXXXXX
Regulatory Quality
Competitive environment X X X X X X X
Factor and products markets .. .. X X X X X
Trade policy X X X X X X X
 
Rule of Law
Property rights X X X X X X ..
Control of Corruption
Transparency, accountability and corruption in public sector X X X X X X ..
















































TABLE A9: Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) 
 
A9: The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU)
http://www.eiu.com
The Economist Intelligence Unit is a for-profit organization producing analysis and forecasts of the political,
economic and business environment in more than 180 countries. The EIU was founded in 1949 and is based in
London. In 1997, the EIU launched two quarterly publications which contain some governance measures: The
Country Risk Service, and the Country Forecasts. The assessments in these publications are based on regular
contributions from a global network of more than 500 information-gatherers. A panel of regional experts checks
the accuracy, consistency and impartiality of these assessments. Our databases utilize data about the individual
subcomponents of these country risk ratings, that were made available to us by EIU.
In the table below we list the variables included in each of the governance indicators.  In this paper, we use data 
from 1997, 1998, 2000, and 2002-2005.
 
2005 2004 2003 2002 2000 1998 1996
Voice and Accountability
Orderly transfers XXXXXXX
Vested interests XXXX. .. .X
Accountablity of Public Officials XXXX. .. .X
Human Rights XXXX. .. .X
Freedom of association XXXX. .. .X
Political Stability
Armed conflict XXXXXXX
Violent demonstrations XXXX. .. .X
Social Unrest XXXXXXX
International tensions / terrorist threat XXXXXXX
Government Effectiveness
Quality of bureaucracy / institutional effectiveness XXXXXXX
Excessive bureacucracy / red tape XXXXXXX
Government policy (pro business stance) .. .. .. .. X X ..
Regulatory Quality
Unfair competitive practices XXXX. .. .X
Price controls XXXX. .. .X
Discriminatory tariffs XXXX. .. .X
Excessive protections XXXX. .. .X




Fairness of judicial process XXXXXXX
Enforceability of contracts XXXX. .. .X
Speediness of judicial process XXXX. .. .X
Confiscation/expropriation XXXX. .. .X
Intellectual property rights protection XXXX. .. .X
Private property protection XXXX. .. .X
Control of Corruption
Corruption among public officials XXXXXXX
Country coverage 120 120 115 115 115 115 115
















































TABLE A10: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBR) 
 
A10: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBR)
http://www.ebrd.org
The EBRD is an international organization which supports the transition towards open market-oriented economies
and promotes private and entrepreneurial initiative in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).  The EBRD is based in London.  
The EBRD publishes an annual Transition Report, which includes a number of governance variables in its
Transition Indicators and Survey of Legal Reforms. The Transition Report presents eight “Transition Indicators”
representing "cumulative progress in the movement from a centrally planned economy to a market economy” for
26 transition economies. The subjective indicators are based on a checklist of various objective measures and
reflect the views of EBRD staff. 
Beginning in 1996, the EBRD has conducted in 26 countries a survey of local public officials, private firms,
academics, lawyers, and other experts, in order to assess the progress made in financial legal reform in transition
economies. The survey considered two areas of financial legal reform: banking and securities activities. For each
area, two indices describing the extensiveness and effectiveness of the financial legal framework were
developed, for a total of four ratings. The “extensiveness” ratings measure how closely legal rules affecting
investment follow international standards. “Effectiveness” reflects how clear, accessible and adequately-
supported the legal rules are. Both are intended to provide a measure of how conducive the laws of these
countries are to fostering investment.  Both indices however were discontinued in 2003. 
In this paper we use data from the 1996, 1998, 2000, and 2002-2005 Transition Reports.  In the table below we 
list the variables included in each of the governance indicators.
 
2005 2004 2003 2002 2000 1998 1996
Voice and Accountability
NA .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Political Stability
NA .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Government Effectiveness
NA .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Regulatory Quality
Price liberalisation  XXXXXXX
Trade & foreign exchange system  XXXXXXX
Competition policy  XXXXXXX
Commercial Law Extensiveness .. .. .. X X X ..
Commercial Law Effectiveness .. .. .. X X X ..
Financial Regulations: extensiveness .. .. .. X X X ..
Financial regulations: effectiveness .. .. .. X X X ..
Rule of Law
NA .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Control of Corruption
NA .. .. .. .. .. .. ..















































TABLE A11:  Freedom House (FRH, FHT, CCR) 
 
A11: Freedom House (FRH, FNT, CCR)
http://www.freedomhouse.org. 
Freedom House is a non-governmental organization which promotes democratic values around the world.
Freedom House was established in 1941 and is headquartered in New York City.   
We rely on data from three Freedom House publications. "Freedom in the World" was launched in 1955, and
became an annual publication in 1978, covering 192 countries and/or related and disputed territories. "Nations in
Transit" was launched in 1995 and covers 28 post-communist countries. Finally, "Countries at the CrossRoads"
was launched in 2004 and covers 30 developing countries.
Freedom House develops its assessments using a team of academic advisors, in-house experts, published
resources, and local correspondents including human rights activists, journalists, editors and political figures.
Freedom House staff also conduct regular fact-finding missions to countries being assessed. An academic
advisory board provides input to the project in general.
Freedom in the World (FRH). This publication evaluates political rights and civil liberties around the world.
Freedom House defines political rights as those freedoms that enable people to participate freely in the political
process, and civil liberties as the freedom to develop views, institutions and personal autonomy apart from the
state. For all countries, the subjective assessments are based on checklists of rights and freedoms. A Freedom
House team assigns a rating to each item on the checklist and produces an initial assessment for each country.
The team then assess whether the checklists might have missed an important factor for a particular country. The
scores are then reviewed to ensure quality and consistency across countries, and a final rating is produced. 
Freedom House Nations in Transit (FNT). This publication evaluates the progress in democratic and
economic reform in post-communist countries. Country surveys are written by Freedom House staff or
consultants and are reviewed by academics and senior Freedom House staff. Each report is divided into nine
sections, ranging from the political process to progress in price liberalization. For each section, a preliminary
rating is based on a checklist of issues. The academic oversight board establishes the final ratings by
consensus following extensive discussions and debate, which are reviewed by the Freedom House rating
committee. 
Countries at the Crossroads (CCR). This publication is a survey of democratic governance that evaluates
performance in 30 key countries that are at a crossroads in determining their political future. The Countries at the
Crossroads survey offers scholars, analysts, and officials a comparative tool for assessing government
performance in the areas of civil liberties, rule of law, anticorruption and transparency, and accountability and 
In the table below we list the variables included in each of the governance indicators.   In this paper we use data 
from the 1996, 1998, 2000, and 2002-2005 editions of Freedom in the World, the 2004 and 2005 editions of 
















































2005 2004 2003 2002 2000 1998 1996
Voice and Accountability
Political Rights  XXXXXXX
Is the head of state and/or head of government or other chief authority elected through 
free and fair elections?
Are the legislative representatives elected through free and fair elections?
Are there fair electoral laws?
Are the voters able to endow their freely elected representatives with real power?
Do the people have the right to freely organize in different political parties or other 
competitive political groupings of their choice, and is the system open to the rise and 
fall of these competing parties or groupings?
Is there a significant opposition vote, de facto opposition power, and a realistic 
possibility for the opposition to increase its support or gain power through elections?
Are the people free from domination by the military, foreign powers, totalitarian parties, 
religious hierarchies, economic oligarchies or any other powerful groups? 
Do cultural, ethnic, religious and other minority groups have reasonable self-
determination, self-government, autonomy or participation through informal consensus 
in the decision-making process? 
Civil Liberties  XXXXXXX
Are there free and independent media, literature and other cultural expressions? 
Is there open public discussion and free private discussion?
Is there freedom of assembly and demonstration?
Is there freedom of political or quasi-political organization?
Are citizens equal under the law, with access to an independent, nondiscriminatory 
judiciary, and are they respected by the security forces?
Is there protection from political terror, and from unjustified imprisonment, exile or 
torture, whether by groups that support or oppose the system, and freedom from war or 
insurgency situations?
Are there free trade unions and peasant organizations or equivalents, and is there 
effective collective bargaining?
Are there free professional and other private organizations?
Are there free businesses or cooperatives?
Are there free religious institutions and free private and public religious expressions?
Are there personal social freedoms, which include such aspects as gender equality, 
property rights, freedom of movement, choice of residence, and choice of marriage and 
size of family?
Is there equality of opportunity, which includes freedom from exploitation by or 
dependency on landlords, employers, union leaders, bureaucrats or any other type of 
denigrating obstacle to a share of legitimate economic gains?
Is there freedom from extreme government indifference and corruption
Table A11: Freedom in the World (193 developed and developing countries) / Nations in Transit (27 transition 


















































2005 2004 2003 2002 2000 1998 1996
Freedom of the Press XXXXXXX
Laws and Practice:  Assess whether or not dissent is allowed, if private media are 
permitted alongside governmental broadcasting, if independent media, in practice, are 
permitted to express diverse views
Political Influence over Media Content: This category reflects political pressure on the 
content of both privately owned and government media, and takes into account the day-
to-day conditions in which journalists work, threats from organized crime, or from 
religious extremists, for example, often generate self-censorship and so negatively 
affect the media environment
Economic influence over Media Content: Influence may come from the government or 
from private entrepreneurs.  This reflects competitive pressures in the private sector 
that distort reportage as well as economic favoritism or reprisals by government for 
unwanted press coverage
Actual Incident of Violations of Press Freedom: Murders, arrests, suspension and other 
violations create a sense of fear which may discourage objective reporting
Nations in Transit
Political Process: Deals with elections, referenda, party configuration, conditions for 
political competition, and popular participation in elections. XXXXXXX
Civil Society: Highlights the degree to which volunteerism, trade unionism, and 
professional associations exist, and whether civic organizations are influential XXXXXXX
Independent Media: Press freedom, public access to a variety of information sources, 
and  independence of those sources from undue government or other influences.
XXXXXXX
Countries at the Crossroads
Civil Liberties X X .. .. .. .. ..
Accountability and public voice X X .. .. .. .. ..
Political Stability
NA .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Government Effectiveness
Nations in Transit: Government and Administration: Government decentralization, 
independent and responsibilities or local and regional governments, and legislative and 
executive transparency are discussed.
XXXXXXX
Regulatory Quality
N/A .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Rule of Law
Nations in Transit: Considers judicial and constitutional matters as well as the legal and 
de facto status of ethnic minorities. XXXXXXX
Countries at the Crossroads: Rule of Law X X .. .. .. .. ..
Control of Corruption
Nations in Transit: corruption XXXXXX. .
Countries at the Crossroads: Anti-Corruption and Transparency X X .. .. .. .. ..
Table A11: Freedom in the World (193 developed and developing countries) / Nations in Transit (27 transition 





















































Gallup International was founded in May 1947, is registered in Zurich, Switzerland, and has 55 members around 
the world governed by the same Code of Statutes to ensure technical competence and quality standards.  
The Gallup International Millennium Survey polled 57,000 adults in 60 different countries of the world between 
August and October, 1999. The survey covered a wide range of topics of an ethical, political and religious nature, 
focusing specifically on issues related to democracy, the United Nations, human rights, women's rights, 
environment, religion, crime and basic values.  This source asks several questions which also appeared in the 
Gallup 50th Anniversary Survey which we use for 1998.
y( )
The survey interviews citizens all around the world and helps understand the opinion of today's world population 
on issues like the environment, terrorism, global issues, governance and democracy. In 2004, in conjunction with 
Transparency International Gallup initiated the Global Barometer survey, interviewing citiznes on corruption 
issues.
In the table below we list the variables included in each of the governance indicators. In this paper, we use data 
from the 2002-2005 Voice of the People Surveys, the 2004-2005 Global Barometer Surveys, the 2000 Gallup 
Millenium Survey and the 1997 50th Anniversary Survey.
 
2005 2004 2003 2002 2000 1998 1996
Voice and Accountability
Trust in National Government .. .. .. X .. .. ..
Trust in the Parliament .. .. .. X .. .. ..
Percent who believe the country is governed by the will of the people .. .. X .. X .. ..
Percent who believe elections are free and fair XXX. .X. .. .
Percent who believe the government is accountable .. .. .. .. X .. ..
Freedom of speech .. .. .. .. X .. ..
Human Rights . .X. .. .. .. .. .
Satisfaction with Democracy X. .. .. .. .. .. .
 
Political Stability
Terrorism / crime . .X. .. .. .. .. .
Government Effectiveness
Percent who believe the government is efficient .. .. .. .. X .. ..
Regulatory Quality
NA .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Rule of Law
Trust in the Legal System .. .. .. X .. .. ..
Concern with level of crime .. .. .. .. X .. ..
Control of Corruption
Percent who believe the government is corrupt .. .. .. .. X .. ..
Frequency of corruption X X .. .. .. X ..
Frequency of household bribery X X .. .. .. .. ..
Extent of grand corruption . .X. .. .. .. .. .
Extent of petty corruption . .X. .. .. .. .. .
Country coverage: 69 62 49 46 60 44 ..




















































The Global E-Governance Index is compiled by Prof. West of Brown University's Center for Public Policy. Official 
websites are evaluated for the presence of various features dealing with information availability, service delivery, 
and public access. Features assessed included online publications, online database, audio clips, video clips, non-
native languages or foreign language translation, commercial advertising, premium fees, user payments, disability 
access, privacy policy, security features, presence of online services, number of different services, digital 
signatures, credit card payments, email address, comment form, automatic email updates, website 
personalization, personal digital assistant (PDA) access, and an English version of the website.
Range for the E-Government index- 0 (bad)-100 (good) based on availability of publications and databases (72 
points) and number of online services (28 points).
In the table below we list the variables included in each of the governance indicators. In this paper, we use data 
from 2002 to 2005.
 
2005 2004 2003 2002 2000 1998 1996
Voice and Accountability
NA .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Political Stability and Lack of Violence
NA .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Government Effectiveness
Global E-governance Index XXXX. .. .. .
Regulatory Quality
NA .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Rule of Law
NA .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Control of Corruption
NA .. .. .. .. .. .. ..















































TABLE A14:  Global Insight's DRI/McGraw-Hill (DRI) 
 
A14: Global Insight's Global Risk Service
http://www.globalinsight.com
DRI is an economic consulting and information company which provides data, analysis, forecasts and expert
advice to strategic planners, business and financial analysts, and policy makers. It was founded in 1973 and is
based in the United States. 
In 1996, DRI launched the Country Risk Review (now referred to as Global Risk Service), a quarterly publication
providing country risk assessments to international investors. A first draft of the risk ratings in this publication are
produced by country analysts, who then submit their preliminary assessment to regional review committees
charged with analyzing and challenging these assessment. The global risk service committee evaluates the
reviewed assessments to ensure quality and cross-country consistency. The country analysts then produce the
final country risk review.
The CRR assesses the relationship between country risk and its effects on the profitability of investments. For
each country, DRI identifies a number of “potential sources of risk”, specifies measurable “risk events”, measures
how probable those risk events are, and assesses the severity of impact that each outcome would have. Based
on these considerations, DRI produces a risk score for each country.
The CRR identifies a total of 33 “immediate risk events” and 18 “secondary risk events” for 117 developed and
developing countries. Immediate risk events are classified into policy risks (tax, and non-tax), and outcome risks
(price, and non-price). Secondary risk events are classified into domestic political risks, external political risks,
and economic risks.  These risk events are described in below.
For each risk event, DRI produces a short run and a long run risk rating. These ratings provide subjective
estimates of the likelihood that a particular risk event will occur within one and five years respectively. DRI follows
a methodology to ensure that the five year forecasts are consistent with the short-term forecasts. Although these
indicators nominally measure the likelihood of future changes in governance concepts, in practice the long-run
ratings provide good measures of the current levels of governance.
In the table below we list the variables included in each of the governance indicators. Variable definitions consist 
of risk events. The actual ratings provide an estimated probability of these events happening.  In this paper, we 

















































2005 2004 2003 2002 2000 1998 1996
Voice and Accountability
NA .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Political Stability
Domestic Political Risks: Military Coup Risk: A military coup d’etat (or a series of such events) 
that reduces the GDP growth rate by 2% during any 12-month period. XXXXXXX
Domestic Political Risks: Major Insurgency/Rebellion: An increase in scope or intensity of one 
or more insurgencies/rebellions that reduces the GDP growth rate by 3% during any 12-month 
period.
XXXXXXX
Domestic Political Risks: Political Terrorism: An increase in scope or intensity of terrorism that 
reduces the GDP growth rate by 1% during any 12-month period. XXXXXXX
Domestic Political Risks: Political Assassination: A political assassination (or a series of such 
events) that reduces the GDP growth rate by 1% during any 12-month period. XXXXXXX
Domestic Political Risks: Civil War: An increase in scope or intensity of one or more civil wars 
that reduces the GDP growth rate by 4% during any 12-month period.
XXXXXXX
Domestic Political Risks: Major Urban Riot: An increase in scope, intensity, or frequency of 
rioting that reduces the GDP growth rate by 1% during any 12-month period. XXXXXXX
Government Effectiveness
Domestic Political Risk: Government Instability: An increase in government personnel turnover 
rate at senior levels that reduces the GDP growth rate by 2% during any 12-month period. XXXXXXX
Domestic Political Risk: Government Ineffectiveness: A decline in government personnel 
quality at any level that reduces the GDP growth rate by 1% during any 12-month period. XXXXXXX
Domestic Political Risk: Institutional Failure: A deterioration of government capacity to cope 
with national problems as a result of institutional rigidity or gridlock that reduces the GDP 
growth rate by 1% during any 12-month period.
XXXXXXX
Regulatory Quality
Policies Non-Tax: Regulations -- Exports: A 2% reduction in export volume as a result of a 
worsening in export regulations or restrictions (such as export limits) during any 12-month 
period, with respect to the level at the time of the assessment.
XXXXXXX
Policies Non-Tax: Regulations -- Imports: A 2% reduction in import volume as a result of a 
worsening in import regulations or restrictions (such as import quotas) during any 12-month 
period, with respect to the level at the time of the assessment.
XXXXXXX
Policies Non-Tax: Regulations -- Other Business: An increase in other regulatory burdens, with 
respect to the level at the time of the assessment, that reduces total aggregate investment in 
real LCU terms by 10%
XXXXXXX
Policies Non-Tax: Ownership of Business by Non-Residents: A 1-point increase on a scale 
from "0" to "10" in legal restrictions on ownership of business by non-residents during any 12-
month period.
XXXXXXX
Policies Non-Tax: Ownership of Equities by Non-Residents: A 1-point increase on a scale from 




Outcomes Non-Price: Losses and Costs of Crime: A 1-point increase on a scale from "0" to 
"10" in crime during any 12-month period. XXXXXXX
Domestic Political Risk: Kidnapping of Foreigners: An increase in scope, intensity, or frequency 
of kidnapping of foreigners that reduces the GDP growth rate by 1% during any 12-month 
period.
XXXXXXX
Policies Non-Tax: Enforceability of Government Contracts: A 1 point decline on a scale from 
"0" to "10" in the enforceability of contracts during any 12-month period. XXXXXXX
Policies Non-Tax: Enforceability of Private Contracts: A 1-point decline on a scale from "0" to 
"10" in the legal enforceability of contracts during any 12-month period. XXXXXXX
Control of Corruption
Risk Event Outcome non-price: Losses and Costs of Corruption: A 1-point increase on a scale 
from "0" to "10" in corruption during any 12-month period. XXXXXXX

















































TABLE A15:  Global Insight's Business Conditions and Risk Indicators (WMO) 
 
A15: Global Insight's Business Conditions and Risk Indicators 
http://www.globalinsight.com
World Markets Online (WMO) is an online subscription service from the World Markets Research Center updated 
daily which provides analysis of the conditions and risks for businesses worldwide. Established in 1996, the World 
Markets Research Centre is based in London and employs over 190 permanent staff. In 2005, it was incorporated 
into Global Insight, which also produces DRI ratings (table A14).
  
World Markets Online has developed a risk rating system to enable its clients to compare and contrast the
investment climate in over 200 countries around the world. For WMO the principal quality their risk measures
endeavor to measure is stability, which they believe businesses need most of all to be able to make secure
investments and plan ahead. In addition to stability, WMO believes that businesses also need the right conditions
in place; governments must ensure the right policies and safeguards to allow businesses to operate effectively. A
country with a high risk rating by WMO is a country where businesses face continual threats to their operations,
either from direct physical intervention, or because of the poor conditions and stability in the country concerned.
The system rates the quality of conditions and level of stability encountered by investors in each country in terms
of political, economic, legal, tax, operational and security environment.
Drawing on a worldwide network of information gatherers and analysts, World Markets Research Centre
generates a comprehensive range of in-depth country, sector and market services. The process by which the
risks are assessed consists firstly of WMO analysts' own experience of the country’s conditions. Daily stories
highlight countries’ changing conditions and constantly inform the risk rating levels. In addition to the in-house
analysts’ own consensus, World Markets Online also draws upon the expertise and impressions of those working
in the field through a wide network of stringers and informal contacts which allows them to access information
only available locally as well as to case studies of individual investor's experience. Regular meetings of all the
analysts across the regional desks ensure that their ratings are fully comparable globally, and that the factors
used for assessment are consistent.
In the table below we list the variables included in each of the governance indicators. In this paper, we use the















































2005 2004 2003 2002 2000 1998 1996
Voice and Accountability
Institutional permanence An assessment of how mature and well-established the political 
system is. It is also an assessment of how far political opposition operates within the system 
or attempts to undermine it from outside. 
X X X X .. .. ..
Representativeness How well the population and organised interests can make their voices 
heard in the political system. Provided representation is handled fairly and effectively, it will 
ensure greater stability and better designed policies. 
X X X X .. .. ..
Political Stability
Civil unrest How widespread political unrest is, and how great a threat it poses to investors. 
Demonstrations in themselves may not be cause for concern, but they will cause major 
disruption if they escalate into severe violence. At the extreme, this factor would amount to 
civil war. 
X X X X .. .. ..
Terrorism Whether the country suffers from a sustained terrorist threat, and from how many 
sources. The degree of localisation of the threat is assessed, and whether the active groups 
are likely to target or affect businesses. 
X X X X .. .. ..
Government Effectiveness
Bureaucracy : An assessment of the quality of the country’s bureaucracy. The better the 
bureaucracy the quicker decisions are made and the more easily foreign investors can go 
about their business.
X X X X .. .. ..
Policy consistency and forward planning How confident businesses can be of the continuity 
of economic policy stance - whether a change of government will entail major policy 
disruption, and whether the current government has pursued a coherent strategy. This factor 
also looks at the extent to which policy-making is far-sighted, or conversely aimed at short-
term economic advantage. 
X X X X .. .. ..
Regulatory Quality
Tax Effectiveness How efficient the country’s tax collection system is. The rules may be clear 
and transparent, but whether they are enforced consistently. This factor looks at the relative 
effectiveness too of corporate and personal, indirect and direct taxation. 
X X X X .. .. ..
Legislation An assessment of whether the necessary business laws are in place, and 
whether there any outstanding gaps. This includes the extent to which the country's 
legislation is compatible with, and respected by, other countries' legal systems. 
X X X X .. .. ..
Rule of Law
Judicial Independence An assessment of how far the state and other outside actors can 
influence and distort the legal system. This will determine the level of legal impartiality 
investors can expect. 
X X X X .. .. ..
Crime How much of a threat businesses face from crime such as kidnapping, extortion, street 
violence, burglary and so on. These problems can cause major inconvenience for foreign 
investors and require them to take expensive security precautions. 
X X X X .. .. ..
Control of Corruption
Corruption : An assessment of the intrusiveness of the country’s bureaucracy. The amount of 
red tape likely to countered is assessed, as is the likelihood of encountering corrupt officials 
and other groups. 
X X X X .. .. ..
Country coverage 202 202 202 186 .. .. ..




















































The Heritage Foundation is a research and educational institute whose mission is to formulate and promote
conservative public policies.  The Heritage Foundation was established in 1973.
In 1995 the Heritage Foundation, in partnership with the Wall street Journal, launched its annual Index of
Economic Freedom. This index covers 161 countries and measures economic freedoms and prospects for
growth in the global economy. The index is designed for cross country research and is intended to assist
international investors and aid donors in the allocation of their resources. This index is based on a detailed
assessment of 10 different factors, including foreign investment codes, taxes, tariffs, banking regulations,
monetary policy, and the black market. For some of these, assessments are mechanically based on objective
data, while others are generated as subjective ratings based on a pre-specified checklist.
In the table below we list the variables included in each of the governance indicators. In this paper, we use 
Heritage data for 1996, 1998, 2000, and 2002-2005.
 
2005 2004 2003 2002 2000 1998 1996
Voice and Accountability
NA .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Political Stability
NA .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Government Effectiveness












NA .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
















































TABLE A17:  IJET's Country Security Risk Ratings (IJT) 
 
A17: IJET's Country Security Risk Ratings
https://worldcue.ijet.com/tic/login.jsp
iJET is a privately held company founded in October 1999 and is based in Annapolis, MD.  iJET monitors the 
world around-the-clock and alerts travelers, expatriates and decision-makers to events and situations in real-time 
to help them avoid or minimize risk and travel disruptions abroad. iJET's professional services offer in-depth 
analysis of changing risks around the world, and allows organizations to monitor, locate and communicate with 
traveling employees and expatriates.
In our paper, we use the iJET's security risk ratings for 167 countries worldwide in 2004 and 2005.
 
2005 2004 2003 2002 2000 1998 1996
Voice and Accountability
NA .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
 
Political Stability
Security Risk Rating X X .. .. .. .. ..
Government Effectiveness
NA .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Regulatory Quality
NA .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Rule of Law
NA .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Control of Corruption
NA .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
















































TABLE A18:  Institute for Management Development (WCY) 
 
A18: Institute for Management Development (WCY)
http://www.imd.ch.  
The Institute for Management Development is an research and educational organization based in Lausanne,
Switzerland. It has published the World Competitiveness Yearbook since 1987. Until 1996, this was a joint
effort with the World Economic Forum. The World Competitiveness Yearbook analyzes the competitive
environment in 47 countries. It is based on both objective data and surveys of perceptions. The survey
questions over 4,000 local and foreign enterprises operating in the countries under analysis. Mean scores on
the survey questions are reported in the yearbook for all countries. In the table below we list the questions
included in the governance database.
In the table below we list the variables included in each of the governance indicators.  We use data from the 
1996, 1998, 2000,and 2002-2005 editions of the World Competitiveness Yearbook.
 
2005 2004 2003 2002 2000 1998 1996
Voice and Accountability
Transparency of Government policy XXXXXXX
Political Stability
The risk of political instability is very high XXXXX. .. .
Government Effectiveness
Government economic policies do not adapt quickly to changes in the economy X X X X X .. X
The public service is not independent from political interference X X X X X X ..
Government decisions are not effectively implemented X X X X X X ..
Bureaucracy hinders business activity XXXXXXX
The distribution infrastructure of goods and services is generally inefficient X X X X X .. X
Political System is not adapted to todays' economic challenges .. .. .. .. X .. X
Policy direction is not consistent X X .. .. .. .. ..
Regulatory Quality
The exchange rate policy of your country hinders the competitiveness of firms X X X X .. .. ..
Protectionism in the country negatively affects the conduct of business X X X X X X ..
Competition legislation in your country does not prevent unfair competition X X X X X X X
Price controls affect pricing of products in most industries X X X X X X X
Legal regulation of financial institutions is inadequate for financial stability . .XXXXXX
Foreign financial institutions do not have access to the domestic market .. .. X X .. .. X
Access to capital markets (foreign and domestic) is easily available X X X X .. .. ..
Ease of doing business is not a competitive advantage for your country X X X X .. .. ..
Financial institutions' transparency is not widely developed in your country X X X X .. .. ..
Customs' authorities do not facilitate the efficient transit of goods X X X X X X ..
The legal framework is detrimental to your country' s  c o m p e t i t i v e n e s s XXXXXX. .
Foreign investors are free to acquire control in domestic companies X X X X X X ..
Public sector contracts are sufficiently open to foreign bidders X X X X X X X
Real personal taxes are non distortionary XXXXXXX
Real corporate taxes are non distortionary XXXXXX. .
Banking regulation does not hinder competitiveness X X X X .. .. ..
Political system as obstacle to development .. .. .. .. X X ..
Labor regulations hinder business activities .. X .. .. .. .. ..
New Legislation restricts competitiveness X X .. .. .. .. ..
Subsidies impair economic development X X .. .. .. .. ..
Ease to start a business X X .. .. .. .. ..
Rule of Law
Tax evasion is a common practice in your country XXXXXX. .
Justice is not fairly administered in society XXXXXXX
Personal security and private property are not adequately p r o t e c t e d XXXXXXX
Parallel economy impairs economic development in your country XXXXXXX
Insider trading is common in the stock market .. X X X .. .. X
Patent and copyright protection is not adequately enforced in your country XXXX. .XX
Control of Corruption
Bribing and corruption exist in the economy XXXXXXX
















































TABLE A19:  International Research & Exchanges Board (MSI)  
 
A19: Media Sustainability Index (MSI)
http://www.irex.org
The International Research & Exchanges Board (IREX) is an international nonprofit organization 
specializing in education, independent media, Internet development, and civil society programs. 
Through training, partnerships, education, research, and grant programs, IREX develops the capacity of 
individuals and institutions to contribute to their societies.
Through the financial assistance of USAID, IREX introduced in 2002 the Media Sustainability Index, a 
tool designed to inform media development practitioners, public officials, scholars and others concerned 
about the region’s media. The MSI analyzes issues such as freedom of speech, plurality of media 
available to citizens, professional journalism standards, business sustainability of media, and the 
efficacy of institutions that support independent media. 
In the table below we list the variables included in each of the governance indicators.  We use data from 
the 2002-2005 Reports  
 
2005 2004 2003 2002 2000 1998 1996
Voice and Accountability
Media Sustainability Index XXXX. .. .. .
Political Stability and Lack of Violence
NA .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Government Effectiveness
NA .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Regulatory Quality
NA .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Rule of Law
NA .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Control of Corruption
NA .. .. .. .. .. .. ..




















































Latinobarometro is a public opinion survey representing the opinions, attitudes, behaviour and values of citizens
of the countries in which it is conducted. The survey began being applied regularly in 8 countries of the region in
1995, and in 17 countries beginning in 1996. Latinobarometro conducts an annual survey, using representative
samples and an identical questionnaire in each country. It asks questions in in the following areas: Economy and
International Trade, Integration and Regional Trading Blocks, Democracy, Politics and Institutions, Social Policies,
Civic Culture, Social Capital and Social Fraud, the Environment, and Current Issues.
In the table below we list the variables included in each of the governance indicators.  We use data from the 
1996, 1998, 2000, and 2002-2005 surveys.
 
2005 2004 2003 2002 2000 1998 1996
Voice and Accountability
Satisfaction with democracy X X X X. .XX
Trust in Parliament X X X .. .. X ..
Political Stability
Country terrorist threat .. .. .. X. .. .. .
Government Effectiveness
Trust in Government X X .. X .. .. ..
Regulatory Quality
NA .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Rule of Law
Trust in Judiciary X X XXXXX
Trust in Police X X .. .. X X X
Have you been a victim of crime? X X X X .. .. ..
Control of Corruption
Frequency of corruption X X X XXX. .
















































TABLE A21:  Merchant International Group (MIG) 
 
A21: Merchant International Group (MIG)
http://www.merchantinternational.com
Established in 1982, the Merchant International Group Limited (“MIG”) is a strategic research and corporate 
intelligence company headquartered in London, which provides a range of support services (from identification to 
evaluation of all manner of risks, weaknesses and threats) to corporates in non-domestic markets.
MIG developed a framework that identifies ten distinctive categories of Grey Area Dynamics™. Each refers to a 
range of events, activities and trends that impact upon business. Their impact is of varying severity and may be 
positive or negative, though typically, Grey Area Dynamics™ take the form of obstacles to progress in non-
domestic markets. 
In the table below we list the variables included in each of the governance indicators.  We use data from 2002 to 
2005.  
 
2005 2004 2003 2002 2000 1998 1996
Voice and Accountability
NA .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Political Stability and Lack of Violence
Extremism XXXX. .. .. .
Government Effectiveness
Bureaucracy XXXX. .. .. .
Regulatory Quality
Unfair Trade XXXX. .. .. .
Unfair Competition XXXX. .. .. .
Rule of Law
Legal Safeguards XXXX. .. .. .
Organized Crime XXXX. .. .. .
Control of Corruption
Corruption XXXX. .. .. .
Country coverage 155 155 155 118 .. .. ..
















































TABLE A22:  Political Economic Risk Consultancy (PRC)  
 
A22. Political Economic Risk Consultancy (PRC)
http://www.asiarisk.com/
Founded in 1976 and headquartered in Hong Kong, the Political and Economic Risk Consultancy specializes in
strategic information and analysis for companies doing business in the countries in East and Southeast Asia.
PERC has conducted various surveys of expatriate business managers in the East Asia region. The original
results of these surveys were published under the titles “Corruption in Asia in 1999” . Based on the average
responses in these surveys, PERC has produced country ratings. In this paper, we use data from the 1998,
2000, 2002-2005 surveys.  
Corruption in Asia
In this survey, foreign managers working within the East Asia region were questioned about their perception of
corruption, the quality of the legal system, and the professionalism and reliability of the police and judiciary. We
have obtained their data on corruption for 12 countries, based on a total of 427 responses. With respect to
corruption, respondents were asked “To what extent does corruption exist in a way that detracts from the
business environment for foreign companies?”  
 
2005 2004 2003 2002 2000 1998 1996
Voice and Accountability
NA .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Political Stability
NA .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Government Effectiveness
NA .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Regulatory Quality
NA .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Rule of Law
NA .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Control of Corruption
To what extent does corruption exist in a way that detracts from the 
business environment for foreign companies?
XXXXXX. .
















































TABLE A23:  Political Risk Services (PRS) 
 
A23: Political Risk Services (PRS)
http://www.prsgroup.com
The PRS group is an affiliate of Investment Business with Knowledge (IBK), a United States-based corporation
providing up-to-date country information for international business. PRS was founded in 1980 and is
headquartered in Syracuse, New York.
Since 1982, PRS has produced the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) which provides assessments of a
political, economic and financial risks in a large number of developed and developing countries. These
assessments are based on the analysis of a worldwide network of experts, and is subject to a peer review
process at subject and regional levels to ensure the coherence and comparability across countries. The ICRG
assesses three major categories of risk: political (with 12 components), financial (5 components) and economic (6
components). We use components of the Political Risk Index, which report subjective assessments of the factors
influencing the business environment in a particular country. 
In the table below we list the variables included in each of the governance indicators.    In this paper we use data 


















































2005 2004 2003 2002 2000 1998 1996
Voice and Accountability
Military in Politics  The military are not elected by anyone, so their participation in 
government, either direct or indirect, reduces accountability and therefore represents a 
risk.  The threat of military intervention might lead as well to an anticipated potentially 
inefficient change in policy or even in government.  It also works as an indication that 
the government is unable to function effectively and that the country has an uneasy 
environment for foreign business.
XXXXXXX
Democratic Accountability.  Quantifies how responsive government is to its people, on 
the basis that the less response there is the more likely is that the government will fall, 
peacefully or violently.  It includes not only if free and fair elections are in place, but 
also how likely is the government to remain in power or remain popular. 
XXXXXXX
Political Stability
Government Stability.  Measures the government’s ability to carry out its declared 
programs, and its ability to stay in office.  This will depend on issues as: the type of 
governance, the cohesion of the government and governing party or parties, the 
closeness of the next election, the government command of the legislature, and 
approval of government policies.
XXXXXXX
Internal Conflict.  Assess political violence and its influence on governance.  Highest 
scores go to countries with no armed opposition, and where the government does not 
indulge in arbitrary violence, direct or indirect.  Lowest ratings go to civil war torn 
countries.  Intermediate ratings are awarded on the basis of the threats to the 
government and busines. 
XXXXXXX
External conflict: The external conflict measure is an assessment both of the risk to the 
incumbent government and to inward investment.  It ranges from trade restrictions and 
embargoes, whether imposed by a single country, a group of countries, or the 
international community as a whole, through geopolitical disputes, armed threats, 
exchanges of fire on borders, border incursions, foreign-supported insurgency, and full-
scale warfare.
XXXXXXX
Ethnic tensions: This component measures the degree of tension within a country 
attributable to racial, nationality, or language divisions.  Lower ratings are given to 
countries where racial and nationality tensions are high because opposing groups are 
intolerant and unwilling to compromise.  Higher ratings are given to countries where 
tensions are minimal, even though such differences may still exist.
XXXXXXX
Government Effectiveness
Bureaucratic Quality.  Measures institutional strength and quality of the civil service, 
assess how much strength and expertise bureaucrats have and how able they are to 
manage political alternations without drastic interruptions in government services, or 
policy changes.  Good performers have somewhat autonomous bureaucracies, free 
from political pressures, and an established mechanism for recruitment and training. 
XXXXXXX
Regulatory Quality
Investment Profile.  Includes the risk to operations (scored from 0 to 4, increasing in 
risk); taxation (scored from 0 to 3), repatriation (scored from 0 to 3); repatriation (scored 
from 0 to 3) and labor costs (scored from 0 to 2).  They all look at the government’s 
attitude towards investment.  
XXXXXXX
Rule of Law
Law and Order.  The Law sub-component is an assessment of the strength and 
impartiality of the legal system, while the Order sub-component is an assessment of 
popular observance of the law.
XXXXXXX
Control of Corruption
Corruption.  Measures corruption within the political system, which distorts the 
economic and financial environment, reduces the efficiency of government and 
business by enabling people to assume positions of power through patronage rather 
than ability, and introduces an inherently instability in the political system.  
XXXXXXX

















































TABLE A24:  Reporters Without Borders (RSF) 
 
A24: Reporters Without Borders
http://www.rsf.org
Reporters Without Borders - headquartered in Paris - is an international organization dedicated to the protection 
of reporters and respect of press freedom in the world.  In 2002,  International Reporters Without Borders 
published its first worldwide press freedom index, compiled for 139 countries. The organisation's initiatives are 
being carried out on five continents through its national branches and its offices in Abidjan, Bangkok, Buenos 
Aires, Istanbul, Montreal, Nairobi, New York, Tokyo and Washington. It also works in close co-operation with local 
and regional press freedom organisations and with members of the "Reporters without Borders' Network." 
The index was drawn up by asking journalists, researchers and legal experts worldwide to answer 50 questions 
about the whole range of press freedom violations (such as murders or arrests of journalists, censorship, 
pressure, state monopolies in various fields, punishment of press law offences and regulation of the media). 
In the table below we list the variables included in each of the governance indicators.  We use data from 2002 to 
2005.
 
2005 2004 2003 2002 2000 1998 1996
Voice and Accountability
Press Freedom Index X X X X .. .. ..
Political Stability and Lack of Violence
NA .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Government Effectiveness
NA .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Regulatory Quality
NA .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Rule of Law
NA .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Control of Corruption
NA .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Country Coverage 165 165 164 138 .. .. ..
















































TABLE A25:  State Department’s Trafficking in people Report (TPR) 
 
 
A25: State Department's Trafficking in People Report
http://www.state.gov/g/tip/rls/tiprpt/
Initiated in 2001, the Trafficking in People Reports cover "severe forms of trafficking in persons" defined as: (a)
sex trafficking in which a commercial sex act is induced by force, fraud, or coercion, or in which the person
induced to perform such act has not attained 18 years of age; or (b) the recruitment, harboring, transportation,
provision, or obtaining of a person for labor or services, through the use of force, fraud or coercion for the
purpose of subjection to involuntary servitude, peonage, debt bondage, or slavery.
In preparing the reports, the Department of State in Washington asked for information from US embassies and 
consulates around the world. The embassy reports reflect discussions with host governments, local non-
governmental organizations, immigration officials, police, journalists, and victims, in addition to reviews of 
government, press, and NGO reports. The State Department's Bureau for International Narcotics and Law 
Enforcement Affairs; the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor; the regional bureaus; and the Office of 
the Legal Adviser, with assistance from the intelligence community, reviewed reporting from U.S. embassies and 
consulates overseas. The Department also reviewed information from other sources including, but not limited to, 
UNICEF, UNHCR, the International Organization for Migration, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, the 
Protection Project, media reports and other U.S. Government agencies. 
In the table below we list the variables included in each of the governance indicators.  We use data from 2001 to 
2006 Reports (which refer to years 2000-2005).  
 
 
2005 2004 2003 2002 2000 1998 1996
Voice and Accountability
NA .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Political Stability
NA .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Government Effectiveness
NA .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Regulatory Quality
NA .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Rule of Law
Trafficking in People X X X X X .. ..
Control of Corruption
NA .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Country coverage 149 142 131 116 82 .. ..















































TABLE A26:  State Department / Amnesty International (HUM / PTS) 
 
A26: State Department / Amnesty International - Human Rights Database
http://www.humanrightsdata.com
http://www.unca.edu/politicalscience/images/Colloquium/faculty-staff/Gibney Doc/Political Terror Scale 1980-2004.xls
We gather data from two different studies that have compiled a set of human rights indicators, drawing from the 
State Department's and Amnesty International's Human Rights Reports
The State Department’s Country Reports on Human Rights Practices cover global human rights practices in the
previous calendar years. Reports are generated through data gathered by the State Department from all of its
embassies and representations throughout the world.
The Amnesty International’s Annual Reports cover global human rights conditions for the previous calendar years.
Reports are based on information collected through Amnesty activists as well as from other sources such as
media reports
The Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Dataset contains standards-based quantitative information on
government respect for 13 internationally recognized human rights for 192 countries. It is designed for use by
scholars and students who seek to test theories about the causes and consequences of human rights violations,
as well as policy makers and analysts who seek to estimate the human rights effects of a wide variety of
institutional changes and public policies including democratization, economic aid, military aid, structural
adjustment, and humanitarian intervention.
The Political Terror Scale (PTS) was originally codified by Prof. Marc Gibney of the University of North Carolina. 
The Index captures the reality of domestic political terror, capturing issues such as: imprisonments, tortures, rule 
of law, security, disappearances and executions. 
In the table below we list the variables included in each of the governance indicators.  We use data from the 
1996, 1998, 2000, and 2002-2005 reports.  
 
2005 2004 2003 2002 2000 1998 1996
Voice and Accountability
Restrictions on domestic and foreign travel (CIRI) XXXXXXX
Freedom of political participation (CIRI) XXXXXXX
Imprisonments because of  ethnicity, race, or political, religious beliefs? (CIRI) X X X X X X X
Government censorship (CIRI) XXXXXXX
Political Stability
Frequency of political killings (CIRI) X X X X X X X
Frequency of disappearances (CIRI) X X X X X X X
Frequency of tortures (CIRI) X X X X X X X
Political terror scale (PTS) X X X X X X X
Government Effectiveness
NA .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Regulatory Quality
NA .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Rule of Law
Independence of judiciary (CIRI) X X X X X X X
Control of Corruption
NA .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Country coverage 192 192 159 159 159 159 159
















































TABLE A27:  The World Business Environment Survey (WBS, WDR) 
 
A27. The World Business Environment Survey (WBS)
http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/economics.nsf/Content/IC-WBESConditions
The World Business Environment Survey (WBS) is a survey conducted by the World Bank in collaboration
with several other institutions. It is designed to provide information on the business environment facing
private enterprises. It was conducted during 1999 and 2000 in 81 countries. The respondents were
managers of firms in at least 100 firms per country. This survey asks several questions similar to those in
the 1997 World Development Report survey that we use in constructing the 1998 version of the indicators.
We therefore treat the WBS as the continuation of this source.
The component of the WBS covering transition economies is referred to as the Business Environment and
Enterprise Performance Survey (BPS), described in Table A2. The questionnaire for this region contains
more detailed questions about corruption issues, including questions on "state capture" referring to the
manipulation of the institutions of the state for private gain on a grand scale. In addition, new rounds of
BPS were conducted in 2002 and 2005.  For these reasons, we treat the BPS as a separate source.
In the table below we list the variables included in each of the governance indicators. We use data from
















































2005 2004 2003 2002 2000 1998 1996
Voice and Accountability
Business have voice to express .. .. .. .. X X ..
Business are informed .. .. .. .. X X ..
Political Stability
Political instability .. .. .. .. X .. ..
Likelihood of uncostitutional .. .. .. .. .. X ..
Threat of terrorism .. .. .. .. .. X ..
Government Effectiveness
Quality of customs .. .. .. .. X X ..
Quality of public works (roads,…) .. .. .. .. X X ..
Quality of power company .. .. .. .. X .. ..
Quality of Water .. .. .. .. X .. ..
Quality of public health .. .. .. .. X X ..
Quality of public education .. .. .. .. X .. ..
Quality of central government  .. .. .. .. X .. ..
Quality of central bank .. .. .. .. X .. ..
Efficiency of government in delivering services .. .. .. .. X X ..
Likelihood that when a government official acts against the rules, one can go 
to another official or a superior and get correct treatment
.. .. .. .. .. X ..
Management time spent with bureaucrats .. .. .. .. .. X ..
The efficiency of mail delivery .. .. .. .. .. X ..
Predictability of changes in rules and laws .. .. .. .. .. X ..
Credibility of government's commitment to policies .. .. .. .. .. X ..
Regulatory Quality
Regulations on starting new businesses .. .. .. .. X X ..
Price controls .. .. .. .. X X ..
Regulations on foreign trade .. .. .. .. X X ..
Foreign currency regulations .. .. .. .. X X ..
General uncertainty about regulations .. .. .. .. X X ..
Rule of Law
Corruption of bankers .. .. .. .. X .. ..
Quality of the Police .. .. .. .. X .. ..
Organized crime .. .. .. .. X .. ..
Street crime .. .. .. .. X X ..
Courts--  fair & impartial .. .. .. .. X .. ..
Courts-affordable .. .. .. .. X .. ..
Courts-consistent/predictable .. .. .. .. X X ..
Court's enforceability .. .. .. .. X .. ..
Confidence in judicial system today in insuring property rights .. .. .. .. X X ..
General constraint—functioning of the judiciary .. .. .. .. X .. ..
Obstacles to competition-violation of patents .. .. .. .. X .. ..
Quality of courts .. .. .. .. X .. ..
Control of Corruption
Frequency of additional payments .. .. .. .. X X ..
Dishonest courts .. .. .. .. X .. ..
Corruption as obstacle to business .. .. .. .. X X ..
Bribery (% of Gross revenues) .. .. .. .. X .. ..
Country coverage .. .. .. .. 80 74 ..
















































TABLE A28:  World Economic Forum (GCS, GCSA) 
 
A28. World Economic Forum (GCS)
http://www.weforum.org
The World Economic Forum (WEF) is an independent, not-for-profit organization bringing together top leaders
from business, government, academia and the media to address key economic, social and political issues in
partnership.  The WEF was founded in 1971 and is headquartered in Geneva, Switzerland.  
Since 1996, the WEF has sponsored the Global Competitiveness Report, an annual publication produced in
collaboration with the Harvard Institute for International Development (HIID). As background for this report, the
WEF conducts the Global Competitiveness Survey, which measures the perceptions of business executives
about the country in which they operate. The survey asks top managers to rank on a 1 to 7 scale their opinion on
issues in eight broad areas: 1) Openness, 2) Government, 3) Finance, 4) Infrastructure, 5) Technology, 6)
Management, 7) Labor, and 8) Institutions.
In 1998 and 2002 the WEF sponsored separate surveys of countries in Africa and Middle East, respectively. We
incorporated them in the Global Surveys, resulting in an increase of country coverage in 1998 and 2002 of 20 and
8 countries, respectively.
In the table below we list the variables included in each of the governance indicators. In this paper, we use data 
from the 1996, 1998, 2000, and 2002-2005 Surveys  Additional questions from the 1998 African Competitiveness 
Report (covering 23 African countries overall) have also been listed (GCSA).  
 
2005 2004 2003 2002 2000 1998 1996
Voice and Accountability
Firms are usually informed clearly and transparently by the Government on changes in policies
affecting their industry . .XXX. .. .. .
Newspapers can publish stories of their choosing without fear of censorship or retaliation X X X X .. .. ..
When deciding upon policies and contracts, Government officials favor well-connected firms X X X X .. .. ..
Extent of direct influence of legal contributions to political parties on specific public policy
outcomes . .XXX. .. .. .
Effectiveness of national Parliament/Congress as a law making and oversight institution X X X X .. .. ..
Political Stability
The threat of terrorism in the country imposes significant costs on business X X X X .. .. ..
New Governments honor commitments of previous Governments .. .. .. .. X X X
Likelihood of dramatic changes in institutions .. .. .. .. X X X
The highest power is always peacefully transferred .. .. .. .. .. X ..
Government coups or political instability as an obstacle to development (GCSA) .. .. .. .. .. X ..
Tribal conflict as an obstacle for business development (GCSA) .. .. .. .. .. X ..
Government Effectiveness
Competence of public sector personnel XXXXXXX
Quality of general infrastructure XXXX. .. .X
Quality of public schools XXXX. .. .X
Time spent by senior management dealing with government officials XXXXXXX
Public Service vulnerability to political pressure .. .. .. .. X X X
Wasteful government expenditure X X .. .. X X ..
Strength and expertise of the civil service to avoid drastic interruptions in government services in
times of political instability (GCSA) .. .. .. .. .. X ..
Government economic policies are independent of pressure from special interest groups.
.. .. .. .. X .. ..
















































2005 2004 2003 2002 2000 1998 1996
Regulatory Quality
Administrative regulations are burdensome XXXXXXX
Tax system is distortionary XXXXXXX
Import barriers as obstacle to growth XXXX. .XX
Competition in local market is limited XXXX. .X. .
It is easy to start company .. X X X .. X ..
Anti monopoly policy is lax and ineffective XXXX. .XX
Environmental regulations hurt competitiveness XXXX. .. .. .
Cost of tariffs imposed on business . .XXX. .XX
Government subsidies keep uncompetitive industries alive artificially .. .. X X .. .. X
Complexity of Tax System X X .. .. .. .. ..
Domestic banks are protected from foreign  c o m p e t i t i o n . .. .. .. .. .X ..
Barriers to entry in banking sector are very high .. .. .. .. .. X ..
Interest rates are heavily regulated .. .. .. .. .. X ..
Private sector participation in infrastructure projects is not permitted .. .. .. .. .. X ..
Costs of uncertain rules, laws, or government policies (GCSA) .. .. .. .. .. X ..
Tranfer costs associated with exporting capital as an obstacle to business (GCSA) .. .. .. .. .. X ..
General uncertainty on costs of regulations as an obstacle to business (GCSA) .. .. .. .. .. X ..
Openness of public sector contracts to foreign investors (GCSA) .. .. .. .. .. X ..
Policies for dividend remittances as obstacles to development (GCSA) .. .. .. .. .. X ..
Dominance of state owned or state controlled enterpriese (GCSA) .. .. .. .. .. X ..
State interference in private business (GCSA) .. .. .. .. .. X ..
Regulatory discretionality (GCSA) .. .. .. .. .. X ..
Price controls as an obstacle to business develpoment (GCSA) .. .. .. .. .. X ..
Regulations on foreign trade as an obstacle to business develpoment (GCSA) .. .. .. .. .. X ..
Foreign currency regulations as an obstacle to business develpoment (GCSA) .. .. .. .. .. X ..
Rule of Law
Common crime imposes costs on business X X X X .. .. ..
Organized crime imposes costs on business X X X X X X X
Money laundering through banks is pervasive X X X X .. .. ..
Money laundering through non-banks is pervasive .. X X X .. .. ..
Quality of Police X X X X X X X
Insider trading is pervasive .. X X X .. .. X
The judiciary is independent from political influences of government, citizens, or firms XXXXXX. .
Legal framework to challenge the legality of government actions is inefficient XXXXXXX
Intellectual Property protection is weak  XXXX. .XX
Protection of financial assets is weak XXXXX. .. .
Illegal donation to parties are frequent .. X X X .. .. ..
Private businesses are morel likely to settle disputes outside courts. .. .. .. .. X .. ..
Compliance with court rulings and /or arbitration awards (GCSA) .. .. .. .. .. X ..
Legal system effectiveness at enforcing commercial contracts (GCSA) .. .. .. .. .. X ..
Citizens’ willingness to accept legal means to adjudicate disputes rather than depending
on physical force or illegal means (GCSA)
.. .. .. .. .. X ..
Percentage of firms which are unofficial or unregistered / Tax evasion X X X X X X X
Control of Corruption
Public trust in financial honesty of politicians XXXX. .. .. .
Extent to which legal contributions to political parties are misused by politicians .. X X X .. .. ..
Diversion of public funds due to corruption is common XXXX. .. .. .
Frequency of bribery in the economy XXXX. .X. .
Frequent for firms to make extra payments connected to: public utilities, tax payments,
loan applications, awarding of public contracts, influencing laws, policies regulations,
decrees, getting favourable judicial decisions
XXXXXXX
Extent to which firms' illegal payments to influence government policies impose costs on
other firms
XXXX. .. .. .
Extent to which influence of powerful firms with political ties impose costs on other firms
XXXX. .. .. .
Country Coverage: 117 104 101 88 80 74 58

















































Appendix B:  Components of Aggregate Governance Indicators, 2005
 Table B1:  Voice and Accountability
 
Code Table Concept Measured
Representative Sources
EIU A9 Orderly transfers
Vested interests
Accountability of Public Officials
Human Rights
Freedom of association
FRH A11 Civil liberties: Freedom of speech, of assembly and demonstration, of religion, equal opportunity, of excessive governmental
intervention
Political Rights: free and fair elections, representative legislative, free vote, political parties, no dominant group, respect for
minorities
Freedom of the Press
GCS A28 Newspapers can publish stories of their choosing without fear of censorship or retaliation
When deciding upon policies and contracts, Government officials favor well-connected firms
Effectiveness of national Parliament/Congress as a law making and oversight institution
HUM A26 Travel: domestic and foreign travel restrictions 
Freedom of political participation
Imprisonments: Are there any imprisoned people because of their ethnicity, race, or their political, religious beliefs?
Government censorship
PRS A23 Military in Politics The military are not elected by anyone, so their participation in government, either direct or indirect,
reduces accountability and therefore represents a risk. The threat of military intervention might lead as well to an anticipated
potentially inefficient change in policy or even in government. 
Democratic Accountability. Quantifies how responsive government is to its people, on the basis that the less response there
is the more likely is that the government will fall, peacefully or violently. It includes not only if free and fair elections are in
place, but also how likely is the government to remain in power. 
RSF A24 Press Freedom Index
WMO A15 Institutional permanence: An assessment of how mature and well-established the political system is.
Representativeness:How well the population and organized interests can make their voices heard in the political system
Non-representative Sources




Political and Social Integration
CCR A11 Civil Liberties
Accountability and public voice
FHT A11 Political Process: Deals with elections, referenda, party configuration, conditions for political competition, and popular
participation in elections.
Civil Society: Highlights the degree to which volunteerism, trade unionism, and professional associations exist, and whether
civic organizations are influential
Independent Media: Press freedom, public access to a variety of information sources, and the independence of those
sources from undue government or other influences.
GAL A12   Fairness of elections
Satisfaction with democracy
LOB A20 Satisfaction with democracy
Trust in Parliament
MSI A19 Media Sustainability Index


















































Table B2:  Political Stability
 
Code Table Concept Measured
Representative Sources
DRI A14 Military Coup Risk: A military coup d’etat (or a series of such events) that reduces the GDP growth rate by 2% during any 
12-month period.
Major Insurgency/Rebellion: An increase in scope or intensity of one or more insurgencies/rebellions that reduces the 
GDP growth rate by 3% during any 12-month period.
Political Terrorism: An increase in scope or intensity of terrorism that reduces the GDP growth rate by 1% during any 12-
month period.
Political Assassination: A political assassination (or a series of such events) that reduces the GDP growth rate by 1% 
during any 12-month period.
Civil War: An increase in scope or intensity of one or more civil wars that reduces the GDP growth rate by 4% during any 
12-month period.
Major Urban Riot: An increase in scope, intensity, or frequency of rioting that reduces the GDP growth rate by 1% during 
any 12-month period.




GCS A28 Country terrorist threat: Does the threat of terrorism in the country impose significant costs on firms?
HUM A26 Frequency of political killings
Frequency of disappearances
Frequency of torture
IJT A17 Security Risk Rating
MIG A21 Extremism. The term “extremism” covers the threat posed by any individuals or organisations who hold a narrow set of 
fanatical beliefs. Extremists are likely to believe that any and all means are justified to eradicate the target of hostility, and 
are not afraid to destroy themselves in the process. This ideological aspect of extremism makes it highly unpredictable, 
and its close association with violence makes it highly dangerous. The extent to which extremism should be judged a 
threat to a particular business in a particular market can be assessed along the following lines: integration issues; religious 
tensions; pressure groups; terrorist activity; xenophobia.
PRS A23 Internal Conflict: Assesses political violence and its influence on governance.  
External conflict: The external conflict measure is an assessment both of the risk to the incumbent government and to 
inward investment.
Government Stability.  Measures the government’s ability to carry out its declared programs, and its ability to stay in office. 
Ethnic tensions: This component measures the degree of tension within a country attributable to racial, nationality, or 
language divisions.
PTS A26 Political Terror Scale
WMO A15 Civil unrest How widespread political unrest is, and how great a threat it poses to investors. Demonstrations in themselves
may not be cause for concern, but they will cause major disruption if they escalate into severe violence. At the extreme,
this factor would amount to civil war.
Terrorism Whether the country suffers from a sustained terrorist threat, and from how many sources. The degree of
localization of the threat is assessed, and whether the active groups are likely to target or affect businesses. 
Non-representative Sources
BRI A6 Fractionalization of political spectrum and the power of these factions.
Fractionalization by language, ethnic and/or religious groups and the power of these factions.
Restrictive (coercive) measures required to retain power.
Organization and strength of forces for a radical government.
    Societal conflict involving demonstrations, strikes, and street violence.
Instability as perceived by non-constitutional changes, assassinations, and guerrilla wars.


















































 Table B3:  Government Effectiveness
Code Table Concept Measured
Representative Sources
DRI A14 Government Instability: An increase in government personnel turnover rate at senior levels that reduces the GDP growth rate 
by 2% during any 12-month period.
Government Ineffectiveness: A decline in government personnel quality at any level that reduces the GDP growth rate by 1% 
during any 12-month period.
Institutional Failure: A deterioration of government capacity to cope with national problems as a result of institutional rigidity 
that reduces the GDP growth rate by 1% during any 12-month period.
EGV A13 Global E-government
EIU A9 Quality of bureaucracy
Excessive bureaucracy / red tape
GCS A28 Public Spending Composition
Quality of general infrastructure
Quality of public schools
Time spent by senior management dealing with government officials
MIG A21 Quality of Bureaucracy.
PRS A23 Bureaucratic Quality.  Measures institutional strength and quality of the civil service, assess how much strength and expertise 
bureaucrats have and how able they are to manage political alternations without drastic interruptions in government services, 
or policy changes.
WMO A15 Policy consistency and forward planning: How confident businesses can be of the continuity of economic policy stance -
whether a change of government will entail major policy disruption, and whether the current government has pursued a
coherent strategy. 
Bureaucracy : An assessment of the quality of the country’s bureaucracy. The better the bureaucracy the quicker decisions 
are made and the more easily foreign investors can go about their business.
Non-representative Sources
ADB A1 Management of public debt
Policies to improve efficiency of public sector
Revenue Mobilization 
Budget Management
AFR A2 Based on your experiences, how easy or difficult is it to obtain household services (like electricity or telephone)?
Based on your experiences, how easy or difficult is it to obtain an identity document (like birth certificate, passport)?
Government handling of health services
Government handling of education
ASD A3 Civil service
Revenue Mobilization and Budget Management
Management and Efficiency of Public Expenditures
BPS A5 How problematic are telecommunications for the growth of your business 
How problematic is electricity for the growth of your business.
How problematic is transportation for the growth of your business.
BRI A6   Bureaucratic delays
BTI A4   Consensus Building
Governance Capability
Effective Use of Resources




FHT A11 Government and Administration: Government decentralization, independent and responsibilities or local and regional
governments, and legislative and executive transparency are discussed.
LBO A20 Trust in Government
WCY A18 Government economic policies do not adapt quickly to changes in the economy
The public service is not independent from political interference
Government decisions are not effectively implemented
Bureaucracy hinders business activity
The distribution infrastructure of goods and services is generally inefficient


















































 Table B4:  Regulatory Quality
 
Code Table Concept Measured
Representative Sources
DRI A14 Regulations -- Exports: A 2% reduction in export volume as a result of a worsening in export regulations or restrictions 
(such as export limits) during any 12-month period, with respect to the level at the time of the assessment.
Regulations -- Imports: A 2% reduction in import volume as a result of a worsening in import regulations or restrictions 
(such as import quotas) during any 12-month period, with respect to the level at the time of the assessment.
Regulations -- Other Business: An increase in other regulatory burdens, with respect to the level at the time of the 
assessment, that reduces total aggregate investment in real LCU terms by 10%
Ownership of Business by Non-Residents: A 1-point increase on a scale from "0" to "10" in legal restrictions on ownership 
of business by non-residents during any 12-month period.
Ownership of Equities by Non-Residents: A 1-point increase on a scale from "0" to "10" in legal restrictions on ownership 
of equities by non-residents during any 12-month period.




GCS A28 Administrative regulations are burdensome
Tax system is distortionary
Import barriers as obstacle to growth
Competition in local market is limited
Anti monopoly policy is lax and ineffective
Environmental regulations hurt competitiveness







MIG A21 Unfair Competition. 
Unfair Trade. 
PRS A23 Investment Profile.
WMO A15 Tax Effectiveness: How efficient the country’s tax collection system is. 

















































 Table B4:  Regulatory Quality (cont.)
 
Code Table Concept Measured
Non-representative Sources
ADB A1 Trade policy
Competitive environment
Labor Market Policies
ASD A3 Trade Policy and Forex Regime
Enabling Environment for Private Sector Development
BPS A5 Information on the laws and regulations is easy to obtain
How problematic are anti competitive practices for the growth of your business.
How problematic are unpredictable regulations for the growth of your business.
How problematic are labor regulations for the growth of your business.
  How problematic are tax regulations for the growth of your business.
How problematic are custom and trade regulations for the growth of your business.
BTI A4 Competition
Price Stability
CPIA A8 Competitive environment
Trade policy
EBRD A10 Price liberalization 
Trade & foreign exchange system 
Competition policy 
WCY A18 Access to capital markets (foreign and domestic) is easily available
Ease of Doing Business
Banking regulation does not hinder competitiveness
Competition legislation in your country does not prevent unfair competition
Customs' authorities do not facilitate the efficient transit of goods
Financial institutions' transparency is not widely developed in your country
Easy to start company
Foreign investors are free to acquire control in domestic companies
Price controls affect pricing of products in most industries
Public sector contracts are sufficiently open to foreign bidders
Real corporate taxes are non distortionary
Real personal taxes are non distortionary
The exchange rate policy of your country hinders the competitiveness of enterprises
The legal framework is detrimental to your country's competitiveness
Protectionism in your country negatively affects the conduct of business in your country
Labor regulations hinder business activities


















































 Table B5:  Rule of Law
Code Table Concept Measured
Representative Sources
DRI A14 Losses and Costs of Crime: A 1-point increase on a scale from "0" to "10" in crime during any 12-month period.
Kidnapping of Foreigners: An increase in scope, intensity, or frequency of kidnapping of foreigners that reduces the GDP 
growth rate by 1% during any 12-month period.
  Enforceability of Government Contracts: A 1 point decline on a scale from "0" to "10" in the enforceability of contracts during 
any 12-month period.
Enforceability of Private Contracts: A 1-point decline on a scale from "0" to "10" in the legal enforceability of contracts during 
any 12-month period.
EIU A9 Violent crime
Organized crime
Fairness of judicial process
Enforceability of contracts
Speediness of judicial process
Confiscation/expropriation
GCS A28 Common crime imposes costs on business
Organized crime imposes costs on business
Money laundering through banks is pervasive
Quality of Police
The judiciary is independent from political influences of members of government, citizens or firms
Legal framework to challenge the legality of government actions is inefficient
Intellectual Property protection is weak 
Protection of financial assets is weak
Tax evasion
HER A16 Black market
Property Rights
HUM A26 Independence of Judiciary
MIG A21 Organised Crime.
Legal Safeguards.
PRS A23 Law and Order.  The Law sub-component is an assessment of the strength and impartiality of the legal system, while the 
Order sub-component is an assessment of popular observance of the law (assessed separately).
QLM A6 Direct Financial Fraud, Money Laundering and Organized Crime
WMO A15 Judicial Independence An assessment of how far the state and other outside actors can influence and distort the legal 
system. This will determine the level of legal impartiality investors can expect. 
Crime - How much of a threat businesses face from crime such as kidnapping, extortion, street violence, burglary... 
Non-representative Sources
ADB A1 Property Rights
AFR A2 Based on your experiences, how easy or difficult is it to obtain help from the police when you need it?
ASD A3 Rule of Law
BPS A5 Fairness, honesty, enforceability, quickness and affordability of the court system
Property right protection
How problematic is organized crime for the growth of your business.
  How problematic is judiciary for the growth of your business.
How problematic is street crime for the growth of your business.
BRI A6 Enforceability of contracts
BTI A4 Rule of Law
Private Property
CCR A11 Rule of Law
CPIA A8 Property rights
FHT A11 Rule of Law: Considers judicial/constitutional matters as well as the legal and de facto status of ethnic minorities.
GAL A12 Trust in the Legal System
LBO A20 Trust in Judiciary
Trust in Police
Have you been a victim of crime?
WCY A18 Tax evasion is a common practice in your country
  Justice is not fairly administered in society
Personal security and private property are not adequately protected
Parallel economy impairs economic development in your country
















































 Table B6: Control of Corruption
 
Code Table Concept Measured
Representative Sources
DRI A14 Risk Event Outcome non-price: Losses and Costs of Corruption: A 1-point increase on a scale from "0" to "10" in corruption 
during any 12-month period.
EIU A9 Corruption
GCS A28 Public trust in financial honesty of politicians
Diversion of public funds due to corruption is common
Frequent for firms to make extra payments connected to: import/export permits
Frequent for firms to make extra payments connected to: public utilities
Frequent for firms to make extra payments connected to tax payments
Frequent for firms to make extra payments connected to: awarding of public contracts
Frequent for firms to make extra payments connected to: getting favorable judicial decisions
Extent to which firms' illegal payments to influence government policies impose costs on other firms
MIG A21 Corruption. There is an immense variety of activities that may be construed as corrupt. Bribery is the most obvious. 
However, what is and is not a bribe is a matter of presentation and perception in much the same way as “corruption” itself. 
Some of the issues that executives should consider include: accounting standards; anti-corruption policy credibility and 
enforceability; cronyism, nepotism and vested interests; cultural differences; judicial independence; transparency of 
decision-making. 
PRS A23 Corruption.  Measures corruption within the political system, which distorts the economic and financial environment, 
reduces the efficiency of government and business by enabling people to assume positions of power through patronage 
rather than ability, and introduces an inherently instability in the political system.  
QLM A6 Indirect Diversion of Funds
WMO A15 Corruption: This index assesses the intrusiveness of the country’s bureaucracy. The amount of red tape likely to countered
is assessed, as is the likelihood of encountering corrupt officials and other groups. 
Non-representative Sources
ADB A1 Transparency / corruption
AFR A2 How many elected leaders (parliamentarians or local councilors) do you think are involved in corruption?
How many judges and magistrates do you think are involved in corruption?
How many government officials do you think are involved in corruption?
How many border/tax officials do you think are involved in corruption?
ASD A3 Anti-corruption
BPS A5 How common is for firms to have to pay irregular additional payments to get things done
On average, what percent of total annual sales do firms pay in unofficial payments to public officials
How often do firms make extra payments to influence the content of new legislation
Extent to which firms' payments to public officials to affect legislation impose costs on other firms
How problematic is corruption for the growth of your business.
Frequency of bribery in utility, permits, procurement, health, fire inspection, environent, taxes, customs and judiciary
BRI A6 Internal Causes of Political Risk: Mentality, including xenophobia, nationalism, corruption, nepotism, willingness to
compromise, etc.
CCR A11   Transparency / corruption
CPIA A8   Transparency / corruption
FHT A11 Corruption
GAL A12 Frequency of corruption
Frequency of household bribery
LBO A20 Have you heard of acts of corruption?
Percentage of corrupt public officials
PRC A22 Corruption Index
















































APPENDIX C: Governance Indicators over Time 
TABLE C1: Voice and Accountability
2005 2004 2003 2002 2000 1998 1996
Country Code Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N.
AFGHANISTAN AFG -1.28 0.15 6 -1.38 0.14 9 -1.27 0.17 7 -1.39 0.24 5 -1.86 0.33 2 -1.78 0.30 2 -1.60 0.38 2
ALBANIA ALB 0.08 0.12 9 0.02 0.11 9 -0.02 0.12 7 -0.15 0.14 6 -0.10 0.17 6 -0.33 0.20 5 -0.40 0.23 4
ALGERIA DZA -0.92 0.12 9 -0.91 0.15 9 -1.08 0.16 8 -1.00 0.18 7 -1.33 0.24 5 -1.55 0.24 4 -1.23 0.22 4
AMERICAN SAMOA ASM 0.59 0.55 1 0.44 0.53 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
ANDORRA ADO 1.26 0.20 3 1.23 0.21 3 1.34 0.22 2 1.54 0.30 2 1.36 0.38 1 1.41 0.35 1 1.39 0.43 1
ANGOLA AGO -1.15 0.12 8 -1.02 0.16 8 -1.13 0.17 7 -1.46 0.18 7 -1.47 0.24 5 -1.38 0.24 4 -1.50 0.22 4
A N G U I L L A A I A 0 . 8 1 0 . 5 5 1 0 . 7 5 0 . 5 3 1. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .
ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA ATG 0.54 0.20 3 0.48 0.21 3 0.10 0.22 2 0.12 0.30 2 -0.07 0.38 1 -0.01 0.35 1 0.12 0.43 1
ARGENTINA ARG 0.43 0.14 11 0.46 0.15 12 0.37 0.16 11 0.02 0.17 11 0.50 0.23 8 0.30 0.23 6 0.55 0.21 6
ARMENIA ARM -0.64 0.12 9 -0.66 0.11 9 -0.53 0.12 7 -0.49 0.14 6 -0.37 0.17 6 -0.38 0.20 5 -0.63 0.25 3
ARUBA ABW 1.03 0.55 1 0.65 0.53 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
AUSTRALIA AUS 1.32 0.16 8 1.44 0.16 10 1.37 0.16 10 1.49 0.17 9 1.48 0.24 6 1.39 0.24 5 1.68 0.22 5
AUSTRIA AUT 1.24 0.16 9 1.26 0.17 9 1.20 0.17 9 1.28 0.18 9 1.12 0.24 6 1.24 0.24 6 1.39 0.22 5
AZERBAIJAN AZE -1.16 0.11 10 -0.97 0.10 11 -0.88 0.12 9 -0.92 0.13 9 -0.89 0.17 7 -1.04 0.19 6 -1.16 0.19 4
BAHAMAS BHS 1.14 0.19 4 1.14 0.20 4 1.12 0.20 3 1.15 0.26 3 1.09 0.29 2 1.05 0.29 2 1.05 0.34 2
BAHRAIN BHR -0.85 0.14 8 -0.72 0.14 9 -0.69 0.17 6 -0.76 0.18 7 -1.22 0.24 5 -1.24 0.24 4 -1.02 0.22 4
BANGLADESH BGD -0.50 0.12 9 -0.66 0.15 9 -0.57 0.16 8 -0.56 0.18 8 -0.40 0.24 6 -0.25 0.24 4 -0.40 0.22 4
BARBADOS BRB 1.12 0.20 3 1.17 0.21 3 1.21 0.22 2 1.36 0.30 2 1.18 0.38 1 1.41 0.35 1 1.18 0.43 1
BELARUS BLR -1.68 0.12 8 -1.53 0.11 9 -1.48 0.12 8 -1.42 0.14 8 -1.32 0.17 6 -1.07 0.20 5 -1.10 0.25 3
BELGIUM BEL 1.31 0.16 8 1.36 0.17 8 1.34 0.17 8 1.41 0.18 8 1.10 0.24 6 1.31 0.24 5 1.44 0.22 5
BELIZE BLZ 0.92 0.20 3 0.91 0.21 3 0.82 0.21 3 0.77 0.28 3 0.81 0.33 3 0.98 0.30 2 1.05 0.38 2
BENIN BEN 0.34 0.15 7 0.27 0.18 6 0.48 0.19 5 -0.08 0.24 5 0.40 0.31 3 0.58 0.29 3 0.70 0.38 2
BERMUDA BMU 1.03 0.55 1 1.00 0.53 1 1.03 0.54 1 1.05 0.47 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
BHUTAN BTN -1.05 0.15 5 -1.18 0.20 4 -1.26 0.20 4 -1.18 0.26 4 -1.70 0.33 2 -1.64 0.30 2 -1.47 0.38 2
BOLIVIA BOL -0.09 0.12 11 -0.02 0.15 10 0.12 0.16 9 -0.04 0.18 9 0.29 0.24 6 0.41 0.23 6 0.03 0.21 5
BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA BIH -0.11 0.12 9 -0.15 0.11 10 -0.19 0.12 8 -0.36 0.15 8 -0.43 0.19 5 -1.20 0.21 3 -1.28 0.38 2
BOTSWANA BWA 0.68 0.14 9 0.77 0.15 10 0.69 0.16 9 0.70 0.18 8 0.79 0.23 7 0.77 0.24 4 0.69 0.22 4
BRAZIL BRA 0.36 0.14 10 0.33 0.15 12 0.39 0.16 10 0.27 0.17 11 0.50 0.24 7 0.57 0.23 7 0.16 0.21 6
BRUNEI BRN -1.04 0.19 4 -1.10 0.20 4 -1.06 0.19 4 -0.85 0.23 5 -1.17 0.27 3 -1.23 0.26 3 -1.04 0.32 3
BULGARIA BGR 0.59 0.11 11 0.57 0.11 12 0.50 0.12 11 0.51 0.13 11 0.54 0.17 8 0.43 0.19 6 0.11 0.18 5
BURKINA FASO BFA -0.37 0.13 7 -0.39 0.17 6 -0.28 0.19 5 -0.30 0.23 5 -0.36 0.26 4 -0.29 0.26 3 -0.54 0.32 3
BURUNDI BDI -1.15 0.16 5 -1.14 0.18 5 -1.12 0.20 4 -1.22 0.26 4 -1.72 0.31 3 -1.66 0.30 2 -1.34 0.38 2
CAMBODIA KHM -0.94 0.16 6 -0.89 0.16 6 -0.76 0.20 4 -0.58 0.26 4 -0.45 0.33 3 -0.95 0.30 2 -0.76 0.38 2
CAMEROON CMR -1.19 0.14 9 -1.17 0.16 8 -1.16 0.17 8 -1.12 0.19 7 -1.09 0.24 6 -0.89 0.24 5 -1.12 0.22 4
CANADA CAN 1.32 0.16 9 1.37 0.16 10 1.31 0.16 10 1.43 0.17 10 1.18 0.23 8 1.16 0.24 6 1.39 0.22 5
CAPE VERDE CPV 0.83 0.18 5 0.79 0.20 5 0.80 0.21 4 0.32 0.29 4 0.82 0.38 1 0.88 0.35 1 0.86 0.43 1
CAYMAN ISLANDS CYM 0.81 0.55 1 0.77 0.53 1 0.81 0.54 1 1.50 0.47 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC CAF -1.15 0.16 5 -1.21 0.18 5 -1.14 0.20 4 -0.86 0.26 4 -0.60 0.33 2 -0.01 0.30 2 -0.21 0.38 2
CHAD TCD -1.25 0.16 6 -1.09 0.18 6 -1.00 0.19 5 -1.01 0.26 4 -0.97 0.33 2 -0.91 0.29 3 -0.83 0.38 2
CHILE CHL 1.04 0.14 10 1.05 0.15 11 1.07 0.16 10 1.09 0.17 10 0.47 0.23 8 0.59 0.23 6 0.89 0.21 6
CHINA CHN -1.66 0.12 10 -1.52 0.15 10 -1.60 0.16 9 -1.37 0.17 9 -1.58 0.24 7 -1.72 0.24 5 -1.36 0.22 5
COLOMBIA COL -0.32 0.12 12 -0.53 0.15 10 -0.50 0.16 9 -0.59 0.18 10 -0.43 0.23 8 -0.26 0.23 7 -0.13 0.21 6
COMOROS COM -0.28 0.19 4 -0.14 0.20 4 -0.55 0.21 3 -0.52 0.29 3 -0.54 0.38 1 -0.10 0.35 1 -0.18 0.43 1
CONGO COG -0.71 0.18 5 -0.81 0.18 6 -0.75 0.18 6 -1.13 0.22 6 -1.55 0.26 4 -1.00 0.26 4 -1.33 0.32 3
Congo, Dem. Rep. (Zaire) ZAR -1.64 0.14 7 -1.66 0.15 8 -1.62 0.17 7 -1.96 0.23 5 -1.95 0.26 4 -1.72 0.26 3 -1.29 0.32 3
COSTA RICA CRI 0.99 0.14 10 1.13 0.15 11 1.08 0.16 9 1.13 0.17 10 1.26 0.24 6 1.21 0.23 6 1.32 0.21 5
CROATIA HRV 0.51 0.11 11 0.46 0.11 11 0.47 0.12 9 0.44 0.13 10 0.32 0.17 7 -0.32 0.19 5 -0.57 0.19 4
CUBA CUB -1.87 0.14 7 -1.85 0.15 8 -1.99 0.17 7 -1.77 0.18 7 -1.87 0.24 4 -1.79 0.24 4 -1.46 0.22 4
CYPRUS CYP 1.03 0.16 7 1.02 0.17 8 1.03 0.17 7 0.94 0.18 6 1.14 0.24 4 1.00 0.24 4 1.01 0.22 4
CZECH REPUBLIC CZE 1.01 0.11 11 1.02 0.11 11 0.92 0.12 10 0.86 0.14 9 0.99 0.17 8 1.08 0.19 7 1.01 0.18 6
DENMARK DNK 1.51 0.16 9 1.60 0.16 10 1.51 0.16 10 1.70 0.17 10 1.35 0.23 7 1.40 0.24 5 1.69 0.22 5
DJIBOUTI DJI -0.84 0.19 4 -0.85 0.20 4 -0.88 0.21 3 -0.76 0.29 3 -0.63 0.38 1 -0.80 0.35 1 -0.85 0.43 1
DOMINICA DMA 1.12 0.20 3 1.13 0.21 3 1.14 0.22 2 0.99 0.30 2 1.18 0.38 1 1.24 0.35 1 1.22 0.43 1
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC DOM 0.20 0.14 10 0.26 0.16 9 0.24 0.17 7 0.13 0.19 7 0.48 0.24 6 -0.01 0.24 4 -0.05 0.22 4
ECUADOR ECU -0.16 0.12 11 -0.13 0.15 10 -0.09 0.16 9 -0.11 0.18 8 -0.17 0.24 6 0.30 0.23 6 0.00 0.21 5
EGYPT EGY -1.15 0.12 9 -1.02 0.15 9 -1.11 0.16 8 -0.88 0.18 8 -0.91 0.24 6 -0.89 0.24 4 -0.80 0.22 4
EL SALVADOR SLV 0.26 0.14 9 0.27 0.16 9 0.24 0.16 8 0.01 0.18 8 0.41 0.24 6 0.08 0.23 5 -0.30 0.21 5
EQUATORIAL GUINEA GNQ -1.71 0.19 4 -1.71 0.20 4 -1.58 0.21 3 -1.46 0.29 3 -1.55 0.38 1 -1.64 0.35 1 -1.56 0.43 1
ERITREA ERI -1.83 0.13 6 -1.91 0.18 6 -1.96 0.19 5 -2.09 0.24 5 -1.51 0.31 3 -1.13 0.30 2 -1.17 0.38 2
ESTONIA EST 1.05 0.12 10 1.10 0.11 12 0.99 0.12 10 0.97 0.14 9 0.89 0.16 9 0.78 0.19 6 0.72 0.19 4
ETHIOPIA ETH -1.10 0.12 10 -1.05 0.15 9 -1.08 0.16 8 -1.17 0.22 6 -1.06 0.26 5 -0.74 0.26 3 -0.68 0.32 3
FIJI FJI 0.18 0.19 4 0.13 0.19 5 0.07 0.19 5 -0.12 0.25 4 0.05 0.31 3 0.03 0.29 3 -0.14 0.38 2
FINLAND FIN 1.49 0.16 9 1.52 0.17 9 1.49 0.17 8 1.68 0.18 9 1.47 0.23 7 1.39 0.24 5 1.67 0.22 5
FRANCE FRA 1.28 0.16 9 1.25 0.16 10 1.18 0.16 10 1.24 0.17 9 0.98 0.23 8 1.06 0.24 6 1.46 0.22 5
FRENCH GUIANA GUF 0.37 0.55 1 0.44 0.53 1 0.38 0.54 1 0.39 0.47 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
GABON GAB -0.71 0.16 6 -0.71 0.17 6 -0.64 0.17 6 -0.45 0.19 6 -0.49 0.24 5 -0.27 0.24 4 -0.61 0.22 4
GAMBIA GMB -0.72 0.18 6 -0.64 0.18 7 -0.62 0.18 7 -1.08 0.22 6 -1.06 0.27 3 -1.27 0.26 3 -1.43 0.32 3
GEORGIA GEO -0.27 0.12 8 -0.38 0.11 11 -0.37 0.12 8 -0.40 0.15 7 -0.26 0.18 6 -0.44 0.21 4 -0.58 0.25 3
GERMANY DEU 1.31 0.16 9 1.37 0.16 10 1.32 0.16 10 1.45 0.17 10 1.18 0.23 8 1.25 0.24 6 1.51 0.22 5  
Note:  “Est.” refers to estimate, “S.E.” refers to standard errors, and “N.” refers to number of sources.  The 
standard errors have the following interpretation: there is roughly a 70% chance that the level of governance lies 















































TABLE C1: Voice and Accountability (cont.)
2005 2004 2003 2002 2000 1998 1996
Country Code Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N.
GHANA GHA 0.41 0.14 10 0.33 0.15 11 0.35 0.16 9 0.01 0.18 8 -0.13 0.24 7 -0.51 0.24 5 -0.41 0.22 4
GREECE GRC 0.95 0.16 9 0.92 0.17 9 0.96 0.17 9 1.01 0.18 8 0.94 0.24 5 0.82 0.24 5 0.93 0.22 5
GRENADA GRD 0.84 0.20 3 0.84 0.20 4 0.90 0.22 2 0.61 0.30 2 0.95 0.38 1 1.01 0.35 1 0.99 0.43 1
G U A M G U M 0 . 5 9 0 . 5 5 1 0 . 5 2 0 . 5 3 1. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .
GUATEMALA GTM -0.37 0.14 10 -0.38 0.14 12 -0.50 0.16 9 -0.51 0.17 10 -0.21 0.24 6 -0.39 0.23 5 -0.71 0.21 5
GUINEA GIN -1.18 0.15 6 -1.12 0.17 6 -1.28 0.19 5 -1.24 0.23 5 -1.18 0.27 3 -1.05 0.26 4 -1.21 0.32 3
GUINEA-BISSAU GNB -0.31 0.18 5 -0.65 0.18 6 -0.95 0.18 6 -0.84 0.22 6 -0.87 0.26 4 -0.34 0.26 4 -0.61 0.32 3
GUYANA GUY 0.49 0.18 5 0.61 0.20 4 0.68 0.19 4 0.59 0.24 4 0.86 0.26 4 0.92 0.26 3 0.85 0.32 3
HAITI HTI -1.41 0.15 6 -1.51 0.15 8 -1.27 0.18 7 -1.15 0.21 7 -0.87 0.26 5 -0.69 0.26 3 -0.54 0.32 3
HONDURAS HND -0.14 0.12 10 -0.05 0.15 10 -0.07 0.16 9 -0.23 0.18 8 0.12 0.24 6 0.23 0.23 5 -0.43 0.21 5
HONG KONG HKG 0.26 0.17 8 0.22 0.17 8 0.41 0.25 7 0.16 0.19 8 -0.52 0.26 5 -0.30 0.26 5 0.49 0.23 4
HUNGARY HUN 1.10 0.12 10 1.16 0.11 11 1.09 0.12 10 1.12 0.14 10 1.09 0.16 9 1.09 0.19 7 1.02 0.18 6
ICELAND ISL 1.38 0.17 8 1.42 0.18 8 1.40 0.18 8 1.50 0.22 7 1.38 0.26 5 1.31 0.26 4 1.40 0.31 4
INDIA IND 0.35 0.14 10 0.29 0.15 11 0.24 0.16 10 0.36 0.17 10 0.40 0.24 7 0.18 0.24 6 0.23 0.22 5
INDONESIA IDN -0.21 0.14 10 -0.43 0.14 12 -0.45 0.16 10 -0.52 0.17 10 -0.54 0.24 7 -1.45 0.24 5 -1.22 0.22 5
IRAN IRN -1.43 0.12 8 -1.38 0.15 8 -1.46 0.17 7 -1.10 0.18 7 -0.82 0.24 5 -1.08 0.24 4 -1.16 0.22 4
IRAQ IRQ -1.47 0.14 7 -1.72 0.16 7 -1.61 0.17 6 -2.15 0.19 6 -2.24 0.24 5 -2.03 0.24 4 -1.80 0.22 4
IRELAND IRL 1.41 0.16 9 1.33 0.16 10 1.27 0.16 9 1.40 0.17 10 1.38 0.23 7 1.30 0.24 6 1.44 0.22 5
ISRAEL ISR 0.61 0.16 9 0.48 0.16 10 0.60 0.16 9 0.59 0.17 10 0.89 0.24 6 0.97 0.24 5 1.03 0.22 5
ITALY ITA 1.00 0.16 9 1.07 0.17 9 1.02 0.17 9 1.06 0.18 9 1.01 0.23 8 1.17 0.24 6 1.05 0.22 5
IVORY COAST CIV -1.50 0.14 7 -1.46 0.15 8 -1.35 0.17 7 -1.28 0.18 7 -1.35 0.24 5 -0.77 0.24 5 -0.25 0.22 4
JAMAICA JAM 0.57 0.14 8 0.53 0.16 8 0.47 0.17 7 0.48 0.19 6 0.72 0.24 4 0.68 0.24 5 0.49 0.22 4
JAPAN JPN 0.94 0.16 9 0.99 0.16 10 1.00 0.16 10 0.97 0.17 10 0.86 0.23 7 1.01 0.26 4 1.02 0.22 5
JORDAN JOR -0.74 0.14 9 -0.67 0.14 10 -0.60 0.17 8 -0.43 0.18 7 -0.38 0.24 5 -0.38 0.24 5 -0.22 0.22 4
KAZAKHSTAN KAZ -1.19 0.11 10 -1.21 0.10 11 -1.15 0.12 9 -1.17 0.13 9 -0.99 0.17 8 -0.80 0.19 6 -1.08 0.19 4
KENYA KEN -0.12 0.14 10 -0.31 0.14 12 -0.29 0.16 10 -0.69 0.18 8 -0.88 0.24 6 -0.89 0.24 5 -0.56 0.22 4
KIRIBATI KIR 0.87 0.20 3 0.85 0.21 3 1.05 0.23 1 1.01 0.37 1 1.12 0.38 1 1.22 0.35 1 1.13 0.43 1
KOREA, NORTH PRK -2.06 0.14 7 -2.04 0.15 8 -2.24 0.17 7 -2.38 0.22 6 -2.11 0.27 3 -2.03 0.26 3 -1.92 0.32 3
KOREA, SOUTH KOR 0.74 0.14 10 0.76 0.15 11 0.63 0.16 10 0.64 0.17 10 0.72 0.23 7 0.66 0.24 6 0.65 0.22 5
KOSOVO LWI -0.46 0.19 3 .. .. .. 0.88 0.89 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
KUWAIT KWT -0.47 0.15 8 -0.45 0.17 7 -0.47 0.17 7 -0.27 0.18 8 -0.39 0.24 4 -0.47 0.24 4 -0.25 0.22 4
KYRGYZ REPUBLIC KGZ -1.03 0.12 7 -1.08 0.11 9 -1.06 0.12 7 -0.98 0.15 7 -0.75 0.19 4 -0.52 0.21 4 -0.55 0.25 3
LAOS LAO -1.54 0.13 7 -1.54 0.18 5 -1.86 0.20 4 -1.74 0.26 4 -1.52 0.31 3 -1.34 0.30 2 -1.18 0.38 2
LATVIA LVA 0.89 0.12 9 0.96 0.11 10 0.94 0.13 8 0.86 0.14 7 0.84 0.17 6 0.73 0.19 6 0.46 0.19 4
LEBANON LBN -0.72 0.14 7 -0.79 0.16 7 -0.82 0.17 6 -0.56 0.18 7 -0.50 0.24 5 -0.67 0.24 4 -0.50 0.22 4
LESOTHO LSO 0.28 0.18 5 0.26 0.20 5 0.22 0.20 5 -0.20 0.28 4 -0.21 0.32 3 -0.09 0.30 2 -0.04 0.38 2
LIBERIA LBR -0.92 0.15 6 -1.26 0.17 7 -1.61 0.18 6 -1.57 0.22 6 -1.24 0.26 4 -1.01 0.26 3 -1.48 0.32 3
LIBYA LBY -1.93 0.12 8 -1.78 0.16 7 -1.85 0.17 6 -1.71 0.19 6 -1.75 0.24 4 -1.70 0.24 4 -1.53 0.22 4
LIECHTENSTEIN LIE 1.26 0.20 3 1.28 0.21 3 1.27 0.22 2 1.45 0.30 2 1.36 0.38 1 1.41 0.35 1 1.39 0.43 1
LITHUANIA LTU 0.90 0.11 10 0.98 0.11 11 0.99 0.12 9 0.85 0.14 8 0.96 0.17 8 0.86 0.19 6 0.71 0.19 4
LUXEMBOURG LUX 1.34 0.18 6 1.41 0.19 7 1.33 0.19 7 1.38 0.23 6 1.29 0.26 5 1.32 0.26 4 1.45 0.31 4
MACAO MAC 0.37 0.55 1 0.11 0.53 1 0.60 0.54 1 0.39 0.47 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
MACEDONIA MKD 0.03 0.11 10 -0.02 0.11 10 -0.03 0.12 9 -0.36 0.14 7 -0.08 0.18 5 0.01 0.20 5 -0.13 0.19 4
MADAGASCAR MDG -0.01 0.15 8 0.06 0.17 7 -0.06 0.18 6 -0.08 0.23 5 0.21 0.26 5 0.36 0.26 4 0.21 0.32 3
MALAWI MWI -0.45 0.14 9 -0.52 0.16 9 -0.34 0.17 8 -0.62 0.19 7 -0.31 0.23 7 -0.11 0.24 5 -0.50 0.22 4
MALAYSIA MYS -0.41 0.14 10 -0.35 0.14 12 -0.39 0.16 10 -0.30 0.17 10 -0.35 0.23 8 -0.22 0.24 6 -0.11 0.22 5
MALDIVES MDV -1.09 0.19 4 -1.07 0.20 4 -1.01 0.21 3 -0.72 0.30 2 -1.02 0.38 1 -1.13 0.35 1 -1.07 0.43 1
MALI MLI 0.47 0.15 8 0.35 0.17 9 0.35 0.18 8 0.10 0.22 7 0.26 0.25 5 0.37 0.26 4 0.26 0.32 3
MALTA MLT 1.18 0.18 5 1.26 0.20 5 1.28 0.20 4 1.25 0.26 3 1.34 0.29 2 1.31 0.29 2 1.06 0.34 2
MARSHALL ISLANDS MHL 1.19 0.21 2 1.14 0.23 2 1.23 0.23 1 1.20 0.37 1 1.27 0.38 1 1.32 0.35 1 1.18 0.43 1
M A R T I N I Q U E M T Q 0 . 5 9 0 . 5 5 1 0 . 6 9 0 . 5 3 1 0 . 6 0 0 . 5 4 1 0 . 6 1 0 . 4 7 1. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .
MAURITANIA MRT -1.09 0.15 5 -1.17 0.20 4 -0.74 0.20 4 -0.68 0.26 4 -0.75 0.31 3 -1.00 0.30 2 -0.91 0.38 2
MAURITIUS MUS 0.92 0.15 7 1.01 0.18 6 0.90 0.18 6 0.76 0.20 6 1.29 0.28 4 0.99 0.26 4 0.82 0.24 3
MEXICO MEX 0.29 0.14 11 0.31 0.15 12 0.38 0.16 11 0.26 0.17 11 0.05 0.23 8 -0.30 0.23 7 -0.30 0.21 6
MICRONESIA FSM 1.11 0.20 3 1.00 0.21 3 0.96 0.23 1 0.89 0.37 1 0.93 0.38 1 0.94 0.35 1 1.14 0.43 1
MOLDOVA MDA -0.49 0.11 11 -0.47 0.11 10 -0.38 0.12 8 -0.38 0.13 7 -0.06 0.17 7 -0.13 0.19 6 -0.28 0.19 4
MONACO MCO 0.96 0.21 2 0.90 0.23 2 1.05 0.23 1 1.09 0.37 1 1.08 0.38 1 1.14 0.35 1 1.12 0.43 1
MONGOLIA MNG 0.36 0.15 7 0.48 0.17 7 0.51 0.18 6 0.44 0.22 6 0.68 0.26 4 0.56 0.20 4 0.32 0.32 3
MOROCCO MAR -0.76 0.14 8 -0.56 0.14 10 -0.62 0.16 8 -0.34 0.18 8 -0.51 0.24 4 -0.58 0.24 5 -0.70 0.22 4
MOZAMBIQUE MOZ -0.06 0.13 9 -0.11 0.17 9 -0.10 0.18 8 -0.30 0.22 7 -0.30 0.26 4 -0.13 0.26 4 -0.26 0.32 3
MYANMAR MMR -2.16 0.14 7 -2.19 0.15 8 -2.18 0.17 7 -2.08 0.18 7 -2.24 0.24 5 -2.02 0.24 4 -1.80 0.22 4
NAMIBIA NAM 0.36 0.14 9 0.40 0.15 10 0.33 0.16 9 0.29 0.18 9 0.33 0.23 7 0.38 0.24 4 0.46 0.22 4
NAURU NRU 1.03 0.21 2 1.08 0.23 2 0.86 0.23 1 0.77 0.37 1 0.85 0.38 1 0.98 0.35 1 0.84 0.43 1
NEPAL NPL -1.19 0.15 6 -1.00 0.15 8 -0.69 0.17 6 -0.55 0.24 5 -0.18 0.31 3 -0.08 0.30 2 0.09 0.38 2
NETHERLANDS NLD 1.45 0.16 9 1.51 0.17 9 1.41 0.17 9 1.61 0.18 9 1.36 0.23 7 1.39 0.24 5 1.66 0.22 5
N E T H E R L A N D S  A N T I L L E S A N T 0 . 5 9 0 . 5 5 1 0 . 4 4 0 . 5 3 1. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .
NEW ZEALAND NZL 1.39 0.16 8 1.48 0.17 9 1.41 0.17 9 1.58 0.18 7 1.34 0.24 6 1.21 0.24 5 1.61 0.22 5
NICARAGUA NIC -0.01 0.14 10 0.04 0.14 11 0.08 0.16 9 0.02 0.18 8 0.02 0.24 6 -0.03 0.23 5 -0.28 0.21 5
NIGER NER -0.06 0.15 6 -0.13 0.17 6 -0.29 0.19 5 -0.23 0.23 5 -0.17 0.26 4 -1.00 0.26 3 -0.47 0.32 3
















































TABLE C1: Voice and Accountability (cont.)
2005 2004 2003 2002 2000 1998 1996
Country Code Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N.
NORWAY NOR 1.45 0.16 9 1.55 0.17 9 1.44 0.17 9 1.62 0.18 9 1.33 0.24 6 1.43 0.24 5 1.71 0.22 5
OMAN OMN -0.94 0.17 5 -0.87 0.17 6 -0.96 0.17 7 -0.52 0.18 7 -0.92 0.24 4 -0.95 0.24 4 -0.68 0.22 4
P A L A U P C I 1 . 1 9 0 . 2 1 2 1 . 2 1 0 . 2 3 2 1 . 2 4 0 . 2 3 1. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .
PAKISTAN PAK -1.23 0.14 9 -1.31 0.14 10 -1.18 0.17 8 -1.12 0.19 7 -1.57 0.24 6 -0.68 0.24 4 -1.06 0.22 4
PANAMA PAN 0.52 0.14 10 0.56 0.16 9 0.58 0.16 9 0.42 0.17 10 0.72 0.24 6 0.52 0.23 5 0.27 0.21 5
PAPUA NEW GUINEA PNG -0.05 0.15 6 -0.07 0.16 7 0.12 0.17 6 -0.23 0.18 6 0.03 0.24 5 0.17 0.24 4 0.09 0.22 4
PARAGUAY PRY -0.19 0.12 11 -0.29 0.15 10 -0.45 0.16 9 -0.59 0.17 9 -0.58 0.24 5 -0.29 0.23 6 -0.46 0.21 5
PERU PER 0.04 0.12 11 -0.06 0.15 11 0.08 0.16 10 0.18 0.17 10 -0.10 0.23 7 -0.82 0.23 6 -0.81 0.21 5
PHILIPPINES PHL 0.01 0.12 11 0.02 0.15 11 0.14 0.16 10 0.13 0.17 9 0.32 0.23 8 0.41 0.24 5 0.11 0.22 5
POLAND POL 1.04 0.11 11 1.13 0.11 12 1.05 0.12 11 1.08 0.14 11 1.13 0.16 9 1.00 0.19 7 0.95 0.18 6
PORTUGAL PRT 1.32 0.16 9 1.32 0.17 9 1.27 0.17 9 1.27 0.18 9 1.29 0.24 6 1.35 0.24 6 1.27 0.22 5
P U E R T O  R I C O P R I 1 . 0 3 0 . 2 1 2 1 . 0 1 0 . 2 3 2 0 . 6 0 0 . 5 4 1 0 . 6 1 0 . 4 7 1. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .
QATAR QAT -0.75 0.16 7 -0.78 0.15 7 -0.90 0.18 5 -0.51 0.19 5 -0.92 0.26 3 -1.04 0.26 3 -0.91 0.23 3
REUNION REU 1.25 0.55 1 1.06 0.53 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
ROMANIA ROM 0.36 0.11 12 0.38 0.11 13 0.39 0.12 11 0.38 0.13 11 0.42 0.17 8 0.20 0.19 5 -0.04 0.18 5
RUSSIA RUS -0.85 0.10 13 -0.79 0.11 13 -0.68 0.12 12 -0.45 0.13 12 -0.47 0.16 9 -0.26 0.19 7 -0.43 0.18 6
RWANDA RWA -1.32 0.13 6 -1.11 0.18 6 -1.36 0.19 5 -1.49 0.24 5 -1.53 0.31 3 -1.57 0.30 2 -1.48 0.38 2
SAMOA SAM 0.62 0.20 3 0.69 0.21 3 0.67 0.22 2 0.63 0.30 2 0.57 0.38 1 0.56 0.35 1 0.72 0.43 1
SAN MARINO SMR 1.16 0.21 2 1.19 0.23 2 1.24 0.23 1 1.37 0.37 1 1.36 0.38 1 1.41 0.35 1 1.39 0.43 1
SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE STP 0.56 0.20 3 0.54 0.21 3 0.71 0.22 2 0.39 0.30 2 0.90 0.38 1 0.70 0.35 1 0.84 0.43 1
SAUDI ARABIA SAU -1.72 0.14 7 -1.58 0.15 8 -1.62 0.17 7 -1.34 0.18 8 -1.37 0.24 5 -1.44 0.24 4 -1.30 0.22 4
SENEGAL SEN 0.30 0.14 9 0.18 0.15 9 0.24 0.16 9 0.12 0.18 8 -0.16 0.24 6 -0.71 0.24 5 -0.23 0.22 4
SEYCHELLES SYC -0.04 0.19 4 -0.04 0.20 4 0.06 0.21 3 0.13 0.29 3 0.05 0.38 1 0.13 0.35 1 0.06 0.43 1
SIERRA LEONE SLE -0.38 0.15 6 -0.55 0.15 8 -0.68 0.18 6 -0.72 0.22 6 -1.35 0.26 4 -1.75 0.26 3 -1.45 0.32 3
SINGAPORE SGP -0.29 0.14 10 -0.10 0.16 10 -0.12 0.17 8 0.50 0.18 7 -0.24 0.24 7 -0.15 0.24 6 0.35 0.22 5
SLOVAK REPUBLIC SVK 1.04 0.12 10 1.09 0.11 10 0.97 0.13 9 0.88 0.14 8 0.87 0.17 8 0.37 0.19 6 0.34 0.18 5
SLOVENIA SVN 1.08 0.12 10 1.13 0.11 11 1.09 0.12 10 1.07 0.14 10 0.94 0.17 8 0.86 0.19 5 0.95 0.19 4
SOLOMON ISLANDS SLB 0.27 0.20 3 0.08 0.21 3 0.31 0.23 1 0.40 0.37 1 0.01 0.38 1 1.07 0.35 1 1.02 0.43 1
SOMALIA SOM -1.89 0.15 6 -1.66 0.17 7 -1.64 0.18 6 -1.68 0.23 5 -1.43 0.26 4 -1.51 0.26 3 -1.98 0.32 3
SOUTH AFRICA ZAF 0.82 0.14 11 0.84 0.15 12 0.82 0.16 11 0.70 0.17 11 0.96 0.23 9 0.79 0.24 6 0.62 0.22 5
SPAIN ESP 1.12 0.16 9 1.15 0.16 10 1.13 0.16 9 1.16 0.17 10 1.01 0.23 8 1.09 0.24 6 1.10 0.22 5
SRI LANKA LKA -0.26 0.14 8 -0.17 0.14 10 -0.13 0.16 8 -0.12 0.18 8 -0.40 0.24 5 -0.33 0.24 4 -0.28 0.22 4
ST. KITTS AND NEVIS KNA 0.87 0.20 3 0.74 0.21 3 0.95 0.23 1 0.92 0.37 1 0.97 0.38 1 1.03 0.35 1 1.00 0.43 1
ST. LUCIA LCA 1.04 0.20 3 0.96 0.21 3 1.06 0.23 1 1.04 0.37 1 1.03 0.38 1 1.09 0.35 1 1.07 0.43 1
ST. VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES VCT 1.04 0.20 3 0.95 0.21 3 0.96 0.23 1 0.96 0.37 1 1.00 0.38 1 1.05 0.35 1 1.08 0.43 1
SUDAN SDN -1.84 0.14 7 -1.80 0.15 8 -1.85 0.17 7 -1.71 0.18 7 -1.88 0.24 5 -1.81 0.24 4 -1.74 0.22 4
SURINAME SUR 0.74 0.19 4 0.57 0.20 4 0.57 0.20 3 0.20 0.26 3 0.55 0.29 2 0.16 0.29 2 -0.12 0.34 2
SWAZILAND SWZ -1.28 0.15 5 -1.32 0.20 4 -1.26 0.20 4 -1.25 0.26 4 -1.29 0.33 2 -0.99 0.30 2 -1.35 0.38 2
SWEDEN SWE 1.41 0.16 8 1.53 0.16 9 1.48 0.16 9 1.63 0.17 10 1.45 0.23 8 1.37 0.24 5 1.66 0.22 5
SWITZERLAND CHE 1.43 0.16 9 1.50 0.17 9 1.43 0.17 9 1.61 0.18 9 1.52 0.23 7 1.44 0.24 6 1.67 0.22 5
SYRIA SYR -1.67 0.12 8 -1.73 0.15 8 -1.79 0.17 7 -1.59 0.18 7 -1.76 0.24 4 -1.69 0.24 4 -1.45 0.22 4
TAIWAN TWN 0.79 0.14 10 0.96 0.15 11 0.79 0.16 10 0.88 0.17 9 0.82 0.23 7 0.68 0.24 5 0.50 0.22 5
TAJIKISTAN TJK -1.17 0.11 9 -1.12 0.12 8 -1.17 0.12 7 -1.14 0.15 7 -1.02 0.19 4 -1.47 0.21 3 -1.50 0.25 3
TANZANIA TZA -0.31 0.14 9 -0.37 0.15 10 -0.25 0.16 9 -0.51 0.18 8 -0.21 0.23 7 -0.50 0.24 5 -0.85 0.22 4
THAILAND THA 0.07 0.12 11 0.25 0.15 10 0.27 0.16 9 0.15 0.17 9 0.27 0.24 7 0.02 0.24 6 -0.05 0.22 5
TIMOR, EAST TMP 0.18 0.18 5 0.24 0.17 5 0.28 0.21 3 0.19 0.30 2 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
TOGO TGO -1.23 0.15 7 -1.23 0.17 6 -1.11 0.19 5 -1.26 0.23 5 -1.13 0.27 3 -1.19 0.26 4 -1.14 0.32 3
TONGA TON -0.16 0.19 4 -0.36 0.20 4 -0.14 0.23 1 -0.08 0.37 1 -0.15 0.38 1 -0.11 0.35 1 -0.08 0.43 1
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO TTO 0.44 0.16 7 0.49 0.17 7 0.48 0.17 7 0.53 0.19 6 0.58 0.24 5 0.92 0.24 4 0.72 0.22 4
TUNISIA TUN -1.13 0.12 9 -1.06 0.15 9 -1.02 0.16 8 -0.80 0.18 8 -0.85 0.24 5 -0.99 0.24 4 -0.60 0.22 4
TURKEY TUR -0.04 0.12 11 -0.10 0.15 11 -0.29 0.16 10 -0.44 0.17 10 -0.74 0.23 8 -0.97 0.24 6 -0.47 0.22 5
TURKMENISTAN TKM -1.95 0.12 6 -1.89 0.12 6 -1.93 0.14 5 -1.89 0.17 5 -1.70 0.19 3 -1.68 0.21 3 -1.77 0.25 3
TUVALU TUV 1.04 0.20 3 0.92 0.21 3 1.16 0.23 1 1.37 0.37 1 1.36 0.38 1 1.41 0.35 1 1.39 0.43 1
UGANDA UGA -0.59 0.14 9 -0.65 0.14 12 -0.78 0.16 10 -0.81 0.18 8 -0.91 0.23 7 -0.58 0.24 5 -0.71 0.22 4
UKRAINE UKR -0.26 0.11 11 -0.61 0.10 13 -0.59 0.12 11 -0.68 0.13 10 -0.43 0.17 7 -0.15 0.19 6 -0.46 0.19 4
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES ARE -1.08 0.14 8 -0.98 0.17 7 -0.92 0.17 6 -0.49 0.19 6 -0.76 0.24 4 -0.84 0.24 4 -0.74 0.22 4
UNITED KINGDOM GBR 1.30 0.16 9 1.37 0.16 10 1.33 0.16 10 1.44 0.17 10 1.21 0.23 8 1.27 0.24 6 1.34 0.22 5
UNITED STATES USA 1.19 0.16 9 1.22 0.17 9 1.16 0.17 9 1.30 0.18 9 1.11 0.24 7 1.38 0.24 6 1.48 0.22 5
URUGUAY URY 0.99 0.14 10 0.99 0.15 10 0.98 0.16 9 0.89 0.18 8 0.96 0.24 6 0.68 0.23 5 0.72 0.21 5
UZBEKISTAN UZB -1.76 0.11 8 -1.73 0.11 10 -1.74 0.12 8 -1.58 0.13 8 -1.51 0.18 6 -1.60 0.20 5 -1.47 0.19 4
VANUATU VUT 0.60 0.20 3 0.67 0.21 3 0.91 0.23 1 0.82 0.37 1 0.58 0.38 1 0.58 0.35 1 0.45 0.43 1
VENEZUELA VEN -0.50 0.14 11 -0.48 0.14 13 -0.47 0.16 10 -0.46 0.17 10 -0.24 0.24 6 0.26 0.23 7 0.00 0.21 6
VIETNAM VNM -1.60 0.14 8 -1.52 0.14 10 -1.58 0.16 8 -1.34 0.18 8 -1.65 0.24 5 -1.73 0.24 4 -1.39 0.22 4
V I R G I N  I S L A N D S  ( U . S . ) V I R 1 . 0 3 0 . 5 5 1 0 . 6 7 0 . 5 3 1. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .
WEST BANK WBG -1.22 0.20 3 -1.24 0.22 3 -1.47 0.21 3 -1.15 0.29 3 -0.97 0.38 2 -0.73 0.34 2 -1.64 0.43 1
YEMEN YEM -1.07 0.14 7 -0.98 0.14 9 -0.98 0.17 7 -0.90 0.18 7 -0.78 0.24 5 -0.73 0.24 4 -0.99 0.22 4
YUGOSLAVIA YUG 0.12 0.11 11 0.11 0.11 11 0.14 0.12 10 -0.30 0.13 8 -0.29 0.17 5 -1.05 0.19 5 -1.45 0.22 4
ZAMBIA ZMB -0.35 0.12 9 -0.33 0.15 10 -0.38 0.16 9 -0.46 0.18 8 -0.25 0.23 7 -0.11 0.24 5 -0.23 0.22 4
















































TABLE C2: Political Stability
2005 2004 2003 2002 2000 1998 1996
Country Code Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N.
AFGHANISTAN AFG -2.12 0.25 5 -2.14 0.23 7 -2.19 0.26 5 -2.35 0.28 4 -2.68 0.40 2 -2.28 0.51 1 -2.06 0.56 1
ALBANIA ALB -0.68 0.26 6 -0.79 0.26 6 -0.43 0.31 4 -0.68 0.29 4 -0.85 0.34 5 -1.09 0.30 4 -0.10 0.38 3
ALGERIA DZA -1.09 0.22 8 -1.59 0.22 9 -1.74 0.23 8 -1.72 0.22 7 -1.90 0.28 5 -2.66 0.28 4 -2.92 0.34 4
A M E R I C A N  S A M O A A S M 0 . 7 4 0 . 4 6 1 0 . 7 2 0 . 4 5 1. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .
ANDORRA ADO 1.38 0.40 2 1.40 0.37 2 1.26 0.47 1 1.18 0.43 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
ANGOLA AGO -0.82 0.23 7 -0.90 0.23 8 -0.91 0.25 7 -1.66 0.22 7 -2.47 0.28 5 -2.18 0.27 5 -2.35 0.34 4
A N G U I L L A A I A 1 . 2 0 0 . 3 7 2 0 . 7 7 0 . 4 5 1. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .
A N T I G U A  A N D  B A R B U D A A T G 0 . 8 0 0 . 3 3 3 1 . 1 3 0 . 3 2 3 0 . 7 4 0 . 4 7 1 0 . 6 8 0 . 4 3 1. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .
ARGENTINA ARG -0.26 0.21 10 -0.34 0.20 12 -0.25 0.22 10 -0.87 0.20 11 0.22 0.24 10 0.32 0.26 6 0.23 0.29 6
ARMENIA ARM -0.22 0.25 7 -0.41 0.25 6 -0.48 0.29 5 -0.76 0.28 5 -0.98 0.35 5 -0.66 0.30 4 0.19 0.40 2
ARUBA ABW 1.37 0.37 2 0.97 0.45 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
AUSTRALIA AUS 0.82 0.21 10 0.79 0.20 11 0.80 0.22 10 1.05 0.21 9 1.13 0.24 8 1.06 0.26 6 1.01 0.29 6
AUSTRIA AUT 0.98 0.21 10 0.94 0.21 11 0.98 0.23 9 1.09 0.22 8 1.18 0.25 8 1.28 0.25 7 1.12 0.29 6
AZERBAIJAN AZE -1.21 0.22 8 -1.38 0.22 8 -1.52 0.24 7 -1.24 0.22 7 -0.87 0.28 6 -0.72 0.27 5 -0.62 0.36 3
BAHAMAS BHS 0.83 0.31 4 0.83 0.31 4 0.97 0.42 2 0.89 0.39 2 0.85 0.68 1 0.46 0.49 1 0.97 0.50 2
BAHRAIN BHR -0.28 0.22 8 -0.01 0.23 8 0.10 0.25 6 0.29 0.24 6 -0.10 0.28 5 -0.19 0.28 4 -0.79 0.34 4
BANGLADESH BGD -1.65 0.22 8 -1.10 0.22 9 -0.93 0.23 8 -0.73 0.22 8 -0.77 0.28 6 -0.52 0.28 4 -0.87 0.34 4
BARBADOS BRB 1.18 0.31 4 1.29 0.29 4 0.89 0.40 2 0.68 0.43 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.98 0.56 1
BELARUS BLR 0.01 0.26 6 -0.04 0.24 7 0.16 0.27 6 0.06 0.27 5 -0.21 0.33 6 -0.33 0.30 4 -0.18 0.40 2
BELGIUM BEL 0.66 0.21 10 0.72 0.21 10 0.88 0.23 9 0.94 0.21 9 0.79 0.25 8 0.86 0.26 6 0.69 0.29 6
BELIZE BLZ 0.31 0.31 4 0.79 0.29 4 0.68 0.36 3 0.43 0.38 2 0.80 0.55 2 0.76 0.51 1 0.71 0.56 1
BENIN BEN 0.31 0.29 5 -0.05 0.27 5 0.30 0.32 4 0.52 0.33 3 0.05 0.50 2 0.10 0.46 2 0.98 0.56 1
B E R M U D A B M U 0 . 7 9 0 . 3 7 2 0 . 8 6 0 . 3 7 2 0 . 7 4 0 . 4 7 1 0 . 6 8 0 . 4 3 1. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .
BHUTAN BTN 1.01 0.31 4 0.90 0.29 4 0.68 0.36 3 0.68 0.38 2 0.54 0.58 1 0.55 0.51 1 0.78 0.56 1
BOLIVIA BOL -1.15 0.22 8 -0.73 0.22 9 -0.30 0.25 7 -0.21 0.22 8 -0.63 0.28 7 -0.09 0.27 5 -0.38 0.34 4
BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA BIH -0.78 0.26 6 -0.66 0.24 8 -1.03 0.28 5 -0.88 0.27 5 -0.55 0.54 3 -0.62 0.51 1 -0.64 0.56 1
BOTSWANA BWA 0.94 0.22 8 0.82 0.23 8 0.74 0.23 8 0.67 0.22 8 0.75 0.28 6 0.61 0.27 5 0.66 0.34 4
BRAZIL BRA -0.13 0.21 10 -0.13 0.20 12 0.17 0.22 10 -0.06 0.20 11 -0.03 0.24 9 -0.52 0.25 7 -0.43 0.29 6
BRITISH VIRGIN ISLANDS VGB 1.50 0.53 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
BRUNEI BRN 1.13 0.36 3 1.23 0.35 3 1.04 0.37 3 0.93 0.35 3 1.14 0.48 2 1.18 0.37 2 1.08 0.50 2
BULGARIA BGR 0.16 0.22 8 0.06 0.21 10 0.36 0.23 8 0.41 0.22 8 0.09 0.27 8 0.36 0.27 5 -0.08 0.34 4
BURKINA FASO BFA -0.05 0.29 5 -0.21 0.28 5 -0.20 0.33 4 -0.28 0.35 3 -0.31 0.43 3 -0.14 0.35 3 -0.41 0.50 2
BURUNDI BDI -1.65 0.31 4 -2.27 0.29 4 -2.10 0.36 3 -2.24 0.38 2 -2.06 0.46 3 -2.28 0.51 1 -2.00 0.56 1
CAMBODIA KHM -0.44 0.29 5 -0.33 0.29 4 -0.43 0.36 3 -0.37 0.35 3 -0.93 0.55 2 -1.38 0.51 1 -1.39 0.56 1
CAMEROON CMR -0.34 0.22 8 -0.59 0.22 8 -0.70 0.25 7 -0.54 0.24 6 -0.67 0.29 6 -0.90 0.26 6 -1.18 0.34 4
CANADA CAN 0.91 0.21 10 0.95 0.20 12 0.99 0.22 10 0.98 0.20 10 1.14 0.24 10 1.02 0.25 7 0.82 0.29 6
CAPE VERDE CPV 0.88 0.40 2 1.09 0.37 2 0.74 0.47 1 0.68 0.43 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.98 0.56 1
CAYMAN ISLANDS CYM 1.20 0.37 2 1.29 0.37 2 0.74 0.47 1 0.68 0.43 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC CAF -1.13 0.31 4 -1.33 0.29 4 -1.48 0.36 3 -1.85 0.38 2 -0.20 0.58 1 0.07 0.51 1 -0.24 0.56 1
CHAD TCD -1.34 0.29 5 -1.23 0.28 5 -1.39 0.34 4 -1.66 0.35 3 -1.08 0.58 1 -1.57 0.46 2 -0.91 0.56 1
CHILE CHL 0.85 0.21 10 0.73 0.20 11 0.93 0.22 10 0.90 0.20 11 0.66 0.24 10 0.37 0.26 6 0.52 0.29 6
CHINA CHN -0.18 0.21 10 -0.15 0.20 11 -0.19 0.22 10 -0.07 0.20 10 -0.08 0.24 9 -0.11 0.26 6 -0.10 0.29 6
COLOMBIA COL -1.79 0.21 10 -2.02 0.21 10 -2.12 0.23 9 -2.05 0.21 10 -1.95 0.24 10 -1.64 0.25 7 -1.50 0.29 6
COMOROS COM -0.36 0.40 2 -0.43 0.37 2 -1.07 0.47 1 -0.31 0.43 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.98 0.56 1
CONGO COG -1.24 0.26 6 -1.56 0.26 6 -1.66 0.31 5 -1.74 0.29 5 -1.85 0.43 3 -2.25 0.35 3 -0.93 0.50 2
Congo, Dem. Rep. (Zaire) ZAR -2.40 0.23 7 -2.29 0.22 8 -2.00 0.24 7 -2.41 0.26 6 -2.93 0.34 4 -3.30 0.32 3 -2.00 0.38 3
COSTA RICA CRI 0.76 0.22 8 0.84 0.21 10 0.87 0.23 8 0.93 0.21 9 1.04 0.27 7 0.97 0.26 6 0.66 0.32 5
CROATIA HRV 0.32 0.22 8 0.37 0.22 9 0.31 0.25 7 0.32 0.23 7 0.19 0.29 6 0.21 0.28 4 0.02 0.36 3
CUBA CUB 0.03 0.23 7 0.20 0.22 8 0.07 0.24 7 0.16 0.22 7 -0.33 0.28 5 -0.24 0.28 4 -0.28 0.34 4
CYPRUS CYP 0.29 0.23 7 0.28 0.23 8 0.36 0.25 6 0.30 0.23 6 0.34 0.30 4 0.26 0.28 4 0.44 0.34 4
CZECH REPUBLIC CZE 0.69 0.21 10 0.74 0.21 11 0.90 0.23 9 0.92 0.21 9 0.61 0.24 9 0.79 0.25 7 0.86 0.29 6
DENMARK DNK 0.91 0.21 10 1.02 0.20 12 1.10 0.22 10 1.14 0.21 9 1.26 0.24 9 1.17 0.26 6 1.01 0.29 6
DJIBOUTI DJI -0.74 0.40 2 -0.57 0.37 2 -1.07 0.47 1 -0.81 0.43 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.17 0.56 1
D O M I N I C A D M A 1 . 0 0 0 . 3 3 3 1 . 0 1 0 . 3 2 3 0 . 4 8 0 . 4 7 1 0 . 4 3 0 . 4 3 1. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC DOM 0.05 0.22 8 -0.02 0.23 8 0.11 0.25 7 0.13 0.23 7 0.05 0.28 7 -0.22 0.32 3 -0.44 0.43 3
ECUADOR ECU -0.83 0.22 8 -0.93 0.21 10 -0.95 0.23 8 -0.84 0.21 9 -1.20 0.26 8 -0.65 0.26 6 -0.85 0.30 5
EGYPT EGY -0.90 0.21 9 -0.87 0.21 10 -0.72 0.22 9 -0.64 0.21 8 -0.17 0.26 8 -0.33 0.26 6 -0.64 0.29 6
EL SALVADOR SLV -0.14 0.25 7 -0.17 0.24 7 -0.24 0.27 6 0.14 0.25 7 0.27 0.32 6 0.13 0.30 4 -0.33 0.38 4
EQUATORIAL GUINEA GNQ 0.21 0.35 3 0.26 0.32 3 0.33 0.40 2 0.11 0.38 2 .. .. .. .. .. .. -0.64 0.56 1
ERITREA ERI -0.72 0.31 4 -0.55 0.27 5 -0.43 0.32 4 -0.38 0.33 3 -0.29 0.50 2 -0.42 0.51 1 0.23 0.56 1
ESTONIA EST 0.68 0.22 9 0.92 0.21 11 1.04 0.23 9 0.89 0.21 9 0.64 0.25 9 0.74 0.27 5 0.60 0.36 3
ETHIOPIA ETH -1.48 0.25 7 -1.21 0.23 8 -1.24 0.26 7 -1.32 0.29 5 -1.27 0.42 4 -0.84 0.35 3 -0.90 0.50 2
FIJI FJI 0.29 0.33 3 0.22 0.30 4 0.19 0.35 3 0.10 0.33 3 -0.22 0.50 2 0.58 0.46 2 0.71 0.56 1
FINLAND FIN 1.48 0.21 10 1.61 0.21 11 1.65 0.23 9 1.54 0.21 9 1.51 0.24 9 1.32 0.26 6 1.22 0.29 6
FRANCE FRA 0.33 0.21 10 0.28 0.20 12 0.36 0.22 10 0.60 0.20 10 0.94 0.24 10 0.70 0.25 7 0.82 0.29 6
F R E N C H  G U I A N A G U F 0 . 2 1 0 . 4 6 1 0 . 1 7 0 . 4 5 1 0 . 2 3 0 . 4 7 1 0 . 1 8 0 . 4 3 1. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .
F R E N C H  P O L Y N E S I A P Y F 0 . 6 5 0 . 5 3 1. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .
GABON GAB 0.22 0.23 7 0.18 0.23 7 -0.03 0.25 6 0.13 0.24 6 -0.45 0.28 5 -0.40 0.32 3 -0.43 0.43 3
GAMBIA GMB 0.18 0.34 4 0.24 0.31 5 0.41 0.32 5 0.45 0.31 4 0.27 0.48 2 0.55 0.37 2 -0.03 0.50 2
GEORGIA GEO -0.80 0.26 6 -1.19 0.24 8 -1.90 0.28 5 -1.83 0.27 5 -0.99 0.36 5 -1.01 0.36 3 -0.95 0.40 2















































TABLE C2: Political Stability (cont.)
2005 2004 2003 2002 2000 1998 1996
Country Code Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N.
GHANA GHA 0.16 0.22 8 0.03 0.21 10 -0.04 0.23 8 -0.08 0.22 7 -0.15 0.29 6 -0.05 0.26 6 -0.11 0.34 4
GREECE GRC 0.35 0.21 10 0.35 0.21 11 0.59 0.23 9 0.61 0.21 9 0.65 0.25 7 0.24 0.26 6 0.16 0.29 6
GREENLAND GRL 1.50 0.53 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
GRENADA GRD 0.49 0.33 3 0.91 0.32 3 0.48 0.47 1 0.43 0.43 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.98 0.56 1
GUADELOUPE GLP 1.50 0.53 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
G U A M G U M 0 . 7 4 0 . 4 6 1 0 . 6 2 0 . 4 5 1. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .
GUATEMALA GTM -0.89 0.25 7 -0.78 0.23 9 -0.77 0.26 7 -0.57 0.23 8 -1.03 0.32 6 -0.83 0.30 4 -1.40 0.38 4
GUINEA GIN -1.11 0.29 5 -0.85 0.28 5 -0.80 0.33 4 -1.46 0.32 4 -1.44 0.48 2 -0.84 0.35 3 -1.53 0.50 2
GUINEA-BISSAU GNB -0.51 0.36 3 -0.43 0.31 4 -0.40 0.33 4 -0.58 0.31 4 -1.11 0.43 3 -1.12 0.35 3 -0.79 0.50 2
GUYANA GUY -0.38 0.28 6 -0.33 0.28 5 -0.34 0.33 4 -0.48 0.35 3 -0.51 0.43 3 -0.11 0.37 2 -0.05 0.50 2
HAITI HTI -1.91 0.29 5 -1.71 0.26 6 -1.15 0.29 6 -1.36 0.29 5 -0.90 0.42 4 -1.48 0.37 2 -0.49 0.50 2
HONDURAS HND -0.78 0.25 7 -0.51 0.23 8 -0.45 0.26 7 -0.24 0.23 8 0.04 0.32 6 -0.14 0.30 4 -0.59 0.38 4
HONG KONG HKG 1.19 0.23 8 1.20 0.23 9 0.97 0.25 7 0.91 0.23 7 0.99 0.28 6 0.64 0.29 5 0.08 0.37 4
HUNGARY HUN 0.79 0.21 10 0.83 0.20 11 0.99 0.22 10 0.97 0.20 10 0.54 0.24 10 1.04 0.25 7 0.54 0.29 6
ICELAND ISL 1.58 0.27 7 1.69 0.26 8 1.65 0.30 6 1.46 0.30 5 1.46 0.37 5 1.15 0.35 3 1.01 0.43 3
INDIA IND -0.85 0.21 10 -1.09 0.20 12 -1.19 0.22 10 -1.02 0.20 10 -0.65 0.24 9 -0.73 0.25 7 -1.03 0.29 6
INDONESIA IDN -1.42 0.21 10 -1.60 0.20 12 -1.94 0.22 10 -1.57 0.20 10 -2.01 0.24 9 -1.57 0.26 6 -0.66 0.29 6
IRAN IRN -1.14 0.22 8 -0.98 0.21 9 -1.05 0.23 8 -0.80 0.21 8 -0.51 0.26 6 -0.49 0.27 5 -0.63 0.30 5
IRAQ IRQ -2.82 0.23 7 -3.05 0.24 6 -2.30 0.25 6 -1.80 0.24 6 -2.26 0.28 5 -2.89 0.28 4 -3.06 0.34 4
IRELAND IRL 1.08 0.21 10 1.07 0.20 12 1.22 0.22 10 1.19 0.21 9 1.17 0.24 9 1.29 0.25 7 0.99 0.29 6
ISRAEL ISR -1.16 0.22 9 -1.29 0.21 11 -1.42 0.23 9 -1.55 0.21 9 -0.82 0.26 7 -0.90 0.27 5 -0.70 0.29 6
ITALY ITA 0.21 0.21 10 0.18 0.21 11 0.39 0.23 9 0.71 0.21 9 0.64 0.24 10 0.80 0.25 7 0.47 0.29 6
IVORY COAST CIV -2.49 0.23 7 -2.21 0.22 8 -2.10 0.24 7 -2.10 0.22 7 -1.02 0.29 5 -0.25 0.26 6 0.02 0.34 4
JAMAICA JAM -0.33 0.25 7 -0.27 0.24 7 -0.37 0.27 6 -0.33 0.25 6 0.17 0.34 4 -0.08 0.31 4 0.43 0.43 3
JAPAN JPN 0.94 0.21 10 0.90 0.20 12 1.14 0.22 10 1.08 0.20 10 1.06 0.24 9 0.96 0.28 5 0.82 0.29 6
JORDAN JOR -0.31 0.22 9 -0.30 0.22 9 -0.32 0.24 8 -0.45 0.23 7 0.05 0.28 6 -0.15 0.26 6 0.18 0.32 5
KAZAKHSTAN KAZ 0.03 0.21 9 -0.01 0.21 9 0.24 0.23 8 0.25 0.21 8 0.09 0.26 8 0.10 0.26 6 -0.28 0.32 4
KENYA KEN -1.16 0.22 8 -1.07 0.21 10 -1.10 0.23 8 -1.11 0.22 7 -1.15 0.28 6 -1.03 0.26 6 -0.65 0.34 4
K I R I B A T I K I R 1 . 3 8 0 . 4 0 2 0 . 9 2 0 . 3 7 2. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .
KOREA, NORTH PRK -0.12 0.30 4 0.04 0.27 5 0.10 0.28 5 0.52 0.31 4 -1.07 0.43 3 -1.30 0.37 2 -1.64 0.50 2
KOREA, SOUTH KOR 0.43 0.21 10 0.44 0.20 12 0.23 0.22 10 0.32 0.20 10 0.20 0.24 9 -0.06 0.25 7 -0.08 0.29 6
KUWAIT KWT 0.11 0.22 8 0.14 0.22 8 0.01 0.24 7 0.11 0.22 7 0.52 0.30 4 0.45 0.28 4 -0.01 0.34 4
KYRGYZ REPUBLIC KGZ -1.21 0.26 6 -1.18 0.25 6 -1.34 0.28 5 -1.23 0.27 5 -0.29 0.39 3 0.51 0.36 3 0.54 0.40 2
LAOS LAO -0.27 0.27 5 -0.76 0.29 4 -0.80 0.36 3 -0.28 0.35 3 -0.11 0.50 2 0.41 0.51 1 0.98 0.56 1
LATVIA LVA 0.83 0.22 8 0.89 0.22 9 1.05 0.25 7 0.80 0.23 7 0.48 0.29 6 0.27 0.27 5 0.54 0.36 3
LEBANON LBN -1.14 0.23 7 -0.90 0.23 7 -0.77 0.25 6 -0.75 0.24 6 -0.77 0.28 5 -0.90 0.28 4 -0.60 0.34 4
LESOTHO LSO 0.31 0.29 4 0.34 0.28 4 0.24 0.30 4 -0.15 0.31 3 0.81 0.58 1 -0.04 0.45 2 0.78 0.56 1
LIBERIA LBR -1.45 0.31 4 -2.16 0.28 5 -2.35 0.33 4 -2.32 0.31 4 -1.80 0.43 3 -1.50 0.37 2 -2.71 0.50 2
LIBYA LBY 0.30 0.23 7 0.09 0.24 6 -0.14 0.25 6 -0.46 0.24 6 -0.69 0.30 4 -1.51 0.28 4 -1.78 0.34 4
LIECHTENSTEIN LIE 1.38 0.40 2 1.50 0.37 2 1.26 0.47 1 1.18 0.43 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
LITHUANIA LTU 0.88 0.22 8 0.85 0.21 10 1.11 0.23 8 0.90 0.22 8 0.25 0.27 8 0.27 0.27 5 0.44 0.36 3
LUXEMBOURG LUX 1.41 0.27 7 1.50 0.26 8 1.62 0.30 6 1.58 0.30 5 1.52 0.39 4 1.41 0.35 3 1.23 0.43 3
MACAO MAC 1.27 0.46 1 1.32 0.45 1 1.00 0.47 1 0.43 0.43 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
MACEDONIA MKD -1.04 0.23 7 -1.07 0.23 8 -1.13 0.25 6 -1.05 0.26 4 -1.04 0.38 3 -0.52 0.37 3 0.03 0.47 2
MADAGASCAR MDG 0.18 0.28 6 0.08 0.27 6 0.16 0.32 5 0.11 0.35 3 0.09 0.42 4 -0.19 0.35 3 -0.07 0.50 2
MALAWI MWI 0.15 0.25 7 -0.14 0.24 7 -0.26 0.27 6 -0.03 0.27 5 -0.09 0.33 5 -0.06 0.29 5 -0.16 0.43 3
MALAYSIA MYS 0.49 0.21 10 0.24 0.20 12 0.32 0.22 10 0.24 0.20 10 0.15 0.24 10 0.18 0.25 7 0.77 0.29 6
MALDIVES MDV 0.76 0.33 3 0.52 0.32 3 1.00 0.47 1 1.18 0.43 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.17 0.56 1
MALI MLI 0.06 0.28 6 -0.03 0.25 7 -0.17 0.29 6 -0.26 0.29 5 0.21 0.43 3 0.13 0.35 3 0.45 0.50 2
MALTA MLT 1.34 0.28 6 1.34 0.27 6 1.40 0.35 4 1.36 0.39 2 1.00 0.68 1 1.16 0.49 1 1.13 0.50 2
MARSHALL ISLANDS MHL 1.10 0.62 1 0.62 0.54 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
M A R T I N I Q U E M T Q 1 . 2 0 0 . 3 7 2 1 . 3 1 0 . 3 7 2 0 . 7 4 0 . 4 7 1 0 . 4 3 0 . 4 3 1. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .
MAURITANIA MRT -0.31 0.31 4 -0.18 0.29 4 -0.11 0.36 3 0.17 0.38 2 -0.57 0.50 2 0.34 0.51 1 0.51 0.56 1
MAURITIUS MUS 0.90 0.30 4 0.89 0.30 4 0.75 0.30 4 0.97 0.30 3 0.97 0.40 3 0.88 0.34 4 0.92 0.47 2
MEXICO MEX -0.29 0.21 10 -0.09 0.20 12 -0.10 0.22 10 0.10 0.20 11 -0.28 0.24 10 -0.56 0.25 7 -0.66 0.29 6
MICRONESIA FSM 1.08 0.33 3 0.95 0.32 3 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
MOLDOVA MDA -0.65 0.24 7 -0.36 0.24 7 -0.21 0.25 6 -0.15 0.25 5 -0.29 0.28 6 -0.05 0.27 5 -0.37 0.36 3
M O N A C O  M C O 0 . 9 9 0 . 4 4 2 1 . 0 9 0 . 4 2 2. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .
MONGOLIA MNG 0.92 0.28 6 0.72 0.26 6 0.88 0.31 5 0.84 0.31 4 0.96 0.43 3 0.39 0.37 2 0.54 0.50 2
MOROCCO MAR -0.43 0.22 8 -0.39 0.22 9 -0.35 0.23 8 -0.30 0.22 8 -0.08 0.30 4 -0.10 0.26 6 -0.60 0.30 5
MOZAMBIQUE MOZ 0.04 0.25 7 0.08 0.23 8 0.31 0.26 7 0.47 0.29 5 -0.33 0.43 3 -0.65 0.33 4 -0.59 0.50 2
MYANMAR MMR -1.00 0.23 7 -1.01 0.22 8 -1.24 0.24 7 -1.39 0.22 7 -1.71 0.28 5 -1.34 0.28 4 -1.29 0.34 4
NAMIBIA NAM 0.50 0.22 8 0.52 0.22 9 0.28 0.23 8 0.30 0.22 8 -0.77 0.33 5 0.08 0.30 4 0.62 0.43 3
NAURU NRU 1.10 0.62 1 0.62 0.54 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
NEPAL NPL -2.36 0.24 6 -2.01 0.24 6 -1.92 0.27 5 -1.76 0.31 4 -1.33 0.50 2 -0.83 0.51 1 -0.58 0.56 1
NETHERLANDS NLD 0.80 0.21 10 0.92 0.21 11 1.13 0.23 9 1.17 0.21 9 1.41 0.24 9 1.42 0.26 6 1.27 0.29 6
NETHERLANDS ANTILLES ANT 0.86 0.37 2 0.67 0.45 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
NEW CALEDONIA NCL -0.21 0.53 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. -0.93 0.76 1
NEW ZEALAND NZL 1.20 0.22 9 1.43 0.22 9 1.24 0.24 8 1.23 0.23 7 1.12 0.26 7 1.28 0.27 5 1.07 0.32 5
NICARAGUA NIC -0.16 0.25 7 -0.20 0.23 8 -0.11 0.26 7 -0.06 0.23 8 0.03 0.32 6 -0.40 0.30 4 -0.86 0.38 4
















































TABLE C2: Political Stability (cont.)
2005 2004 2003 2002 2000 1998 1996
Country Code Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N.
NIGERIA NGA -1.77 0.22 8 -1.78 0.21 10 -1.65 0.23 8 -1.69 0.22 8 -1.64 0.27 8 -1.15 0.26 6 -1.75 0.30 5
NORWAY NOR 1.22 0.21 10 1.30 0.21 11 1.36 0.23 9 1.37 0.22 8 1.22 0.25 8 1.24 0.26 6 1.23 0.29 6
OMAN OMN 0.82 0.23 7 0.82 0.22 8 0.94 0.24 7 0.95 0.22 7 0.89 0.28 5 0.71 0.28 4 0.55 0.34 4
PALAU PCI 1.10 0.62 1 0.62 0.54 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
PAKISTAN PAK -1.68 0.21 9 -1.67 0.21 10 -1.58 0.23 8 -1.51 0.22 7 -0.88 0.27 7 -1.21 0.26 6 -1.41 0.30 5
PANAMA PAN -0.05 0.22 8 0.18 0.22 9 0.25 0.23 8 0.23 0.21 9 0.40 0.27 7 0.09 0.28 4 0.13 0.34 4
PAPUA NEW GUINEA PNG -0.81 0.23 7 -0.70 0.22 8 -0.92 0.24 7 -0.85 0.23 6 -0.66 0.28 5 -0.63 0.32 3 -1.41 0.43 3
PARAGUAY PRY -0.62 0.25 7 -0.68 0.23 8 -0.87 0.26 7 -1.32 0.23 8 -1.02 0.33 5 -0.56 0.31 4 -0.26 0.43 3
PERU PER -1.08 0.21 9 -0.89 0.20 11 -0.84 0.22 9 -0.86 0.20 10 -0.61 0.25 9 -0.60 0.25 7 -1.08 0.29 6
PHILIPPINES PHL -1.11 0.21 10 -1.23 0.20 12 -1.22 0.22 10 -0.75 0.20 10 -0.59 0.24 10 -0.12 0.26 6 -0.33 0.29 6
POLAND POL 0.23 0.21 10 0.28 0.20 12 0.61 0.22 10 0.57 0.20 10 0.56 0.24 10 0.61 0.25 7 0.40 0.29 6
PORTUGAL PRT 0.94 0.21 10 0.83 0.21 11 1.10 0.23 9 1.24 0.22 8 1.25 0.25 8 1.28 0.25 7 1.08 0.29 6
PUERTO RICO PRI 0.72 0.28 4 0.84 0.28 4 0.69 0.33 3 0.49 0.33 2 0.70 0.49 1 0.63 0.51 1 0.58 0.51 1
QATAR QAT 0.83 0.22 8 0.97 0.23 7 0.95 0.27 5 0.72 0.26 4 1.31 0.31 4 1.16 0.32 3 0.76 0.34 4
REUNION REU 0.48 0.46 1 0.42 0.45 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
ROMANIA ROM 0.03 0.21 10 0.15 0.21 11 0.24 0.23 9 0.22 0.22 8 -0.18 0.27 8 0.10 0.28 4 0.31 0.34 4
RUSSIA RUS -1.07 0.21 10 -1.02 0.20 12 -0.64 0.22 10 -0.60 0.20 10 -0.74 0.24 10 -0.68 0.25 7 -1.17 0.29 6
RWANDA RWA -1.21 0.40 2 -1.08 0.33 3 -1.09 0.35 3 -1.55 0.33 3 -1.76 0.50 2 -2.28 0.51 1 -1.46 0.56 1
SAMOA SAM 1.10 0.33 3 1.04 0.32 3 1.00 0.47 1 0.68 0.43 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
S A N  M A R I N O S M R 1 . 1 0 0 . 6 2 1 1 . 1 9 0 . 5 4 1. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .
SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE STP 0.61 0.40 2 0.34 0.37 2 -0.03 0.47 1 0.43 0.43 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.98 0.56 1
SAUDI ARABIA SAU -0.70 0.22 8 -0.82 0.21 9 -0.39 0.23 8 -0.26 0.21 8 0.26 0.26 6 -0.12 0.27 5 -0.48 0.30 5
SENEGAL SEN -0.07 0.26 6 -0.18 0.24 7 -0.38 0.26 7 -0.34 0.25 6 -0.80 0.33 5 -1.24 0.31 4 -0.78 0.43 3
SEYCHELLES SYC 0.84 0.31 4 0.64 0.29 4 0.52 0.40 2 0.93 0.43 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.98 0.56 1
SIERRA LEONE SLE -0.48 0.31 4 -0.76 0.28 5 -1.01 0.33 4 -1.43 0.31 4 -1.76 0.43 3 -2.32 0.37 2 -2.47 0.50 2
SINGAPORE SGP 1.08 0.21 10 1.15 0.21 11 0.88 0.23 9 1.15 0.21 9 1.33 0.24 9 1.04 0.25 7 1.17 0.29 6
SLOVAK REPUBLIC SVK 0.69 0.22 9 0.64 0.22 9 0.94 0.24 8 0.86 0.22 8 0.49 0.26 8 0.85 0.26 6 0.36 0.32 5
SLOVENIA SVN 0.94 0.22 9 0.99 0.21 10 1.13 0.23 9 1.19 0.21 9 0.80 0.25 8 0.99 0.28 4 0.88 0.36 3
SOLOMON ISLANDS SLB -0.05 0.40 2 -0.39 0.37 2 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.98 0.56 1
SOMALIA SOM -2.51 0.31 4 -2.65 0.31 4 -2.36 0.33 4 -2.10 0.31 4 -1.82 0.43 3 -2.35 0.37 2 -2.40 0.50 2
SOUTH AFRICA ZAF -0.10 0.21 10 -0.24 0.20 12 -0.25 0.22 10 -0.35 0.20 10 -0.31 0.24 10 -0.96 0.25 7 -1.17 0.29 6
SPAIN ESP 0.38 0.21 10 0.10 0.20 12 0.34 0.22 10 0.52 0.20 10 0.89 0.24 10 0.59 0.25 7 0.37 0.29 6
SRI LANKA LKA -1.25 0.22 8 -1.14 0.22 9 -1.02 0.23 8 -1.08 0.22 8 -1.93 0.28 6 -1.70 0.28 4 -1.91 0.34 4
ST. KITTS AND NEVIS KNA 1.29 0.33 3 1.41 0.32 3 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
ST. LUCIA LCA 1.10 0.33 3 1.45 0.32 3 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.98 0.56 1
S T .  V I N C E N T  A N D  T H E  G R E N A D I N E S V C T 1 . 1 4 0 . 3 3 3 1 . 3 5 0 . 3 2 3. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . 0 . 9 8 0 . 5 6 1
SUDAN SDN -2.05 0.23 7 -2.01 0.23 7 -2.21 0.24 7 -2.07 0.22 7 -2.53 0.28 5 -2.16 0.32 3 -2.82 0.43 3
SURINAME SUR 0.26 0.33 4 0.55 0.31 4 0.45 0.37 3 0.38 0.39 2 -0.06 0.68 1 -0.11 0.49 1 0.43 0.50 2
SWAZILAND SWZ -0.04 0.29 4 0.17 0.28 4 -0.08 0.30 4 0.12 0.31 3 0.34 0.58 1 -0.52 0.45 2 -0.04 0.56 1
SWEDEN SWE 1.18 0.21 10 1.23 0.20 11 1.49 0.22 10 1.25 0.21 9 1.29 0.24 10 1.28 0.26 6 1.17 0.29 6
SWITZERLAND CHE 1.26 0.21 10 1.29 0.21 11 1.53 0.23 9 1.44 0.22 8 1.52 0.24 9 1.52 0.25 7 1.39 0.29 6
SYRIA SYR -0.91 0.23 7 -0.64 0.22 8 -0.47 0.24 7 -0.33 0.22 7 -0.66 0.28 5 -0.42 0.28 4 -0.74 0.34 4
TAIWAN TWN 0.53 0.21 10 0.50 0.20 12 0.67 0.22 10 0.67 0.20 10 0.47 0.24 9 0.78 0.26 6 0.81 0.29 6
TAJIKISTAN TJK -1.35 0.26 6 -1.30 0.25 6 -1.48 0.28 5 -1.30 0.27 5 -1.63 0.37 3 -1.78 0.39 2 -2.80 0.40 2
TANZANIA TZA -0.37 0.22 8 -0.53 0.22 9 -0.51 0.23 8 -0.35 0.22 7 -0.52 0.28 6 0.11 0.26 6 -0.20 0.34 4
THAILAND THA -0.55 0.21 10 -0.38 0.20 11 0.14 0.22 10 0.31 0.20 10 0.03 0.24 9 0.17 0.25 7 -0.06 0.29 6
TIMOR, EAST TMP -0.69 0.31 4 -0.30 0.32 3 -0.55 0.47 1 -1.06 0.43 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
TOGO TGO -1.22 0.29 5 -0.34 0.28 5 -0.46 0.33 4 0.03 0.35 3 -0.54 0.48 2 -1.13 0.35 3 -0.72 0.50 2
TONGA TON 0.53 0.33 3 0.80 0.32 3 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO TTO -0.05 0.22 8 0.06 0.24 7 -0.05 0.27 6 -0.05 0.27 5 0.33 0.33 5 0.65 0.32 3 0.45 0.43 3
TUNISIA TUN 0.12 0.22 8 0.11 0.22 9 0.16 0.23 8 0.17 0.22 8 0.59 0.28 6 0.28 0.27 5 0.04 0.34 4
TURKEY TUR -0.54 0.21 10 -0.78 0.20 12 -0.81 0.22 10 -0.86 0.20 10 -1.26 0.24 10 -1.19 0.25 7 -1.40 0.29 6
TURKMENISTAN TKM -0.34 0.27 5 -0.62 0.26 5 -0.60 0.30 4 -0.32 0.29 4 -0.10 0.40 2 -0.01 0.39 2 0.15 0.40 2
T U R K S  A N D  C A I C O S  I S L A N D S T C A 1 . 5 0 0 . 5 3 1. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .
T U V A L U T U V 1 . 3 8 0 . 4 0 2 1 . 0 2 0 . 3 7 2. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .
UGANDA UGA -1.32 0.22 8 -1.32 0.22 9 -1.48 0.23 8 -1.60 0.22 7 -1.51 0.28 6 -1.21 0.26 6 -1.35 0.34 4
UKRAINE UKR -0.39 0.21 9 -0.32 0.20 11 -0.14 0.22 9 -0.06 0.21 9 -0.70 0.26 8 -0.38 0.25 7 -0.45 0.30 5
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES ARE 0.61 0.22 8 0.77 0.23 8 0.85 0.25 6 0.82 0.24 6 0.91 0.30 4 0.68 0.28 4 0.73 0.34 4
UNITED KINGDOM GBR 0.34 0.21 10 0.36 0.20 12 0.53 0.22 10 0.61 0.20 10 0.98 0.24 10 0.73 0.25 7 0.82 0.29 6
UNITED STATES USA 0.06 0.21 10 0.12 0.21 11 0.20 0.23 9 0.13 0.21 9 1.08 0.24 9 0.88 0.25 7 0.82 0.29 6
URUGUAY URY 0.64 0.22 8 0.43 0.22 9 0.65 0.25 7 0.67 0.22 8 0.88 0.28 7 0.57 0.28 4 0.62 0.34 4
UZBEKISTAN UZB -1.91 0.24 6 -1.41 0.22 7 -1.39 0.25 6 -1.15 0.23 6 -1.24 0.30 5 -0.48 0.31 4 -0.16 0.36 3
VANUATU VUT 1.27 0.40 2 0.72 0.37 2 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.98 0.56 1
VENEZUELA VEN -1.22 0.21 10 -1.13 0.20 12 -1.28 0.22 10 -1.35 0.20 11 -0.67 0.25 8 -0.47 0.25 7 -0.88 0.29 6
VIETNAM VNM 0.34 0.21 9 0.24 0.21 10 0.32 0.22 9 0.35 0.21 9 0.23 0.26 7 0.35 0.26 6 0.17 0.29 6
V I R G I N  I S L A N D S  ( U . S . ) V I R 0 . 5 2 0 . 3 7 2 0 . 8 2 0 . 4 5 1. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .
WEST BANK WBG -1.69 0.35 3 -1.62 0.32 3 -1.65 0.40 2 -1.92 0.38 2 -0.67 0.93 1 -0.02 0.73 1 .. .. ..
YEMEN YEM -1.61 0.26 6 -1.49 0.24 7 -1.49 0.26 6 -1.53 0.25 6 -1.18 0.33 4 -1.50 0.32 3 -1.09 0.43 3
YUGOSLAVIA YUG -0.91 0.22 8 -0.89 0.23 8 -0.90 0.25 7 -1.03 0.24 6 -1.33 0.35 3 -2.01 0.32 3 -1.29 0.43 3
ZAMBIA ZMB 0.02 0.23 7 0.05 0.22 9 -0.07 0.23 8 -0.24 0.22 7 -0.73 0.28 6 -0.37 0.26 6 -0.66 0.34 4















































TABLE C3: Government Effectiveness
2005 2004 2003 2002 2000 1998 1996
Country Code Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N.
AFGHANISTAN AFG -1.20 0.20 5 -1.19 0.20 6 -1.06 0.21 5 -1.47 0.26 4 -1.34 0.49 1 .. .. .. .. .. ..
ALBANIA ALB -0.49 0.15 9 -0.26 0.16 8 -0.42 0.17 7 -0.48 0.17 7 -0.72 0.24 6 -0.63 0.29 5 -0.49 0.26 4
ALGERIA DZA -0.37 0.16 10 -0.52 0.16 11 -0.46 0.17 10 -0.59 0.17 9 -0.73 0.21 6 -1.10 0.31 4 -0.60 0.21 4
AMERICAN SAMOA ASM 0.21 0.27 1 -0.20 0.39 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
ANDORRA ADO 1.29 0.26 2 1.32 0.38 2 1.25 0.34 2 1.30 0.32 2 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
ANGOLA AGO -0.96 0.17 9 -1.14 0.17 10 -1.05 0.18 9 -1.23 0.17 9 -1.86 0.21 6 -1.83 0.29 5 -1.33 0.21 4
ANGUILLA A I A 1 . 5 6 0 . 2 7 1 0 . 9 6 0 . 3 9 1 . . . . . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .
ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA ATG 0.48 0.26 2 0.43 0.38 2 0.47 0.34 2 0.49 0.32 2 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
ARGENTINA ARG -0.27 0.15 12 -0.24 0.16 13 -0.37 0.16 11 -0.40 0.15 12 0.36 0.19 10 0.34 0.26 7 0.65 0.19 7
ARMENIA ARM -0.17 0.15 10 -0.27 0.15 9 -0.34 0.16 8 -0.37 0.17 8 -0.79 0.25 6 -0.57 0.29 5 -0.39 0.27 3
ARUBA A B W 1 . 2 9 0 . 2 7 1 1 . 1 7 0 . 3 9 1 . . . . . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .
AUSTRALIA AUS 1.88 0.16 9 1.97 0.17 10 2.01 0.17 10 1.89 0.16 9 1.89 0.21 7 1.85 0.31 6 2.00 0.21 6
AUSTRIA AUT 1.60 0.16 9 1.76 0.18 9 1.84 0.18 9 1.89 0.17 8 1.78 0.22 7 1.55 0.29 7 1.99 0.21 6
AZERBAIJAN AZE -0.73 0.13 12 -0.83 0.13 12 -0.79 0.14 11 -0.98 0.14 11 -0.95 0.18 8 -0.86 0.26 6 -1.17 0.19 4
BAHAMAS BHS 1.28 0.25 3 1.11 0.32 3 1.22 0.30 3 1.23 0.28 3 0.73 0.56 1 0.65 0.90 1 0.43 0.66 1
BAHRAIN BHR 0.42 0.17 8 0.60 0.18 8 0.62 0.21 6 0.70 0.18 7 0.59 0.25 4 0.33 0.40 3 0.61 0.23 3
BANGLADESH BGD -0.90 0.15 10 -0.75 0.16 11 -0.61 0.17 10 -0.63 0.17 10 -0.49 0.20 7 -0.44 0.31 4 -0.77 0.21 4
BARBADOS BRB 1.17 0.25 3 1.07 0.34 3 1.22 0.32 3 1.30 0.32 2 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
BELARUS BLR -1.19 0.16 9 -1.09 0.15 10 -1.05 0.16 9 -1.12 0.16 8 -0.99 0.24 7 -0.90 0.29 5 -1.30 0.27 3
BELGIUM BEL 1.65 0.16 9 1.77 0.18 9 1.80 0.18 9 1.93 0.17 9 1.56 0.22 7 1.12 0.31 6 1.93 0.21 6
BELIZE BLZ 0.13 0.23 4 0.06 0.30 4 0.13 0.27 4 -0.02 0.28 3 -0.36 0.40 2 -0.59 0.47 1 -0.39 0.47 1
BENIN BEN -0.69 0.17 8 -0.33 0.22 7 -0.42 0.23 6 -0.53 0.24 5 -0.03 0.32 3 -0.23 0.41 2 -0.02 0.47 1
BERMUDA BMU 1.02 0.27 1 1.05 0.39 1 1.05 0.35 1 1.11 0.33 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
BHUTAN BTN 0.33 0.21 5 0.14 0.27 5 0.58 0.25 5 0.71 0.27 4 0.71 0.31 2 0.14 0.47 1 0.25 0.47 1
BOLIVIA BOL -0.80 0.16 10 -0.52 0.17 10 -0.30 0.18 8 -0.51 0.17 9 -0.31 0.21 7 -0.11 0.27 6 -0.62 0.21 4
BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA BIH -0.53 0.15 9 -0.55 0.15 10 -0.70 0.16 8 -0.88 0.17 8 -0.54 0.32 4 -0.86 0.36 2 .. .. ..
BOTSWANA BWA 0.79 0.15 11 0.85 0.15 12 0.72 0.16 11 0.85 0.16 11 0.84 0.21 7 0.58 0.29 5 0.45 0.21 4
BRAZIL BRA -0.09 0.15 12 0.08 0.16 13 0.06 0.16 11 -0.11 0.15 12 -0.13 0.19 9 -0.08 0.25 8- 0 . 2 5 0.19 7
BRUNEI BRN 0.56 0.25 3 0.09 0.32 3 0.67 0.30 3 0.80 0.28 3 0.73 0.56 1 0.04 0.90 1 1.09 0.66 1
BULGARIA BGR 0.23 0.14 11 0.00 0.13 12 -0.07 0.14 11 0.00 0.14 11 -0.12 0.19 9 -1.03 0.26 6 -0.64 0.18 5
BURKINA FASO BFA -0.60 0.19 7 -0.60 0.22 7 -0.61 0.23 6 -0.66 0.24 5 -0.38 0.29 4 -0.26 0.38 3 -0.71 0.40 2
BURUNDI BDI -1.34 0.20 6 -1.33 0.24 6 -1.32 0.25 5 -1.52 0.26 4 -1.28 0.28 4 -1.02 0.47 1 -0.98 0.47 1
CAMBODIA KHM -0.94 0.18 7 -0.89 0.24 6 -0.57 0.25 5 -0.60 0.27 5 -0.50 0.30 3 -1.21 0.47 1 -0.66 0.47 1
CAMEROON CMR -0.90 0.16 10 -0.70 0.18 9 -0.58 0.18 9 -0.68 0.18 8 -0.50 0.22 7 -0.68 0.27 6 -1.11 0.21 4
CANADA CAN 1.92 0.16 9 2.01 0.17 10 2.02 0.17 10 2.01 0.16 10 1.94 0.21 9 2.13 0.29 7 2.03 0.21 6
CAPE VERDE CPV -0.11 0.20 5 -0.14 0.24 5 -0.19 0.22 5 -0.13 0.24 5 0.23 0.36 2 0.26 0.47 1 -0.07 0.47 1
CAYMAN ISLANDS CYM 1.29 0.27 1 1.15 0.39 1 1.31 0.35 1 1.93 0.33 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC CAF -1.47 0.20 6 -1.64 0.24 6 -1.49 0.25 5 -1.52 0.26 4 -1.11 0.36 2 -1.00 0.39 2 -0.92 0.47 1
CHAD TCD -1.13 0.18 7 -0.98 0.22 7 -0.78 0.23 6 -0.71 0.26 5 -0.43 0.36 2 -0.56 0.41 2 -0.66 0.47 1
CHILE CHL 1.26 0.15 12 1.30 0.16 13 1.23 0.16 11 1.25 0.15 12 1.31 0.19 10 1.31 0.26 7 1.20 0.19 7
CHINA CHN -0.11 0.15 11 0.05 0.16 12 0.08 0.16 11 0.14 0.16 11 0.25 0.19 9 0.06 0.26 7 0.15 0.19 7
COLOMBIA COL -0.09 0.15 12 -0.13 0.16 12 -0.19 0.17 10 -0.39 0.16 11 -0.22 0.19 10 -0.04 0.25 8 0.17 0.19 7
COMOROS COM -1.63 0.22 4 -1.54 0.29 4 -1.45 0.27 4 -0.98 0.26 4 -1.37 0.36 2 -1.09 0.47 1 -0.66 0.47 1
CONGO COG -1.31 0.20 7 -1.26 0.23 7 -1.36 0.22 7 -1.44 0.22 7 -1.80 0.29 4 -0.81 0.34 4 -1.19 0.40 2
Congo, Dem. Rep. (Zaire) ZAR -1.64 0.17 9 -1.46 0.17 10 -1.38 0.18 9 -1.72 0.20 8 -1.91 0.25 5 -1.96 0.37 3 -1.72 0.36 3
COOK ISLANDS COK 0.23 0.90 1 -0.16 0.54 1 -0.24 0.51 2 0.09 0.80 2 -0.06 0.41 1 .. .. .. .. .. ..
COSTA RICA CRI 0.30 0.16 10 0.52 0.17 11 0.51 0.17 9 0.49 0.16 10 0.63 0.21 7 0.49 0.29 5 0.11 0.21 5
CROATIA HRV 0.44 0.14 11 0.31 0.14 11 0.18 0.15 10 0.24 0.14 10 0.22 0.21 7 0.23 0.27 5 -0.30 0.19 4
CUBA CUB -0.94 0.18 7 -0.61 0.19 8 -0.48 0.19 7 -0.37 0.18 7 -0.29 0.25 4 -0.53 0.40 3 -0.29 0.23 3
CYPRUS CYP 1.16 0.18 6 1.06 0.19 7 1.16 0.20 6 1.08 0.19 6 1.17 0.27 3 1.33 0.40 3 1.17 0.23 3
CZECH REPUBLIC CZE 0.94 0.13 12 0.73 0.13 13 0.73 0.14 12 0.75 0.14 12 0.77 0.18 10 0.69 0.23 9 0.52 0.17 8
DENMARK DNK 2.12 0.16 9 2.21 0.17 10 2.11 0.17 10 2.03 0.16 9 1.84 0.21 8 2.20 0.31 6 2.09 0.21 6
DJIBOUTI DJI -0.85 0.22 4 -0.75 0.29 4 -0.80 0.27 4 -0.89 0.26 4 -1.14 0.36 2 -0.90 0.47 1 -1.09 0.47 1
DOMINICA DMA 0.57 0.25 3 0.39 0.32 3 0.24 0.29 3 0.17 0.28 3 -0.73 0.43 1 -0.90 0.47 1 -0.87 0.47 1
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC DOM -0.41 0.16 10 -0.52 0.17 10 -0.45 0.18 8 -0.48 0.17 8 -0.23 0.21 7 -0.67 0.35 3 -0.37 0.22 3
ECUADOR ECU -1.01 0.16 10 -0.83 0.16 11 -0.82 0.17 9 -0.90 0.16 10 -1.04 0.20 8 -0.84 0.28 6 -0.98 0.20 5
EGYPT EGY -0.35 0.15 11 -0.23 0.15 12 -0.26 0.16 11 -0.33 0.16 11 0.26 0.19 9 -0.09 0.27 6 -0.30 0.20 6
EL SALVADOR SLV -0.30 0.16 9 -0.25 0.18 9 -0.41 0.20 7 -0.48 0.18 8 -0.11 0.22 6 -0.01 0.35 3 -0.53 0.21 4
EQUATORIAL GUINEA GNQ -1.42 0.22 5 -1.37 0.27 5 -1.26 0.25 5 -1.42 0.26 5 -2.25 0.36 2 -1.64 0.47 1 -1.51 0.47 1
ERITREA ERI -0.98 0.20 6 -0.96 0.22 7 -0.67 0.23 6 -0.54 0.24 5 -0.37 0.36 2 0.26 0.47 1 -0.34 0.47 1
ESTONIA EST 1.03 0.14 12 0.95 0.13 13 1.04 0.14 12 0.82 0.14 12 1.04 0.19 10 0.45 0.26 6 0.53 0.19 4
ETHIOPIA ETH -0.97 0.16 9 -0.87 0.17 10 -0.79 0.18 9 -0.79 0.22 7 -0.46 0.28 5 -0.18 0.38 3 -0.55 0.40 2
FIJI FJI -0.09 0.25 3 -0.37 0.28 4 -0.10 0.26 4 0.13 0.26 4 -0.47 0.37 2 -0.07 0.41 2 -0.07 0.47 1
FINLAND FIN 2.07 0.16 9 2.06 0.18 9 2.14 0.18 9 2.08 0.17 9 1.89 0.21 8 2.12 0.31 6 2.04 0.21 6
FRANCE FRA 1.46 0.16 9 1.49 0.17 10 1.57 0.17 10 1.62 0.16 10 1.54 0.21 8 1.59 0.29 7 1.94 0.21 6
FRENCH GUIANA GUF 0.75 0.27 1 0.57 0.39 1 0.79 0.35 1 0.83 0.33 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
GABON GAB -0.63 0.18 8 -0.63 0.19 8 -0.54 0.18 8 -0.41 0.18 8 -0.72 0.21 6 -0.84 0.35 3 -1.02 0.22 3
GAMBIA GMB -0.65 0.19 6 -0.64 0.21 7 -0.65 0.21 7 -0.85 0.22 6 -0.10 0.31 3 -0.31 0.44 2 -0.34 0.40 2
GEORGIA GEO -0.47 0.15 9 -0.81 0.15 10 -0.74 0.16 8 -0.76 0.17 8 -0.74 0.26 6 -0.47 0.30 4 -0.45 0.27 3















































TABLE C3: Government Effectiveness (cont.)
2005 2004 2003 2002 2000 1998 1996
Country Code Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N.
GHANA GHA -0.09 0.15 11 -0.21 0.15 12 -0.30 0.16 11 -0.11 0.16 10 0.03 0.22 7 -0.29 0.27 6 0.05 0.21 4
GREECE GRC 0.66 0.16 9 0.80 0.18 9 0.83 0.18 9 0.82 0.17 9 0.89 0.22 6 0.74 0.31 6 0.82 0.21 6
GRENADA GRD 0.26 0.25 3 0.21 0.32 3 0.24 0.29 3 0.37 0.28 3 -0.02 0.43 1 -0.29 0.47 1 -0.55 0.47 1
G U A M G U M 0 . 2 1 0 . 2 7 1 0 . 2 6 0 . 3 9 1. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .
GUATEMALA GTM -0.70 0.16 9 -0.84 0.18 10 -0.91 0.19 8 -0.57 0.17 9 -0.50 0.22 6 -0.25 0.35 3 -0.53 0.21 4
GUINEA GIN -1.03 0.19 7 -1.01 0.22 7 -0.79 0.23 6 -0.78 0.23 6 -0.34 0.31 3 -0.45 0.39 3 -1.11 0.40 2
GUINEA-BISSAU GNB -1.46 0.21 5 -1.27 0.24 6 -1.23 0.22 6 -1.30 0.22 6 -1.35 0.29 4 -0.45 0.39 3 -0.55 0.40 2
GUYANA GUY -0.52 0.19 6 -0.12 0.26 5 -0.23 0.25 5 -0.23 0.25 4 -0.16 0.32 3 -0.20 0.44 2 -0.23 0.40 2
HAITI HTI -1.39 0.20 6 -1.72 0.22 7 -1.61 0.21 7 -1.64 0.21 6 -1.74 0.31 4 -0.96 0.44 2 -1.16 0.40 2
HONDURAS HND -0.64 0.16 9 -0.65 0.18 10 -0.71 0.19 8 -0.67 0.17 9 -0.44 0.22 6 -0.40 0.35 3 -1.07 0.21 4
HONG KONG HKG 1.63 0.17 8 1.56 0.19 8 1.40 0.19 8 1.38 0.18 8 1.13 0.24 6 1.55 0.31 6 1.93 0.22 5
HUNGARY HUN 0.79 0.13 13 0.70 0.13 14 0.75 0.13 13 0.80 0.13 13 0.83 0.18 11 0.76 0.23 9 0.39 0.17 8
ICELAND ISL 2.20 0.20 6 2.22 0.25 6 2.23 0.24 6 1.97 0.24 5 2.11 0.37 4 1.92 0.50 3 1.56 0.45 3
INDIA IND -0.11 0.15 11 -0.03 0.16 12 -0.03 0.16 11 -0.09 0.16 11 -0.06 0.19 9 -0.18 0.25 8 -0.45 0.19 7
INDONESIA IDN -0.47 0.14 12 -0.42 0.15 13 -0.58 0.16 12 -0.55 0.16 12 -0.39 0.17 10 -0.57 0.26 7 0.08 0.19 7
IRAN IRN -0.77 0.17 9 -0.65 0.17 10 -0.47 0.17 9 -0.47 0.17 9 -0.09 0.24 5 -0.32 0.36 4 -0.36 0.22 4
IRAQ IRQ -1.64 0.20 6 -1.46 0.20 7 -1.34 0.21 6 -1.81 0.19 6 -1.65 0.25 4 -2.18 0.40 3 -1.30 0.23 3
IRELAND IRL 1.63 0.16 9 1.56 0.17 10 1.52 0.17 10 1.63 0.16 9 2.06 0.21 8 1.73 0.29 7 1.70 0.21 6
ISRAEL ISR 0.95 0.17 8 1.12 0.18 9 0.97 0.18 9 1.11 0.17 9 1.18 0.23 6 0.92 0.33 5 1.49 0.21 6
ITALY ITA 0.60 0.16 9 0.66 0.18 9 0.88 0.18 9 0.90 0.17 9 0.90 0.21 9 0.99 0.29 7 0.93 0.21 6
IVORY COAST CIV -1.38 0.17 9 -1.28 0.17 10 -0.97 0.18 9 -0.94 0.17 9 -0.86 0.22 6 -0.13 0.27 6 0.05 0.21 4
JAMAICA JAM -0.12 0.17 8 0.14 0.18 8 -0.07 0.20 7 0.01 0.18 7 -0.26 0.24 4 -0.63 0.32 4 -0.35 0.22 3
JAPAN JPN 1.16 0.16 9 1.17 0.17 10 1.16 0.17 10 1.11 0.16 10 1.15 0.21 8 1.05 0.36 5 1.33 0.21 6
JORDAN JOR 0.08 0.16 10 0.16 0.17 10 0.34 0.18 9 0.33 0.17 8 0.33 0.21 6 0.50 0.27 6 0.13 0.21 5
KAZAKHSTAN KAZ -0.71 0.13 12 -0.80 0.13 12 -0.75 0.14 11 -0.88 0.14 11 -0.62 0.19 9 -0.77 0.25 7 -1.03 0.18 5
KENYA KEN -0.78 0.15 11 -0.72 0.15 12 -0.65 0.16 11 -0.71 0.16 10 -0.72 0.21 7 -0.98 0.27 6 -0.64 0.21 4
KIRIBATI KIR -0.50 0.22 4 -0.77 0.29 4 -0.34 0.38 3 -0.13 0.44 3 -0.20 0.31 2 -0.53 0.47 1 -0.34 0.47 1
KOREA, NORTH PRK -1.82 0.20 5 -1.66 0.20 6 -1.40 0.22 5 -1.87 0.26 4 -1.39 0.45 2 -0.58 0.90 1 -0.89 0.66 1
KOREA, SOUTH KOR 1.00 0.15 11 0.92 0.16 12 0.91 0.16 11 0.95 0.16 11 0.73 0.19 9 0.43 0.25 8 0.63 0.21 6
K O S O V O L W I - 0 . 7 6 0 . 2 7 1. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .
KUWAIT KWT 0.39 0.18 7 0.29 0.20 7 0.31 0.19 7 0.13 0.17 8 0.07 0.27 3 0.08 0.40 3 0.17 0.23 3
KYRGYZ REPUBLIC KGZ -0.91 0.14 10 -0.83 0.15 10 -0.78 0.16 9 -0.77 0.17 9 -0.65 0.23 5 -0.33 0.30 4 -0.53 0.27 3
LAOS LAO -1.09 0.19 7 -1.01 0.24 6 -0.96 0.25 5 -0.62 0.27 5 -0.73 0.28 3 -0.35 0.47 1 -0.07 0.47 1
LATVIA LVA 0.68 0.14 11 0.64 0.14 11 0.74 0.15 10 0.71 0.14 10 0.29 0.20 7 0.24 0.26 6 -0.34 0.19 4
LEBANON LBN -0.30 0.18 8 -0.32 0.19 8 -0.24 0.19 7 -0.40 0.17 8 -0.23 0.22 5 -0.03 0.31 4 -0.34 0.21 4
LESOTHO LSO -0.29 0.19 7 -0.23 0.21 7 -0.35 0.20 7 -0.27 0.22 6 -0.14 0.36 2 -0.39 0.39 2 0.09 0.47 1
LIBERIA LBR -1.36 0.21 5 -1.74 0.25 5 -1.75 0.26 4 -1.73 0.25 5 -1.68 0.29 4 -1.87 0.44 2 -1.80 0.40 2
LIBYA LBY -0.96 0.18 7 -0.79 0.20 7 -0.93 0.21 6 -0.97 0.19 6 -1.29 0.27 3 -1.51 0.40 3 -0.82 0.23 3
LIECHTENSTEIN LIE 1.57 0.26 2 1.64 0.38 2 1.44 0.34 2 1.65 0.32 2 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
LITHUANIA LTU 0.85 0.14 11 0.72 0.13 12 0.77 0.14 11 0.64 0.14 11 0.46 0.19 9 0.20 0.26 6 -0.16 0.19 4
LUXEMBOURG LUX 1.94 0.20 6 2.09 0.25 6 2.08 0.24 6 2.16 0.26 5 1.87 0.46 3 2.04 0.50 3 2.34 0.45 3
MACAO MAC 1.29 0.27 1 1.08 0.39 1 1.31 0.35 1 0.83 0.33 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
MACEDONIA MKD -0.28 0.14 10 -0.16 0.14 10 -0.29 0.15 9 -0.39 0.15 7 -0.56 0.25 4 -0.42 0.29 4 -0.29 0.19 3
MADAGASCAR MDG -0.12 0.16 9 -0.39 0.20 8 -0.34 0.22 7 -0.41 0.24 5 -0.55 0.28 5 -0.49 0.34 4 -0.95 0.40 2
MALAWI MWI -0.78 0.15 10 -0.82 0.17 10 -0.72 0.17 9 -0.60 0.18 8 -0.57 0.22 6 -0.63 0.29 5 -0.67 0.22 3
MALAYSIA MYS 1.01 0.15 11 0.95 0.16 12 0.85 0.16 11 0.95 0.16 11 0.71 0.19 10 0.73 0.25 8 0.75 0.19 7
MALDIVES MDV 0.18 0.22 4 0.20 0.29 4 0.40 0.26 4 0.73 0.27 4 0.11 0.31 2 0.45 0.47 1 -0.02 0.47 1
MALI MLI -0.46 0.16 9 -0.26 0.18 10 -0.39 0.18 9 -0.65 0.21 8 -0.72 0.29 4 -0.26 0.39 3 -0.72 0.40 2
MALTA MLT 0.95 0.20 5 1.03 0.26 5 1.04 0.25 5 1.08 0.28 3 0.73 0.56 1 0.65 0.90 1 -0.23 0.66 1
MARSHALL ISLANDS MHL -0.96 0.36 3 -0.92 0.39 3 -1.00 0.38 3 -0.42 0.44 3 -0.68 0.31 2 -0.59 0.47 1 .. .. ..
MARTINIQUE MTQ 0.75 0.27 1 0.74 0.39 1 0.79 0.35 1 0.83 0.33 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
MAURITANIA MRT -0.19 0.22 5 -0.10 0.27 5 0.06 0.25 5 -0.05 0.26 4 -0.33 0.32 3 -0.23 0.47 1 0.14 0.47 1
MAURITIUS MUS 0.60 0.17 7 0.70 0.21 6 0.71 0.21 6 0.49 0.19 6 0.72 0.23 5 0.48 0.30 4 0.62 0.23 2
MEXICO MEX -0.01 0.15 12 0.07 0.16 13 0.12 0.16 11 0.25 0.15 12 0.28 0.19 10 0.16 0.25 8 -0.20 0.19 7
MICRONESIA FSM -0.09 0.22 4 -0.67 0.29 4 -0.53 0.38 3 -0.41 0.44 3 -0.54 0.31 2 -0.53 0.47 1 .. .. ..
MOLDOVA MDA -0.75 0.14 11 -0.79 0.14 10 -0.63 0.15 9 -0.62 0.15 8 -1.14 0.20 7 -0.56 0.26 6 -0.82 0.19 4
MONACO MCO -0.12 0.90 1 1.39 0.86 1 -0.64 0.87 1 -0.63 0.88 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
MONGOLIA MNG -0.35 0.17 8 -0.37 0.21 8 -0.37 0.22 7 -0.26 0.23 6 -0.22 0.26 4 0.03 0.35 3 -0.50 0.40 2
MOROCCO MAR -0.20 0.16 10 -0.11 0.16 11 -0.02 0.17 10 -0.01 0.16 10 -0.09 0.22 5 0.17 0.27 6 -0.05 0.20 5
MOZAMBIQUE MOZ -0.34 0.16 10 -0.42 0.17 11 -0.48 0.17 10 -0.45 0.21 8 -0.53 0.29 4 -0.42 0.34 4 -0.54 0.40 2
MYANMAR MMR -1.61 0.18 7 -1.54 0.19 8 -1.35 0.19 7 -1.35 0.18 7 -1.38 0.25 4 -1.69 0.40 3 -1.20 0.23 3
NAMIBIA NAM 0.09 0.15 11 0.16 0.15 12 0.15 0.16 11 0.07 0.16 11 0.30 0.22 6 0.04 0.32 4 0.25 0.22 3
NAURU NRU -0.44 0.90 1 -1.33 0.86 1 -1.72 0.87 1 -1.18 0.88 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
NEPAL NPL -0.97 0.17 8 -0.84 0.19 8 -0.63 0.20 7 -0.47 0.25 6 -0.63 0.28 3 -1.02 0.47 1 -0.39 0.47 1
NETHERLANDS NLD 1.95 0.16 9 2.06 0.18 9 2.07 0.18 9 2.15 0.17 9 2.09 0.21 8 2.50 0.31 6 2.44 0.21 6
NETHERLANDS ANTILLES ANT 1.02 0.27 1 1.08 0.39 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
NEW ZEALAND NZL 1.90 0.17 8 2.13 0.19 8 2.13 0.19 8 1.98 0.18 7 1.50 0.23 6 2.01 0.33 5 2.46 0.22 5
NICARAGUA NIC -0.78 0.16 9 -0.67 0.18 10 -0.69 0.19 8 -0.81 0.17 9 -0.73 0.22 6 -0.49 0.35 3 -0.64 0.21 4
NIGER NER -0.79 0.19 7 -0.78 0.22 7 -0.85 0.23 6 -0.90 0.24 5 -1.02 0.29 4 -1.03 0.44 2 -1.07 0.40 2















































TABLE C3: Government Effectiveness (cont.)
2005 2004 2003 2002 2000 1998 1996
Country Code Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N.
NIUE NIU -0.44 0.90 1 .. .. .. -0.19 0.87 1 -0.77 0 . 8 8 1. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .
NORWAY NOR 1.99 0.16 9 2.11 0.18 9 2.07 0.18 9 1.89 0.17 8 1.63 0.22 7 2.12 0.31 6 2.13 0.21 6
OMAN OMN 0.47 0.20 6 0.66 0.20 7 0.75 0.19 7 0.56 0.17 8 0.85 0.25 4 1.09 0.40 3 0.67 0.23 3
PALAU PCI -0.76 0.90 1 0.38 0.86 1 0.32 0.87 1 -0.35 0 . 8 8 1. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .
PAKISTAN PAK -0.53 0.15 11 -0.52 0.16 11 -0.56 0.17 10 -0.57 0.17 9 -0.53 0.19 7 -0.74 0.27 6 -0.39 0.20 5
PANAMA PAN 0.11 0.16 10 -0.03 0.18 10 -0.13 0.17 9 -0.10 0.16 10 -0.03 0.21 7 -0.04 0.31 4 -0.38 0.21 4
PAPUA NEW GUINEA PNG -0.96 0.17 9 -0.80 0.17 10 -0.73 0.18 9 -0.77 0.18 8 -0.64 0.20 6 -0.59 0.35 3 -0.60 0.22 3
PARAGUAY PRY -0.83 0.16 9 -1.03 0.18 10 -1.15 0.19 8 -1.21 0.17 9 -1.23 0.24 5 -1.05 0.32 4- 0 . 9 2 0.22 3
PERU PER -0.60 0.15 11 -0.47 0.16 12 -0.48 0.17 10 -0.38 0.16 11 -0.40 0.20 9 0.19 0.26 7 -0.11 0.20 6
PHILIPPINES PHL -0.07 0.15 11 -0.17 0.16 12 -0.16 0.16 11 -0.06 0.16 11 0.12 0.19 10 0.13 0.26 7 0.22 0.19 7
POLAND POL 0.58 0.13 13 0.60 0.13 14 0.65 0.13 13 0.64 0.13 13 0.52 0.18 11 0.84 0.23 9 0.50 0.17 8
PORTUGAL PRT 1.03 0.16 9 1.05 0.18 9 1.23 0.18 9 1.06 0.17 8 1.14 0.22 7 1.43 0.29 7 1.03 0.21 6
PUERTO RICO PRI 1.01 0.24 3 1.11 0.29 3 1.16 0.27 3 1.18 0.28 2 1.59 0.49 1 1.61 0.60 1 1.43 0.66 1
QATAR QAT 0.55 0.18 7 0.63 0.21 6 0.59 0.21 6 0.63 0.18 6 0.78 0.25 4 0.63 0.40 3 0.62 0.23 3
R E U N I O N R E U 1 . 0 2 0 . 2 7 1 1 . 0 5 0 . 3 9 1. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .
ROMANIA ROM -0.03 0.13 13 -0.11 0.13 13 -0.16 0.14 12 -0.32 0.14 11 -0.67 0.19 9 -0.63 0.27 5 -0.88 0.18 5
RUSSIA RUS -0.45 0.13 13 -0.37 0.13 14 -0.34 0.13 13 -0.47 0.13 13 -0.70 0.18 11 -0.62 0.23 9 -0.79 0.17 8
RWANDA RWA -1.05 0.21 5 -0.59 0.23 6 -0.66 0.24 5 -0.80 0.24 5 -0.20 0.36 2 -0.72 0.47 1 -1.24 0.47 1
SAMOA SAM 0.35 0.22 4 0.11 0.29 4 0.37 0.26 4 0.27 0.27 4 0.10 0.31 2 -0.12 0.47 1 -0.34 0.47 1
SAN MARINO SMR -0.50 0.90 1 -0.22 0.86 1 -0.68 0.87 1 -0.35 0 . 8 8 1. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .
SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE STP -0.75 0.22 4 -0.85 0.29 4 -0.60 0.27 4 -0.68 0.26 4 -0.77 0.36 2 -0.84 0.47 1- 0 . 6 6 0.47 1
SAUDI ARABIA SAU -0.38 0.17 8 -0.22 0.17 9 -0.10 0.18 8 -0.11 0.17 9 -0.04 0.24 5 -0.38 0.36 4- 0 . 2 5 0.22 4
SENEGAL SEN -0.15 0.16 9 -0.15 0.17 10 -0.23 0.16 10 -0.19 0.17 9 0.12 0.22 6 0.06 0.29 5 -0.32 0.22 3
SEYCHELLES SYC -0.05 0.22 5 -0.27 0.27 5 -0.29 0.25 5 -0.16 0.26 4 -1.00 0.36 2 -0.59 0.47 1 -0.71 0.47 1
SIERRA LEONE SLE -1.20 0.20 6 -1.43 0.22 7 -1.57 0.22 6 -1.66 0.22 6 -1.42 0.29 4 -0.53 0.44 2 -0.60 0.40 2
SINGAPORE SGP 2.14 0.15 10 2.19 0.17 10 2.42 0.18 9 2.31 0.17 9 2.33 0.22 8 2.57 0.29 7 2.31 0.21 6
SLOVAK REPUBLIC SVK 0.95 0.14 12 0.73 0.13 12 0.57 0.14 11 0.46 0.14 10 0.32 0.19 9 0.00 0.24 7 0.17 0.18 6
SLOVENIA SVN 0.99 0.14 11 0.95 0.13 12 1.00 0.14 12 0.87 0.14 12 0.79 0.19 9 0.68 0.27 5 0.52 0.19 4
SOLOMON ISLANDS SLB -0.69 0.22 4 -1.49 0.29 4 -2.43 0.38 3 -1.70 0.44 3 -0.85 0.31 2 -0.84 0.47 1- 1 . 0 3 0.47 1
SOMALIA SOM -2.21 0.21 5 -2.05 0.25 5 -1.92 0.26 4 -1.71 0.26 4 -2.34 0.32 3 -1.87 0.44 2 -1.80 0.40 2
SOUTH AFRICA ZAF 0.84 0.14 13 0.74 0.14 14 0.64 0.15 13 0.63 0.15 13 0.40 0.18 11 0.12 0.25 8 0.53 0.19 7
SPAIN ESP 1.40 0.16 9 1.35 0.17 10 1.53 0.17 10 1.58 0.16 10 1.82 0.21 9 1.95 0.29 7 1.70 0.21 6
SRI LANKA LKA -0.41 0.15 10 -0.29 0.16 11 -0.16 0.17 10 0.02 0.17 10 -0.34 0.19 7 -0.41 0.31 4 -0.33 0.21 4
ST. KITTS AND NEVIS KNA 1.00 0.25 3 -0.09 0.32 3 -0.42 0.47 2 -0.27 0.46 2 0.06 0.43 1 -0.29 0.47 1- 0 . 2 8 0.47 1
ST. LUCIA LCA 1.12 0.25 3 0.20 0.32 3 0.15 0.47 2 0.01 0.46 2 0.11 0.43 1 -0.23 0.47 1 0.30 0.47 1
ST. VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES VCT 1.07 0.25 3 0.35 0.32 3 -0.10 0.47 2 -0.20 0.46 2 -0.06 0.43 1 -0.29 0.47 1- 0 . 2 8 0.47 1
SUDAN SDN -1.30 0.17 9 -1.20 0.17 10 -1.20 0.18 9 -1.13 0.17 9 -1.56 0.21 6 -1.70 0.35 3 -1.34 0.22 3
SURINAME SUR -0.04 0.23 4 -0.03 0.29 4 -0.18 0.28 4 -0.28 0.28 3 -0.10 0.56 1 0.04 0.90 1- 0 . 8 9 0.66 1
SWAZILAND SWZ -0.84 0.20 6 -0.70 0.24 6 -0.79 0.23 6 -0.43 0.24 5 -0.63 0.36 2 -0.81 0.39 2 -0.39 0.47 1
SWEDEN SWE 1.93 0.16 9 1.99 0.17 10 2.03 0.17 10 1.93 0.16 9 1.77 0.21 9 1.99 0.31 6 2.05 0.21 6
SWITZERLAND CHE 2.03 0.16 9 2.28 0.18 9 2.29 0.18 9 2.25 0.17 8 2.18 0.21 8 2.48 0.29 7 2.53 0.21 6
SYRIA SYR -1.23 0.18 7 -0.92 0.19 8 -0.79 0.19 7 -0.68 0.18 7 -1.01 0.25 4 -1.28 0.40 3 -0.69 0.23 3
TAIWAN TWN 1.11 0.15 10 1.19 0.16 11 1.14 0.17 10 1.10 0.16 10 1.21 0.21 8 1.56 0.31 6 1.26 0.21 6
TAJIKISTAN TJK -1.06 0.14 10 -1.01 0.15 10 -1.09 0.16 9 -1.24 0.17 9 -1.26 0.23 5 -1.45 0.32 3 -1.54 0.27 3
TANZANIA TZA -0.37 0.15 11 -0.39 0.15 12 -0.40 0.16 11 -0.56 0.16 10 -0.35 0.21 7 -0.60 0.27 6 -1.20 0.21 4
THAILAND THA 0.40 0.15 11 0.37 0.16 12 0.29 0.16 11 0.26 0.16 11 0.19 0.20 9 0.04 0.25 8 0.58 0.19 7
TIMOR, EAST TMP -0.97 0.22 3 -0.84 0.33 2 -0.94 0.30 3 -0.93 0.32 2 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
TOGO TGO -1.38 0.19 7 -1.33 0.22 7 -1.27 0.23 6 -1.25 0.24 5 -1.51 0.31 3 -0.51 0.39 3 -0.75 0.40 2
TONGA TON -0.48 0.22 4 -0.75 0.29 4 -0.59 0.38 3 -0.65 0.44 3 -0.53 0.31 2 -0.47 0.47 1- 0 . 2 3 0.47 1
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO TTO 0.29 0.17 8 0.54 0.20 7 0.52 0.20 7 0.52 0.18 6 0.61 0.23 5 0.42 0.35 3 0.37 0.22 3
TUNISIA TUN 0.43 0.16 10 0.53 0.16 11 0.61 0.17 10 0.58 0.16 10 1.07 0.21 7 0.75 0.29 5 0.49 0.21 4
TURKEY TUR 0.27 0.15 12 0.07 0.16 13 0.09 0.16 12 -0.05 0.16 12 0.11 0.19 10 -0.38 0.25 8 -0.16 0.19 7
TURKMENISTAN TKM -1.57 0.16 7 -1.45 0.16 7 -1.33 0.17 6 -1.52 0.18 6 -1.42 0.29 3 -1.46 0.32 3 -1.47 0.27 3
TUVALU TUV 0.23 0.26 2 -1.04 0.33 3 -0.96 0.51 2 0.18 0.80 2 0 . 1 9 0 . 4 1 1. .. .. .. .. .. .
UGANDA UGA -0.48 0.15 11 -0.45 0.15 12 -0.41 0.16 11 -0.48 0.16 10 -0.19 0.21 7 -0.27 0.27 6 -0.39 0.21 4
UKRAINE UKR -0.42 0.13 12 -0.63 0.13 13 -0.58 0.14 12 -0.73 0.14 12 -0.76 0.19 9 -1.00 0.23 8 -0.87 0.18 6
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES ARE 0.55 0.17 8 1.02 0.19 7 0.77 0.21 6 0.80 0.18 7 0.64 0.27 3 0.26 0.40 3 0.59 0.23 3
UNITED KINGDOM GBR 1.70 0.16 9 1.92 0.17 10 1.96 0.17 10 2.02 0.16 10 2.04 0.21 9 2.39 0.29 7 2.33 0.21 6
UNITED STATES USA 1.59 0.16 9 1.79 0.18 9 1.80 0.18 9 1.70 0.17 9 1.74 0.22 8 1.71 0.29 7 2.06 0.21 6
URUGUAY URY 0.53 0.16 10 0.50 0.17 10 0.46 0.18 8 0.55 0.17 9 0.57 0.21 7 0.58 0.31 4 0.71 0.21 4
UZBEKISTAN UZB -1.20 0.15 10 -1.05 0.14 11 -1.02 0.15 10 -1.12 0.15 10 -0.98 0.19 7 -1.33 0.26 5 -1.07 0.19 4
VANUATU VUT -0.33 0.22 4 -0.75 0.29 4 -0.93 0.38 3 -0.39 0.44 3 -0.51 0.31 2 -0.47 0.47 1- 0 . 2 3 0.47 1
VENEZUELA VEN -0.83 0.15 12 -0.98 0.16 13 -1.04 0.16 11 -1.06 0.15 12 -0.83 0.20 8 -0.89 0.25 8 -0.78 0.19 7
VIETNAM VNM -0.31 0.15 11 -0.37 0.15 12 -0.31 0.16 11 -0.34 0.16 11 -0.36 0.18 8 -0.24 0.27 6 -0.28 0.20 6
VIRGIN ISLANDS (U.S.) V I R 1 . 2 9 0 . 2 7 1 0 . 5 5 0 . 3 9 1. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .
WEST BANK WBG -1.13 0.25 2 -0.91 0.35 2 -1.23 0.32 2 -1.03 0.32 2 0.44 0.80 1 -0.05 0.68 1. .. .. .
YEMEN YEM -0.94 0.18 7 -0.94 0.19 8 -0.70 0.20 7 -0.89 0.18 7 -0.75 0.25 4 -0.48 0.35 3 -0.73 0.22 3
YUGOSLAVIA YUG -0.31 0.14 11 -0.12 0.14 11 -0.50 0.15 10 -0.61 0.15 9 -0.80 0.27 3 -1.11 0.36 3 -0.71 0.24 2
ZAMBIA ZMB -0.94 0.16 10 -0.82 0.15 12 -0.87 0.16 11 -0.72 0.16 10 -0.63 0.21 7 -0.53 0.27 6 -0.75 0.21 4

















































TABLE C4: Regulatory Quality
2005 2004 2003 2002 2000 1998 1996
Country Code Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N.
AFGHANISTAN AFG -1.63 0.21 4 -1.78 0.22 4 -1.69 0.23 3 -1.84 0.30 2 -3.69 0.57 1 .. .. .. .. .. ..
ALBANIA ALB -0.27 0.18 9 -0.23 0.19 8 -0.44 0.20 7 -0.40 0.21 7 -0.13 0.37 6 -0.62 0.30 6 -0.04 0.31 5
ALGERIA DZA -0.63 0.16 10 -0.65 0.17 10 -0.54 0.18 9 -0.62 0.19 8 -0.82 0.32 5 -1.21 0.41 4 -0.81 0.29 5
AMERICAN SAMOA ASM 0.36 0.31 1 0.46 0.34 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
ANDORRA ADO 1.33 0.31 1 1.36 0.34 1 1.38 0.31 1 1.42 0.31 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
ANGOLA AGO -1.24 0.17 9 -1.25 0.18 9 -1.28 0.19 8 -1.41 0.19 7 -1.85 0.32 5 -1.33 0.31 5 -1.46 0.29 5
A N G U I L L A A I A 1 . 0 9 0 . 3 1 1 0 . 8 7 0 . 3 4 1 . . . . . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .
ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA ATG 0.60 0.31 1 0.65 0.34 1 0.65 0.31 1 0.68 0.31 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
ARGENTINA ARG -0.64 0.17 10 -0.74 0.17 10 -0.65 0.17 9 -0.84 0.18 9 0.43 0.32 7 0.77 0.27 6 0.73 0.23 7
ARMENIA ARM 0.12 0.18 10 -0.05 0.19 9 0.13 0.20 8 0.08 0.21 8 -0.46 0.37 6 -0.51 0.30 6 -0.81 0.34 4
ARUBA ABW 0.85 0.31 1 0.73 0.34 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
AUSTRALIA AUS 1.58 0.19 8 1.71 0.19 8 1.65 0.18 8 1.62 0.19 7 1.43 0.36 5 1.16 0.28 5 1.25 0.24 6
AUSTRIA AUT 1.52 0.19 8 1.48 0.19 8 1.55 0.18 8 1.65 0.19 7 1.44 0.36 5 1.08 0.28 6 1.27 0.24 6
AZERBAIJAN AZE -0.52 0.16 12 -0.54 0.17 11 -0.60 0.17 10 -0.90 0.18 10 -0.57 0.33 7 -1.11 0.30 6 -1.20 0.28 5
BAHAMAS BHS 0.99 0.25 3 0.99 0.26 3 1.03 0.25 3 1.33 0.26 3 0.87 0.67 2 1.06 0.64 2 0.66 0.47 2
BAHRAIN BHR 0.69 0.18 8 0.80 0.19 8 0.70 0.20 6 0.95 0.20 7 0.94 0.46 3 0.91 0.49 3 0.60 0.30 4
BANGLADESH BGD -1.07 0.17 10 -1.16 0.17 10 -1.05 0.17 9 -1.09 0.19 9 -0.23 0.34 6 -0.13 0.41 4 -0.41 0.29 5
BARBADOS BRB 1.00 0.26 3 1.06 0.28 3 1.04 0.26 3 1.11 0.28 2 0.45 0.79 1 0.74 0.74 1 0.30 0.57 1
BELARUS BLR -1.53 0.18 9 -1.56 0.19 9 -1.82 0.20 8 -1.70 0.21 7 -2.75 0.38 5 -1.98 0.30 6 -1.09 0.34 4
BELGIUM BEL 1.24 0.19 8 1.36 0.19 8 1.35 0.18 8 1.45 0.19 8 0.69 0.34 6 0.95 0.28 5 1.17 0.24 6
BELIZE BLZ 0.09 0.24 4 0.08 0.25 4 0.19 0.24 4 0.11 0.26 3 -0.24 0.51 3 0.10 0.52 2 0.10 0.47 2
BENIN BEN -0.55 0.19 7 -0.64 0.22 6 -0.62 0.23 5 -0.51 0.24 4 -0.11 0.38 3 -0.13 0.52 3 0.12 0.47 2
BERMUDA BMU 1.33 0.31 1 1.39 0.34 1 1.38 0.31 1 1.42 0.31 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
BHUTAN BTN -0.11 0.26 4 -0.75 0.26 4 0.08 0.23 4 -0.41 0.27 3 0.17 0.46 2 -0.23 0.63 1 0.06 0.67 1
BOLIVIA BOL -0.53 0.17 9 -0.11 0.18 9 0.07 0.18 8 -0.15 0.19 8 0.59 0.36 6 0.80 0.40 5 0.76 0.29 5
BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA BIH -0.53 0.19 9 -0.52 0.19 9 -0.79 0.21 7 -0.94 0.22 7 -0.80 0.47 4 -1.30 0.33 3 -2.10 0.62 1
BOTSWANA BWA 0.76 0.16 10 0.81 0.17 10 0.81 0.18 9 0.77 0.18 9 0.71 0.32 6 0.82 0.31 5 0.60 0.29 5
BRAZIL BRA 0.08 0.17 10 0.08 0.17 10 0.28 0.17 9 0.20 0.18 9 0.30 0.32 7 0.23 0.27 7 0.12 0.23 7
BRUNEI BRN 0.95 0.27 2 1.18 0.29 2 1.00 0.27 2 1.03 0.28 2 0.20 0.88 1 -0.11 0.88 1 3.34 0.66 1
BULGARIA BGR 0.63 0.17 11 0.64 0.17 11 0.58 0.17 10 0.59 0.18 10 0.15 0.34 7 0.39 0.30 6 -0.02 0.27 6
BURKINA FASO BFA -0.47 0.19 7 -0.34 0.20 7 -0.30 0.21 6 -0.20 0.23 5 -0.06 0.36 4 -0.27 0.34 4 -0.38 0.41 3
BURUNDI BDI -1.22 0.20 6 -1.28 0.23 5 -1.28 0.25 4 -1.33 0.26 3 -0.92 0.36 4 -1.27 0.52 2 -1.33 0.67 1
CAMBODIA KHM -0.62 0.20 7 -0.57 0.22 6 -0.49 0.22 5 -0.47 0.25 5 -0.14 0.42 4 -0.27 0.52 2 -0.31 0.67 1
CAMEROON CMR -0.76 0.16 10 -0.77 0.18 9 -0.75 0.18 9 -0.80 0.19 8 -0.07 0.32 6 -0.28 0.31 6 -0.83 0.29 5
CANADA CAN 1.57 0.19 8 1.65 0.19 8 1.55 0.18 8 1.63 0.19 8 1.29 0.36 6 1.05 0.28 6 1.15 0.24 6
CAPE VERDE CPV -0.21 0.23 4 -0.12 0.25 4 -0.10 0.24 4 -0.28 0.24 4 -0.14 0.38 3 -0.61 0.52 2 -0.60 0.47 2
CAYMAN ISLANDS CYM 1.33 0.31 1 1.41 0.34 1 1.38 0.31 1 1.42 0.31 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC CAF -1.23 0.20 6 -1.44 0.22 6 -1.16 0.23 5 -0.89 0.24 4 -0.71 0.41 2 -0.60 0.63 1 -0.31 0.67 1
CHAD TCD -0.94 0.19 7 -0.87 0.21 7 -0.84 0.22 6 -0.99 0.24 5 -0.35 0.38 3 -0.70 0.52 3 -0.01 0.67 1
CHILE CHL 1.40 0.17 10 1.48 0.17 10 1.52 0.17 9 1.46 0.18 9 1.19 0.32 7 1.10 0.27 6 1.36 0.23 7
CHINA CHN -0.28 0.17 10 -0.38 0.17 10 -0.35 0.17 9 -0.46 0.18 9 -0.03 0.32 7 -0.11 0.27 6 -0.15 0.23 7
COLOMBIA COL 0.05 0.17 10 -0.03 0.17 10 0.00 0.17 9 -0.10 0.18 9 -0.02 0.32 7 0.43 0.27 7 0.44 0.23 7
COMOROS COM -1.63 0.24 3 -1.43 0.27 3 -1.33 0.26 3 -1.05 0.26 3 -0.96 0.41 2 -0.73 0.63 1 -0.74 0.67 1
CONGO COG -1.20 0.20 7 -1.06 0.22 6 -1.12 0.21 6 -1.09 0.22 6 -1.09 0.36 4 -0.98 0.48 4 -0.84 0.41 3
Congo, Dem. Rep. (Zaire) ZAR -1.66 0.17 8 -1.69 0.19 8 -1.62 0.19 7 -1.67 0.23 6 -2.70 0.32 5 -2.72 0.41 4 -2.24 0.34 4
COOK ISLANDS COK .. .. .. -0.05 0.66 1 -0.18 0.44 1 -0.07 0.71 1 -0.06 0.62 1 .. .. .. .. .. ..
COSTA RICA CRI 0.61 0.17 9 0.56 0.18 9 0.72 0.18 8 0.76 0.19 8 0.84 0.36 6 0.90 0.40 5 0.59 0.26 6
CROATIA HRV 0.45 0.17 11 0.33 0.17 11 0.29 0.17 10 0.17 0.18 10 0.23 0.37 6 0.27 0.30 5 -0.07 0.28 5
CUBA CUB -1.75 0.18 7 -1.53 0.19 7 -1.37 0.20 6 -1.22 0.20 6 -1.56 0.46 3 -1.08 0.49 3 -0.76 0.30 4
CYPRUS CYP 1.31 0.20 6 1.27 0.21 6 1.23 0.20 5 1.21 0.20 5 1.00 0.46 3 1.02 0.49 3 0.82 0.30 4
CZECH REPUBLIC CZE 1.04 0.17 11 0.98 0.16 12 1.08 0.16 11 1.10 0.17 11 0.63 0.31 8 0.70 0.23 8 1.00 0.22 8
DENMARK DNK 1.69 0.19 8 1.80 0.19 8 1.76 0.18 8 1.72 0.19 7 1.32 0.36 5 1.25 0.28 5 1.37 0.24 6
DJIBOUTI DJI -0.86 0.23 4 -0.72 0.25 4 -0.78 0.24 4 -0.69 0.24 4 -0.73 0.38 3 -0.82 0.52 2 -0.02 0.67 1
DOMINICA DMA 0.75 0.27 2 0.68 0.29 2 0.74 0.28 2 0.74 0.28 2 -0.20 0.59 1 -0.60 0.63 1 -0.23 0.67 1
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC DOM -0.27 0.17 9 -0.30 0.18 9 -0.22 0.18 8 -0.16 0.19 8 0.45 0.36 6 0.17 0.48 3 0.16 0.32 4
ECUADOR ECU -0.83 0.17 9 -0.58 0.18 9 -0.54 0.18 8 -0.61 0.19 8 -0.32 0.36 6 0.12 0.40 5 0.00 0.29 5
EGYPT EGY -0.47 0.16 10 -0.46 0.17 10 -0.50 0.18 9 -0.50 0.18 9 -0.08 0.30 7 0.12 0.31 5 -0.05 0.26 6
EL SALVADOR SLV 0.12 0.18 8 0.24 0.18 8 0.06 0.19 7 0.05 0.19 7 1.07 0.43 5 1.31 0.48 3 0.69 0.28 5
EQUATORIAL GUINEA GNQ -1.31 0.22 5 -1.10 0.24 5 -1.21 0.23 5 -1.45 0.24 5 -1.37 0.38 3 -2.08 0.52 2 -0.97 0.67 1
ERITREA ERI -1.84 0.21 5 -1.40 0.23 5 -1.34 0.25 4 -1.11 0.26 3 -0.47 0.41 2 0.02 0.63 1 -0.16 0.67 1
ESTONIA EST 1.43 0.16 12 1.45 0.16 12 1.45 0.16 11 1.40 0.17 11 1.24 0.31 8 0.95 0.30 6 1.23 0.28 5
ETHIOPIA ETH -1.09 0.17 9 -1.05 0.18 9 -1.09 0.18 8 -1.02 0.22 6 -0.69 0.36 5 -0.22 0.34 4 -1.31 0.41 3
FIJI FJI -0.35 0.25 3 -0.57 0.26 3 -0.34 0.25 3 -0.12 0.26 3 -0.88 0.51 2 -0.64 0.52 3 -0.52 0.47 2
FINLAND FIN 1.74 0.19 8 1.82 0.19 8 1.90 0.18 8 1.93 0.19 8 1.72 0.36 5 1.35 0.28 5 1.26 0.24 6
FRANCE FRA 1.09 0.19 8 1.10 0.19 8 1.16 0.18 8 1.19 0.19 8 0.70 0.36 6 0.85 0.28 6 1.04 0.24 6
FRENCH GUIANA GUF 0.85 0.31 1 0.49 0.34 1 0.89 0.31 1 0.93 0.31 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
GABON GAB -0.26 0.18 8 -0.39 0.19 8 -0.25 0.18 8 -0.24 0.19 8 -0.36 0.32 5 0.04 0.48 3 -0.53 0.32 4

















































TABLE C4: Regulatory Quality (cont.)
2005 2004 2003 2002 2000 1998 1996
Country Code Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N.
GEORGIA GEO -0.54 0.19 9 -0.52 0.19 9 -0.58 0.21 7 -0.83 0.22 7 -0.62 0.38 5 -0.81 0.30 5 -0.92 0.34 4
GERMANY DEU 1.38 0.19 8 1.39 0.19 8 1.51 0.18 8 1.54 0.19 8 1.30 0.36 6 1.06 0.28 6 1.31 0.24 6
GHANA GHA -0.14 0.16 10 -0.36 0.17 10 -0.22 0.18 9 -0.26 0.19 8 0.03 0.32 6 0.26 0.31 6 0.00 0.29 5
GREECE GRC 0.91 0.19 8 0.92 0.19 8 1.05 0.18 8 1.11 0.19 8 0.92 0.36 5 0.74 0.28 5 0.76 0.24 6
GRENADA GRD 0.36 0.27 2 0.23 0.29 2 0.36 0.28 2 0.38 0.28 2 0.20 0.59 1 0.14 0.63 1 -0.16 0.67 1
G U A M G U M 0 . 6 0 0 . 3 1 1 0 . 6 8 0 . 3 4 1. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .
GUATEMALA GTM -0.26 0.18 8 -0.11 0.18 8 -0.16 0.19 7 -0.11 0.19 7 0.46 0.43 5 0.75 0.48 3 0.11 0.28 5
GUINEA GIN -0.92 0.19 7 -1.06 0.20 7 -0.84 0.21 6 -0.78 0.22 6 -0.16 0.36 4 0.07 0.48 4 0.00 0.41 3
GUINEA-BISSAU GNB -1.11 0.21 5 -0.94 0.23 5 -0.94 0.22 5 -0.97 0.23 5 -1.15 0.36 4 -1.31 0.48 4 0.14 0.52 2
GUYANA GUY -0.38 0.22 6 -0.25 0.23 5 -0.25 0.22 5 -0.40 0.24 4 -0.11 0.47 3 0.24 0.48 3 0.28 0.41 3
HAITI HTI -1.17 0.20 6 -1.35 0.21 6 -1.06 0.22 6 -0.96 0.23 5 -1.21 0.47 4 -1.00 0.48 3 -1.31 0.41 3
HONDURAS HND -0.44 0.18 8 -0.36 0.18 8 -0.50 0.19 7 -0.37 0.19 7 0.25 0.43 5 0.50 0.48 3 -0.31 0.28 5
HONG KONG HKG 1.89 0.19 8 1.88 0.19 8 1.75 0.18 8 1.43 0.19 8 1.72 0.36 5 1.44 0.28 6 1.75 0.24 6
HUNGARY HUN 1.11 0.16 12 1.15 0.16 12 1.10 0.16 11 1.17 0.17 11 1.00 0.31 8 1.04 0.23 8 0.45 0.22 8
ICELAND ISL 1.67 0.22 6 1.71 0.23 6 1.66 0.21 6 1.53 0.22 5 1.30 0.43 4 0.74 0.31 4 0.23 0.33 3
INDIA IND -0.34 0.17 10 -0.47 0.17 10 -0.46 0.17 9 -0.39 0.18 9 -0.31 0.32 7 -0.14 0.27 7 -0.13 0.23 7
INDONESIA IDN -0.45 0.16 11 -0.44 0.17 11 -0.69 0.16 10 -0.71 0.18 10 -0.41 0.29 8 0.04 0.27 6 0.22 0.23 7
IRAN IRN -1.49 0.18 8 -1.20 0.18 8 -1.14 0.19 7 -1.27 0.19 7 -1.35 0.46 3 -1.55 0.49 3 -1.45 0.30 4
IRAQ IRQ -1.61 0.19 6 -1.61 0.20 6 -1.44 0.21 5 -2.30 0.20 6 -3.47 0.46 3 -3.88 0.49 3 -2.39 0.30 4
IRELAND IRL 1.56 0.19 8 1.61 0.19 8 1.60 0.18 8 1.61 0.19 7 1.61 0.36 5 1.38 0.28 6 1.41 0.24 6
ISRAEL ISR 0.89 0.19 8 0.85 0.19 8 0.89 0.18 8 0.99 0.19 8 0.84 0.36 5 0.66 0.28 5 1.12 0.24 6
ITALY ITA 0.94 0.19 8 1.08 0.19 8 1.13 0.18 8 1.09 0.19 8 0.70 0.36 6 0.72 0.28 6 0.62 0.24 6
IVORY COAST CIV -0.95 0.17 9 -0.83 0.18 9 -0.71 0.18 8 -0.41 0.19 8 -0.39 0.32 6 0.07 0.31 6 -0.13 0.29 5
JAMAICA JAM 0.24 0.18 8 0.16 0.18 8 0.26 0.19 7 0.28 0.19 7 0.33 0.43 4 0.54 0.48 4 0.52 0.32 4
JAPAN JPN 1.17 0.19 8 1.15 0.19 8 1.03 0.18 8 0.95 0.19 8 0.73 0.36 5 0.48 0.28 5 0.71 0.24 6
JORDAN JOR 0.16 0.17 10 0.21 0.17 10 0.22 0.17 9 0.07 0.19 8 0.60 0.36 5 0.52 0.31 6 0.10 0.26 6
KAZAKHSTAN KAZ -0.47 0.17 11 -0.70 0.17 10 -0.71 0.18 9 -0.74 0.18 9 -0.54 0.37 6 -0.39 0.30 6 -0.32 0.31 4
KENYA KEN -0.32 0.16 10 -0.25 0.17 10 -0.27 0.18 9 -0.55 0.19 8 -0.26 0.32 6 -0.17 0.31 6 -0.43 0.29 5
KIRIBATI KIR -0.98 0.27 3 -0.59 0.28 3 -0.99 0.36 2 -1.13 0.48 2 -0.85 0.46 2 -0.97 0.63 1 -0.38 0.67 1
KOREA, NORTH PRK -2.31 0.19 5 -2.20 0.20 5 -2.05 0.21 4 -1.93 0.26 3 -1.75 0.67 2 -1.73 0.64 2 -2.19 0.47 2
KOREA, SOUTH KOR 0.77 0.17 10 0.76 0.17 10 0.67 0.17 9 0.80 0.18 9 0.49 0.32 6 0.23 0.27 7 0.58 0.24 6
KUWAIT KWT 0.43 0.20 7 0.48 0.21 6 0.26 0.20 6 0.33 0.20 7 -0.20 0.46 3 -0.12 0.49 3 0.20 0.30 4
KYRGYZ REPUBLIC KGZ -0.67 0.19 10 -0.12 0.19 9 -0.36 0.19 8 -0.45 0.22 8 -0.43 0.34 6 -0.75 0.30 5 -0.28 0.39 3
LAOS LAO -1.21 0.20 7 -1.24 0.22 6 -1.38 0.22 5 -1.28 0.25 5 -1.30 0.42 3 -1.19 0.52 2 -1.22 0.47 2
LATVIA LVA 1.03 0.17 11 1.05 0.17 11 1.01 0.17 10 0.90 0.18 10 0.46 0.34 6 0.63 0.30 6 0.45 0.28 5
LEBANON LBN -0.28 0.18 8 -0.30 0.18 8 -0.28 0.19 7 -0.52 0.19 8 0.21 0.38 4 0.45 0.41 4 0.27 0.29 5
LESOTHO LSO -0.55 0.21 6 -0.44 0.23 6 -0.60 0.22 6 -0.45 0.24 5 -0.45 0.38 3 0.12 0.35 3 -0.72 0.47 2
LIBERIA LBR -1.70 0.21 4 -1.70 0.25 3 -1.59 0.27 2 -1.57 0.26 3 -1.42 0.39 3 -2.31 0.57 2 -3.00 0.52 2
LIBYA LBY -1.44 0.18 7 -1.41 0.19 7 -1.65 0.20 6 -1.61 0.20 6 -2.07 0.46 3 -2.93 0.49 3 -1.75 0.30 4
LIECHTENSTEIN LIE 1.58 0.31 1 1.51 0.34 1 1.62 0.31 1 1.66 0.31 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
LITHUANIA LTU 1.13 0.17 11 1.18 0.17 11 1.09 0.17 10 1.01 0.18 10 0.50 0.34 7 0.14 0.30 6 0.28 0.28 5
LUXEMBOURG LUX 1.79 0.22 6 1.94 0.23 6 1.95 0.21 6 1.91 0.23 5 1.81 0.48 3 1.13 0.31 4 1.47 0.29 4
MACAO MAC 1.09 0.31 1 1.53 0.34 1 1.14 0.31 1 0.68 0.31 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
MACEDONIA MKD -0.20 0.17 10 -0.20 0.17 10 -0.20 0.18 9 -0.12 0.19 7 0.06 0.54 2 -0.22 0.36 3 -0.23 0.36 3
MADAGASCAR MDG -0.27 0.18 8 -0.08 0.20 8 -0.04 0.21 7 -0.25 0.23 5 -0.24 0.36 5 -0.50 0.48 4 -0.08 0.41 3
MALAWI MWI -0.58 0.17 9 -0.51 0.18 9 -0.32 0.18 8 -0.43 0.19 7 -0.17 0.36 5 0.02 0.34 5 -0.39 0.32 4
MALAYSIA MYS 0.50 0.17 10 0.57 0.17 10 0.59 0.17 9 0.53 0.18 9 0.28 0.32 7 0.49 0.27 7 0.80 0.23 7
MALDIVES MDV 0.50 0.27 3 0.08 0.28 3 0.47 0.24 3 0.69 0.27 3 -0.01 0.46 2 0.14 0.63 1 0.21 0.67 1
MALI MLI -0.50 0.18 8 -0.35 0.20 8 -0.41 0.21 7 -0.42 0.22 6 0.17 0.36 4 0.07 0.48 4 0.12 0.41 3
MALTA MLT 1.24 0.23 5 1.26 0.24 5 1.21 0.23 5 1.09 0.26 3 0.38 0.67 2 0.46 0.64 2 0.43 0.47 2
MARSHALL ISLANDS MHL -0.77 0.47 2 -0.92 0.43 2 -0.77 0.36 2 -0.79 0.48 2 -0.73 0.46 2 -0.85 0.63 1 .. .. ..
MARTINIQUE MTQ 0.85 0.31 1 0.77 0.34 1 0.89 0.31 1 0.93 0.31 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
MAURITANIA MRT -0.14 0.22 5 -0.06 0.24 5 -0.10 0.23 5 0.06 0.24 4 -0.45 0.38 3 -0.51 0.52 2 -0.69 0.47 2
MAURITIUS MUS 0.32 0.18 7 0.43 0.20 6 0.46 0.20 6 0.50 0.20 6 0.66 0.36 4 0.55 0.35 4 0.14 0.41 2
MEXICO MEX 0.33 0.17 10 0.46 0.17 10 0.43 0.17 9 0.42 0.18 9 0.56 0.32 7 0.68 0.27 7 0.48 0.23 7
MICRONESIA FSM 0.19 0.27 3 -0.05 0.28 3 -0.59 0.36 2 -0.69 0.48 2 -0.63 0.46 2 -0.73 0.63 1 .. .. ..
MOLDOVA MDA -0.43 0.17 11 -0.54 0.17 10 -0.39 0.18 9 -0.19 0.18 8 -1.17 0.37 6 -0.43 0.30 6 0.04 0.28 5
MONGOLIA MNG -0.32 0.19 8 -0.22 0.20 7 -0.40 0.20 6 -0.13 0.23 5 0.30 0.40 4 0.20 0.48 3 -0.71 0.41 3
MOROCCO MAR -0.39 0.16 10 -0.14 0.17 10 -0.13 0.18 9 -0.04 0.18 9 0.24 0.32 5 0.27 0.31 6 0.11 0.29 5
MOZAMBIQUE MOZ -0.60 0.18 9 -0.43 0.19 9 -0.46 0.20 8 -0.55 0.22 6 -0.12 0.36 4 -0.40 0.34 5 -1.07 0.41 3
MYANMAR MMR -2.19 0.18 7 -2.28 0.19 7 -2.02 0.20 6 -1.87 0.20 6 -1.46 0.46 3 -1.25 0.49 3 -1.18 0.30 4
NAMIBIA NAM 0.11 0.16 10 0.33 0.17 10 0.16 0.18 9 0.23 0.18 9 0.27 0.36 5 0.46 0.34 4 -0.03 0.37 3
NEPAL NPL -0.59 0.18 8 -0.64 0.19 7 -0.49 0.19 6 -0.54 0.25 5 -0.46 0.42 3 -0.38 0.52 2 -0.26 0.47 2
NETHERLANDS NLD 1.64 0.19 8 1.73 0.19 8 1.75 0.18 8 1.87 0.19 8 1.82 0.36 5 1.36 0.28 5 1.49 0.24 6
NETHERLANDS ANTILLES ANT 0.85 0.31 1 0.61 0.34 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
NEW ZEALAND NZL 1.66 0.19 8 1.78 0.19 8 1.72 0.18 8 1.68 0.19 7 1.37 0.36 5 1.44 0.28 5 1.70 0.24 6
NICARAGUA NIC -0.31 0.18 8 -0.22 0.18 8 -0.27 0.19 7 -0.44 0.19 7 0.25 0.43 5 0.37 0.48 3 -0.19 0.28 5
















































TABLE C4: Regulatory Quality (cont.)
2005 2004 2003 2002 2000 1998 1996
Country Code Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N.
NIGERIA NGA -1.01 0.16 10 -1.28 0.17 10 -1.24 0.18 9 -1.22 0.18 9 -0.45 0.30 7 -0.56 0.31 6 -1.02 0.29 5
NORWAY NOR 1.46 0.19 8 1.50 0.19 8 1.44 0.18 8 1.50 0.19 7 0.87 0.36 5 1.11 0.28 5 1.17 0.24 6
OMAN OMN 0.49 0.20 6 0.53 0.21 6 0.59 0.20 6 0.60 0.20 7 0.71 0.46 3 0.36 0.49 3 0.46 0.30 4
PAKISTAN PAK -0.60 0.17 10 -0.89 0.17 10 -0.78 0.17 9 -0.83 0.19 8 -0.81 0.34 6 -0.20 0.31 5 -0.54 0.29 5
PANAMA PAN 0.25 0.17 9 0.32 0.19 8 0.32 0.18 8 0.45 0.19 8 0.92 0.36 6 1.12 0.41 4 0.55 0.29 5
PAPUA NEW GUINEA PNG -0.86 0.18 8 -0.82 0.19 8 -0.63 0.18 7 -0.49 0.20 6 -0.67 0.34 5 -0.52 0.48 3 -0.75 0.37 3
PARAGUAY PRY -0.77 0.18 8 -0.60 0.18 8 -0.67 0.19 7 -0.59 0.19 7 -0.86 0.43 4 -0.31 0.48 4 0.75 0.32 4
PERU PER 0.10 0.17 9 0.14 0.18 9 0.21 0.18 8 0.17 0.19 8 0.50 0.36 6 0.78 0.31 6 0.49 0.26 6
PHILIPPINES PHL -0.02 0.17 10 -0.20 0.17 10 0.06 0.17 9 0.02 0.18 9 0.28 0.32 7 0.61 0.27 6 0.40 0.23 7
POLAND POL 0.82 0.16 12 0.77 0.16 12 0.54 0.16 11 0.62 0.17 11 0.64 0.31 8 0.75 0.23 8 0.38 0.22 8
PORTUGAL PRT 1.20 0.19 8 1.22 0.19 8 1.30 0.18 8 1.45 0.19 7 0.97 0.36 6 1.07 0.28 6 1.20 0.24 6
PUERTO RICO PRI 1.01 0.28 3 0.83 0.30 3 1.09 0.28 3 1.21 0.30 21 . 1 2 0 . 5 7 11 . 0 3 0.64 10 . 8 8 0.54 1
QATAR QAT 0.20 0.20 7 0.14 0.21 6 0.15 0.20 6 0.11 0.20 6 0.44 0.46 3 0.39 0.49 3 0.28 0.34 3
REUNION REU 1.09 0.31 1 1.15 0.34 1. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .
ROMANIA ROM 0.17 0.16 12 0.13 0.16 12 -0.20 0.16 11 0.01 0.18 10 -0.31 0.34 7 0.23 0.30 5 -0.59 0.27 6
RUSSIA RUS -0.29 0.16 12 -0.23 0.16 12 -0.34 0.16 11 -0.38 0.17 11 -1.64 0.31 8 -0.39 0.23 8 -0.64 0.22 8
RWANDA RWA -0.73 0.20 5 -0.70 0.22 5 -0.68 0.24 4 -0.92 0.24 4 -0.61 0.38 3 -0.96 0.52 2 -1.11 0.67 1
SAMOA SAM 0.01 0.27 3 -0.07 0.28 3 -0.07 0.24 3 -0.09 0.27 3 -0.10 0.42 3 -0.73 0.63 1- 0 . 2 3 0.67 1
SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE STP -0.84 0.24 3 -0.79 0.27 3 -0.62 0.26 3 -0.46 0.26 3 -0.59 0.41 2 -0.97 0.63 1- 0 . 3 8 0.67 1
SAUDI ARABIA SAU -0.01 0.18 7 -0.06 0.19 7 0.01 0.20 6 0.02 0.20 7 -0.17 0.46 3 -0.19 0.49 3 -0.13 0.30 4
SENEGAL SEN -0.30 0.17 8 -0.27 0.18 8 -0.20 0.18 8 -0.26 0.19 7 -0.12 0.36 5 -0.30 0.48 4 -0.53 0.32 4
SEYCHELLES SYC -0.09 0.24 4 -0.49 0.26 4 -0.37 0.25 4 -0.52 0.26 3 -1.40 0.41 2 -1.22 0.63 1- 1 . 1 9 0.67 1
SIERRA LEONE SLE -0.94 0.19 6 -1.10 0.21 6 -1.20 0.22 5 -1.31 0.24 4 -1.11 0.36 4 -1.41 0.48 3 -0.51 0.41 3
SINGAPORE SGP 1.79 0.17 9 1.89 0.18 9 1.89 0.18 8 1.88 0.19 8 2.07 0.36 6 1.51 0.28 6 1.95 0.24 6
SLOVAK REPUBLIC SVK 1.16 0.16 12 1.14 0.16 12 0.91 0.16 11 0.73 0.17 11 0.29 0.31 8 0.22 0.25 7 0.30 0.24 7
SLOVENIA SVN 0.86 0.17 11 0.93 0.17 11 0.85 0.16 11 0.83 0.17 11 0.58 0.31 8 0.65 0.30 5 0.45 0.28 5
SOLOMON ISLANDS SLB -1.05 0.27 3 -1.38 0.28 3 -2.38 0.36 2 -1.92 0.48 2 -1.61 0.46 2- 1 . 1 0 0.63 1- 1 . 2 6 0.67 1
SOMALIA SOM -2.35 0.21 4 -2.35 0.25 3 -2.06 0.27 2 -2.05 0.28 2 -2.46 0.47 3 -2.47 0.48 3 -3.00 0.52 2
SOUTH AFRICA ZAF 0.59 0.16 11 0.55 0.17 11 0.56 0.17 10 0.50 0.17 10 -0.03 0.28 8 0.36 0.27 7 0.16 0.23 7
SPAIN ESP 1.25 0.19 8 1.31 0.19 8 1.32 0.18 8 1.38 0.19 8 1.31 0.36 6 1.04 0.28 6 0.99 0.24 6
SRI LANKA LKA -0.12 0.17 10 0.08 0.17 10 0.13 0.17 9 0.14 0.19 9 0.25 0.32 6 0.63 0.41 4 0.41 0.29 5
ST. KITTS AND NEVIS KNA 1.14 0.27 2 0.05 0.29 20 . 1 5 0.51 1 0.12 0.54 10 . 2 0 0 . 5 9 10 . 3 9 0.63 1- 0 . 1 6 0.67 1
ST. LUCIA LCA 1.14 0.27 2 0.16 0.29 20 . 1 5 0.51 1 0.12 0.54 10 . 2 0 0 . 5 9 10 . 3 9 0.63 1- 0 . 1 6 0.67 1
ST. VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES VCT 1.14 0.27 2 0.18 0.29 20 . 1 5 0.51 1 0.12 0.54 10 . 2 0 0 . 5 9 10 . 2 7 0.63 1- 0 . 2 3 0.67 1
SUDAN SDN -1.29 0.17 8 -1.12 0.19 8 -1.19 0.19 7 -1.22 0.19 7 -0.90 0.32 5 -1.15 0.48 3 -1.70 0.32 4
SURINAME SUR -0.46 0.24 4 -0.49 0.25 4 -0.58 0.24 4 -0.64 0.26 3 -1.04 0.67 2- 0 . 7 3 0.64 2- 0 . 6 8 0.47 2
SWAZILAND SWZ -0.44 0.21 6 -0.42 0.23 6 -0.50 0.22 6 -0.17 0.24 5 -0.44 0.38 3 0.49 0.35 3 -0.01 0.47 2
SWEDEN SWE 1.47 0.19 8 1.63 0.19 8 1.68 0.18 8 1.68 0.19 7 1.30 0.36 6 1.01 0.28 5 1.16 0.24 6
SWITZERLAND CHE 1.47 0.19 8 1.56 0.19 8 1.59 0.18 8 1.59 0.19 7 1.47 0.36 5 1.05 0.28 6 1.25 0.24 6
SYRIA SYR -1.22 0.18 7 -0.93 0.19 7 -0.94 0.20 6 -0.97 0.20 6 -0.85 0.46 3 -1.14 0.49 3 -0.80 0.30 4
TAIWAN TWN 1.07 0.17 9 1.11 0.18 9 1.04 0.18 8 1.00 0.19 8 0.94 0.36 5 0.99 0.28 5 1.03 0.24 6
TAJIKISTAN TJK -1.05 0.19 10 -1.05 0.19 9 -1.09 0.19 8 -1.29 0.22 8 -1.39 0.34 5 -1.70 0.30 4 -1.89 0.39 3
TANZANIA TZA -0.51 0.16 10 -0.48 0.17 10 -0.33 0.18 9 -0.53 0.19 8 0.00 0.32 6 0.19 0.31 6 -0.35 0.29 5
THAILAND THA 0.38 0.17 10 0.12 0.17 10 0.31 0.17 9 0.28 0.18 9 0.68 0.32 7 0.21 0.27 7 0.42 0.23 7
TIMOR, EAST TMP -1.09 0.29 2 -1.16 0.32 2 -1.41 0.26 2 -1.28 0 . 3 1 1. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .
TOGO TGO -0.81 0.19 7 -0.73 0.20 7 -0.65 0.21 6 -0.64 0.23 5 -0.54 0.36 4 -0.67 0.48 4 0.36 0.52 2
TONGA TON -0.69 0.27 3 -0.76 0.28 3 -1.06 0.36 2 -1.25 0.48 2 -0.25 0.46 2- 1 . 1 0 0.63 1- 0 . 1 6 0.67 1
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO TTO 0.65 0.19 8 0.70 0.19 7 0.71 0.19 7 0.64 0.20 6 0.73 0.43 5 0.73 0.48 3 0.44 0.32 4
TUNISIA TUN -0.07 0.16 10 -0.09 0.17 10 0.05 0.18 9 -0.05 0.18 9 0.30 0.32 6 0.55 0.31 5 0.29 0.29 5
TURKEY TUR 0.18 0.17 11 0.07 0.17 11 0.06 0.17 10 0.02 0.18 10 0.31 0.32 7 0.75 0.27 7 0.44 0.23 7
TURKMENISTAN TKM -1.95 0.19 7 -1.95 0.20 7 -1.99 0.21 6 -1.93 0.22 6 -2.23 0.38 4 -2.41 0.30 4 -2.60 0.39 3
TUVALU TUV -0.37 0.31 1 -0.05 0.32 2 0.09 0.44 1 0.33 0.71 1 0.35 0.62 1 .. .. .. .. .. ..
UGANDA UGA 0.01 0.16 10 -0.04 0.17 10 0.06 0.18 9 -0.05 0.19 8 0.08 0.32 6 0.46 0.31 6 0.14 0.29 5
UKRAINE UKR -0.26 0.17 11 -0.48 0.17 11 -0.62 0.17 10 -0.66 0.18 10 -1.28 0.34 7 -0.88 0.25 7 -0.63 0.26 6
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES ARE 0.44 0.18 8 1.03 0.20 7 0.82 0.20 6 0.94 0.20 7 0.45 0.46 3 0.35 0.49 3 0.90 0.30 4
UNITED KINGDOM GBR 1.53 0.19 8 1.74 0.19 8 1.69 0.18 8 1.75 0.19 8 1.53 0.36 6 1.44 0.28 6 1.58 0.24 6
UNITED STATES USA 1.47 0.19 8 1.46 0.19 8 1.44 0.18 8 1.44 0.19 8 1.45 0.36 6 1.35 0.28 6 1.39 0.24 6
URUGUAY URY 0.26 0.17 9 0.31 0.18 9 0.34 0.18 8 0.45 0.19 8 0.93 0.36 6 0.92 0.41 4 0.92 0.29 5
UZBEKISTAN UZB -1.71 0.17 10 -1.67 0.17 10 -1.66 0.17 9 -1.47 0.19 9 -1.46 0.34 6 -1.80 0.30 5 -1.40 0.31 4
VANUATU VUT 0.05 0.27 3 -0.44 0.28 3 -1.29 0.36 2 -1.23 0.48 2 -0.81 0.46 2- 0 . 3 5 0.63 1- 0 . 0 9 0.67 1
VENEZUELA VEN -1.15 0.17 10 -1.11 0.17 10 -1.16 0.17 9 -0.57 0.18 9 -0.65 0.32 7 0.08 0.27 7 -0.19 0.23 7
VIETNAM VNM -0.64 0.17 10 -0.60 0.17 10 -0.54 0.17 9 -0.71 0.19 9 -0.72 0.32 6 -0.61 0.31 5 -0.48 0.26 6
VIRGIN ISLANDS (U.S.) VIR 1.09 0.31 1 1.22 0.34 1. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .
WEST BANK WBG -1.14 0.29 2 -0.89 0.32 2 -1.09 0.30 2 -1.01 0.30 20 . 5 8 1 . 1 9 1 -0.21 1.20 1. .. .. .
YEMEN YEM -0.83 0.18 7 -1.02 0.19 7 -0.71 0.19 6 -0.64 0.20 6 -0.50 0.47 3 -0.43 0.48 3 -0.69 0.32 4
YUGOSLAVIA YUG -0.53 0.17 10 -0.52 0.17 10 -0.68 0.18 9 -0.62 0.18 9 -0.90 0.88 1- 1 . 9 0 0.88 1- 1 . 4 5 0.36 3
ZAMBIA ZMB -0.62 0.17 9 -0.57 0.17 10 -0.59 0.18 9 -0.59 0.19 8 0.25 0.32 6 -0.06 0.31 6 0.31 0.29 5















































TABLE C5: Rule of Law
2005 2004 2003 2002 2000 1998 1996
Country Code Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N.
AFGHANISTAN AFG -1.68 0.21 6 -1.81 0.18 8 -1.68 0.18 6 -1.70 0.25 4 -2.37 0.42 2 -1.23 0.77 1 -1.25 0.79 1
ALBANIA ALB -0.84 0.16 11 -0.87 0.16 10 -0.90 0.17 9 -0.99 0.17 9 -0.87 0.18 9 -1.03 0.23 7 -0.37 0.27 5
ALGERIA DZA -0.71 0.14 14 -0.71 0.13 14 -0.59 0.14 12 -0.65 0.15 11 -0.90 0.18 9 -0.92 0.22 7 -0.67 0.19 6
AMERICAN SAMOA ASM 1.15 0.35 1 0.84 0.33 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
ANDORRA A D O 1 . 0 3 0 . 3 3 2 1 . 3 9 0 . 3 2 2 1 . 2 0 0 . 3 2 1 1 . 4 7 0 . 3 3 1. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .
ANGOLA AGO -1.28 0.15 13 -1.34 0.14 12 -1.34 0.15 11 -1.55 0.16 11 -1.52 0.18 10 -1.38 0.20 8 -1.50 0.19 6
ANGUILLA A I A 1 . 6 7 0 . 3 5 1 1 . 1 4 0 . 3 3 1 . . . . . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .
A N T I G U A  A N D  B A R B U D AA T G 0 . 7 3 0 . 3 3 2 0 . 9 3 0 . 3 2 2 0 . 9 4 0 . 3 2 1 0 . 9 5 0 . 3 3 1. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .
ARGENTINA ARG -0.56 0.13 15 -0.72 0.12 16 -0.57 0.13 15 -0.87 0.13 15 0.07 0.15 14 0.06 0.18 11 0.24 0.16 10
ARMENIA ARM -0.46 0.14 13 -0.58 0.14 13 -0.47 0.15 11 -0.53 0.16 11 -0.60 0.17 9 -0.46 0.20 8 -0.51 0.24 5
ARUBA ABW 0.88 0.35 1 0.91 0.33 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
AUSTRALIA AUS 1.80 0.14 12 1.83 0.13 13 1.85 0.13 13 1.77 0.14 11 1.89 0.16 10 1.91 0.20 9 1.85 0.16 9
AUSTRIA AUT 1.87 0.14 12 1.79 0.13 12 1.83 0.14 12 1.83 0.14 12 1.94 0.17 11 1.93 0.20 10 1.95 0.16 9
AZERBAIJAN AZE -0.84 0.13 15 -0.89 0.12 16 -0.84 0.13 14 -0.87 0.13 13 -1.09 0.16 11 -0.93 0.19 9 -0.91 0.17 6
BAHAMAS BHS 1.33 0.24 4 1.31 0.24 4 1.29 0.25 3 1.25 0.25 3 0.99 0.42 2 0.85 0.46 2 0.76 0.47 2
BAHRAIN BHR 0.71 0.15 11 0.78 0.14 12 0.85 0.15 9 0.84 0.15 10 0.47 0.21 8 0.68 0.24 6 0.70 0.19 6
BANGLADESH BGD -0.87 0.14 14 -0.89 0.13 14 -0.79 0.13 13 -0.83 0.14 13 -0.71 0.18 11 -0.77 0.22 7 -0.74 0.19 6
BARBADOS BRB 1.22 0.23 4 1.19 0.23 4 1.27 0.24 3 1.34 0.27 2 1.22 0.48 1 0.43 0.54 1 -0.33 0.56 1
BELARUS BLR -1.04 0.16 11 -1.22 0.15 12 -1.20 0.16 11 -1.14 0.17 10 -1.11 0.18 10 -1.17 0.23 7 -1.07 0.28 4
BELGIUM BEL 1.47 0.14 12 1.50 0.13 12 1.47 0.14 12 1.42 0.14 12 1.53 0.17 11 1.24 0.20 9 1.62 0.16 9
BELIZE BLZ 0.02 0.21 6 0.07 0.21 6 0.18 0.21 6 -0.13 0.23 5 0.27 0.30 4 -0.08 0.34 3 0.66 0.50 2
BENIN BEN -0.59 0.17 10 -0.60 0.18 9 -0.51 0.20 8 -0.34 0.22 7 -0.46 0.26 6 -0.48 0.31 4 -0.05 0.50 2
BERMUDA B M U 0 . 8 8 0 . 3 5 1 1 . 0 9 0 . 3 3 1 1 . 2 0 0 . 3 2 1 1 . 2 1 0 . 3 3 1. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .
BHUTAN BTN 0.52 0.24 6 0.39 0.23 5 0.36 0.22 5 0.18 0.25 4 -0.48 0.36 3 -0.17 0.41 2 -1.25 0.79 1
BOLIVIA BOL -0.78 0.14 14 -0.59 0.13 13 -0.44 0.14 12 -0.67 0.14 13 -0.58 0.17 11 -0.45 0.21 9 -0.71 0.19 7
BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA BIH -0.74 0.15 11 -0.75 0.14 12 -1.01 0.16 10 -0.99 0.17 11 -0.96 0.21 7 -1.12 0.26 4 -0.24 0.79 1
BOTSWANA BWA 0.70 0.14 12 0.70 0.14 13 0.71 0.14 12 0.62 0.14 12 0.56 0.19 10 0.50 0.23 7 0.76 0.21 5
BRAZIL BRA -0.41 0.13 15 -0.34 0.12 16 -0.28 0.13 15 -0.37 0.13 16 -0.21 0.15 14 -0.17 0.18 12 -0.31 0.16 10
BRUNEI BRN 0.45 0.31 3 0.53 0.30 3 0.54 0.29 3 0.52 0.30 4 0.79 0.58 2 0.78 0.58 2 0.66 0.59 2
BULGARIA BGR -0.19 0.13 14 -0.08 0.12 15 -0.06 0.13 14 -0.07 0.13 15 -0.22 0.14 13 -0.31 0.19 9 -0.14 0.17 7
BURKINA FASO BFA -0.54 0.19 10 -0.63 0.18 9 -0.49 0.20 8 -0.55 0.22 7 -0.61 0.25 7 -0.52 0.29 5 -0.81 0.44 3
BURUNDI BDI -1.17 0.19 8 -1.40 0.22 7 -1.52 0.24 6 -1.44 0.26 5 -1.01 0.22 6 -0.93 0.34 3 -0.24 0.79 1
CAMBODIA KHM -1.13 0.16 10 -1.12 0.17 10 -1.05 0.18 8 -0.94 0.19 8 -0.83 0.23 7 -0.83 0.28 4 -0.97 0.40 2
CAMEROON CMR -1.02 0.15 12 -1.12 0.15 11 -1.02 0.15 11 -1.23 0.16 11 -1.06 0.20 10 -0.85 0.22 8 -1.24 0.21 5
CANADA CAN 1.81 0.14 12 1.80 0.13 13 1.79 0.13 13 1.72 0.13 14 1.87 0.16 13 1.83 0.20 10 1.84 0.16 9
CAPE VERDE CPV 0.21 0.21 6 0.14 0.20 6 -0.01 0.21 5 0.04 0.21 5 0.36 0.29 3 0.57 0.36 2 0.04 0.56 1
CAYMAN ISLANDS CYM 0.88 0.35 1 1.14 0.33 1 1.20 0.32 1 1.47 0.33 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC CAF -1.29 0.19 8 -1.54 0.19 7 -1.50 0.21 6 -1.09 0.23 5 -0.74 0.33 3 -0.96 0.41 2 -0.24 0.79 1
CHAD TCD -1.23 0.18 9 -1.17 0.18 9 -1.09 0.20 7 -0.87 0.22 6 -0.89 0.28 4 -1.07 0.31 4 -0.24 0.79 1
CHILE CHL 1.20 0.13 15 1.21 0.12 16 1.17 0.13 15 1.18 0.13 14 1.23 0.15 14 1.18 0.18 11 1.22 0.16 10
CHINA CHN -0.47 0.13 15 -0.41 0.12 15 -0.41 0.13 14 -0.28 0.13 14 -0.42 0.15 13 -0.35 0.19 10 -0.50 0.16 9
COLOMBIA COL -0.71 0.13 16 -0.74 0.12 15 -0.83 0.13 14 -0.86 0.13 15 -0.73 0.15 15 -0.72 0.18 12 -0.51 0.16 10
COMOROS COM -0.96 0.26 4 -0.93 0.25 4 -0.99 0.26 3 -1.05 0.27 3 -1.26 0.35 2 -1.06 0.44 1 .. .. ..
CONGO COG -1.42 0.17 9 -1.17 0.17 9 -1.23 0.18 9 -1.29 0.19 9 -1.26 0.22 7 -1.31 0.25 6 -1.33 0.32 4
Congo, Dem. Rep. (Zaire) ZAR -1.76 0.16 11 -1.76 0.15 12 -1.69 0.15 11 -1.84 0.19 10 -1.94 0.20 9 -2.04 0.25 6 -1.89 0.29 5
COOK ISLANDS COK .. .. .. 0.63 0.57 1 0.75 0.46 1 0.86 0.47 1 0.65 0.75 1 .. .. .. .. .. ..
COSTA RICA CRI 0.54 0.14 13 0.57 0.13 14 0.70 0.14 13 0.61 0.14 14 0.72 0.17 12 0.81 0.20 10 0.60 0.18 8
CROATIA HRV 0.00 0.13 14 0.05 0.12 14 0.05 0.13 13 0.04 0.13 14 0.08 0.16 10 -0.20 0.19 8 -0.58 0.17 6
CUBA CUB -1.14 0.16 10 -1.19 0.14 11 -1.21 0.15 10 -0.98 0.16 10 -0.73 0.21 7 -0.62 0.24 6 -0.79 0.19 6
CYPRUS CYP 0.85 0.15 9 0.82 0.15 10 0.85 0.15 9 0.72 0.16 8 0.95 0.22 6 0.87 0.24 6 0.57 0.19 6
CZECH REPUBLIC CZE 0.70 0.12 15 0.65 0.12 16 0.69 0.12 15 0.65 0.12 15 0.51 0.14 14 0.59 0.17 12 0.60 0.15 10
DENMARK DNK 1.99 0.14 12 1.95 0.13 13 1.94 0.13 13 1.91 0.14 13 1.87 0.16 11 1.92 0.20 9 2.00 0.16 9
DJIBOUTI DJI -0.87 0.21 6 -0.78 0.21 5 -0.74 0.22 4 -0.62 0.23 4 -0.64 0.29 3 -0.43 0.36 2 .. .. ..
DOMINICA DMA 0.66 0.28 3 0.61 0.26 3 0.57 0.27 2 0.60 0.29 2 -0.41 0.41 1 -0.44 0.44 1 .. .. ..
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC DOM -0.66 0.14 13 -0.54 0.13 13 -0.44 0.14 11 -0.50 0.14 12 -0.27 0.17 11 -0.22 0.23 6 -0.57 0.20 5
ECUADOR ECU -0.84 0.14 14 -0.70 0.13 14 -0.64 0.14 13 -0.69 0.14 12 -0.74 0.16 12 -0.73 0.20 10 -0.45 0.18 8
EGYPT EGY 0.02 0.13 15 -0.02 0.13 15 0.01 0.13 14 0.01 0.14 13 0.10 0.15 12 0.01 0.20 9 0.19 0.17 8
EL SALVADOR SLV -0.37 0.15 11 -0.40 0.15 11 -0.43 0.16 10 -0.50 0.16 10 -0.59 0.20 10 -0.43 0.24 7 -0.53 0.21 6
EQUATORIAL GUINEA GNQ -1.33 0.20 7 -1.33 0.20 7 -1.12 0.21 6 -1.24 0.22 6 -1.58 0.29 3 -1.77 0.36 2 .. .. ..
ERITREA ERI -0.81 0.22 7 -0.73 0.21 7 -0.66 0.23 6 -0.34 0.26 4 -0.17 0.31 4 -0.15 0.41 2 -0.24 0.79 1
ESTONIA EST 0.82 0.12 15 0.88 0.12 16 0.74 0.13 15 0.72 0.13 15 0.63 0.14 13 0.44 0.19 9 0.30 0.17 6
ETHIOPIA ETH -0.77 0.15 12 -0.80 0.15 12 -0.73 0.16 11 -0.41 0.21 9 -0.47 0.25 8 -0.16 0.29 5 -0.32 0.44 3
FIJI FJI -0.25 0.23 4 -0.09 0.21 5 -0.14 0.21 5 -0.41 0.23 5 -0.77 0.31 3 -0.50 0.31 4 0.05 0.50 2
FINLAND FIN 1.96 0.14 12 1.94 0.13 12 1.95 0.14 12 1.90 0.14 13 2.02 0.16 11 1.98 0.20 9 2.05 0.16 9
FRANCE FRA 1.35 0.14 12 1.39 0.13 13 1.40 0.13 13 1.31 0.14 13 1.36 0.16 13 1.35 0.20 10 1.62 0.16 9
F R E N C H  G U I A N A G U F 0 . 8 8 0 . 3 5 1 0 . 5 4 0 . 3 3 1 0 . 9 4 0 . 3 2 1 0 . 9 5 0 . 3 3 1. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .
GABON GAB -0.48 0.15 11 -0.60 0.14 11 -0.53 0.15 11 -0.32 0.15 11 -0.65 0.18 10 -0.56 0.23 6 -0.36 0.20 5
GAMBIA GMB -0.29 0.18 8 -0.28 0.18 9 -0.14 0.19 9 -0.49 0.21 8 -0.44 0.27 5 -0.40 0.32 4 0.20 0.59 2
GEORGIA GEO -0.82 0.14 12 -0.83 0.13 14 -1.13 0.15 11 -1.25 0.16 12 -0.65 0.17 10 -0.84 0.21 7 -0.90 0.24 5
















































TABLE C5: Rule of Law (cont.)
2005 2004 2003 2002 2000 1998 1996
Country Code Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N.
GHANA GHA -0.23 0.14 14 -0.21 0.13 15 -0.21 0.13 14 -0.24 0.14 13 -0.11 0.17 12 -0.23 0.20 9 -0.17 0.19 6
GREECE GRC 0.66 0.14 12 0.74 0.13 12 0.74 0.14 12 0.68 0.14 12 0.66 0.17 10 0.65 0.20 9 0.74 0.16 9
GRENADA GRD 0.32 0.28 3 0.28 0.26 3 0.19 0.27 2 0.20 0.29 2 0.29 0.41 1 0.19 0.44 1 .. .. ..
G U A M G U M 1 . 1 5 0 . 3 5 1 0 . 9 9 0 . 3 3 1. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .
GUATEMALA GTM -1.04 0.14 12 -0.98 0.14 14 -0.96 0.15 12 -0.92 0.15 13 -0.87 0.18 11 -0.87 0.21 8 -0.70 0.19 7
GUINEA GIN -1.11 0.19 9 -1.11 0.18 9 -0.95 0.20 8 -0.78 0.21 7 -1.04 0.27 5 -0.98 0.29 5 -1.13 0.44 3
GUINEA-BISSAU GNB -1.33 0.21 7 -1.16 0.20 7 -1.19 0.20 7 -1.16 0.22 6 -1.33 0.26 6 -1.31 0.29 5 -1.65 0.59 2
GUYANA GUY -0.80 0.18 8 -0.63 0.20 7 -0.48 0.21 7 -0.52 0.23 5 -0.23 0.28 5 -0.03 0.32 4 -0.03 0.44 3
HAITI HTI -1.62 0.20 7 -1.67 0.18 10 -1.63 0.19 8 -1.91 0.20 8 -1.53 0.27 7 -1.05 0.32 4 -1.29 0.44 3
HONDURAS HND -0.78 0.14 13 -0.70 0.14 13 -0.81 0.15 12 -0.88 0.15 12 -0.98 0.18 11 -0.79 0.21 8 -0.90 0.19 7
HONG KONG HKG 1.50 0.14 10 1.38 0.14 10 1.33 0.14 10 1.17 0.14 11 1.44 0.18 9 1.52 0.21 8 1.67 0.17 7
HUNGARY HUN 0.70 0.12 16 0.75 0.11 17 0.78 0.12 16 0.79 0.12 16 0.77 0.13 15 0.73 0.17 12 0.62 0.15 10
ICELAND ISL 2.10 0.16 8 2.03 0.17 8 2.02 0.17 8 1.92 0.18 7 1.95 0.21 7 1.82 0.26 6 1.67 0.26 5
INDIA IND 0.09 0.13 14 -0.01 0.12 15 0.03 0.13 14 -0.02 0.13 15 0.15 0.15 13 0.13 0.18 11 -0.06 0.16 9
INDONESIA IDN -0.87 0.13 15 -0.82 0.12 17 -0.89 0.12 15 -0.97 0.13 16 -1.03 0.15 14 -1.06 0.19 10 -0.41 0.16 9
IRAN IRN -0.76 0.14 13 -0.69 0.13 13 -0.59 0.14 12 -0.58 0.14 11 -0.51 0.19 8 -0.54 0.23 7 -0.83 0.18 7
IRAQ IRQ -1.81 0.17 8 -1.94 0.16 8 -1.52 0.17 7 -1.70 0.16 8 -1.55 0.21 7 -1.70 0.24 6 -1.63 0.19 6
IRELAND IRL 1.63 0.14 12 1.58 0.13 12 1.57 0.13 12 1.61 0.14 12 1.71 0.16 11 1.68 0.20 10 1.73 0.16 9
ISRAEL ISR 0.76 0.14 11 0.75 0.14 12 0.79 0.14 12 0.90 0.14 13 0.96 0.17 10 1.01 0.21 8 1.14 0.16 9
ITALY ITA 0.51 0.14 12 0.64 0.13 12 0.79 0.14 12 0.76 0.14 13 0.88 0.16 13 1.03 0.20 10 0.85 0.16 9
IVORY COAST CIV -1.47 0.16 11 -1.45 0.15 12 -1.40 0.15 11 -1.26 0.16 11 -0.68 0.20 9 -0.51 0.22 8 -0.74 0.21 5
JAMAICA JAM -0.55 0.14 11 -0.44 0.14 11 -0.61 0.15 10 -0.52 0.15 10 -0.25 0.19 7 -0.35 0.22 7 -0.26 0.20 5
JAPAN JPN 1.33 0.14 12 1.35 0.13 13 1.34 0.13 13 1.31 0.13 14 1.66 0.16 12 1.63 0.23 8 1.56 0.16 9
JORDAN JOR 0.43 0.13 13 0.36 0.13 13 0.39 0.14 11 0.30 0.14 10 0.47 0.17 9 0.49 0.20 9 0.15 0.18 7
KAZAKHSTAN KAZ -0.79 0.12 15 -0.98 0.12 16 -0.99 0.13 14 -0.98 0.13 14 -0.89 0.15 13 -0.91 0.18 10 -0.79 0.17 6
KENYA KEN -0.94 0.14 14 -1.01 0.13 16 -1.06 0.13 14 -1.08 0.14 13 -1.03 0.18 10 -1.02 0.20 9 -0.83 0.19 6
KIRIBATI KIR 0.76 0.26 4 0.36 0.25 4 0.20 0.34 2 0.60 0.37 2 -0.08 0.39 2 -0.75 0.44 1 .. .. ..
KOREA, NORTH PRK -1.15 0.18 7 -1.24 0.17 8 -1.07 0.18 7 -0.96 0.24 6 -1.18 0.36 4 -1.29 0.42 3 -1.10 0.44 3
KOREA, SOUTH KOR 0.73 0.13 14 0.66 0.12 15 0.60 0.13 14 0.79 0.13 15 0.52 0.15 13 0.70 0.18 11 0.77 0.16 9
K O S O V O L W I - 0 . 9 5 0 . 3 2 1. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .
KUWAIT KWT 0.67 0.15 10 0.65 0.15 10 0.70 0.15 10 0.70 0.15 11 1.03 0.22 6 0.98 0.24 6 0.61 0.19 6
KYRGYZ REPUBLIC KGZ -1.07 0.14 13 -0.87 0.14 14 -0.81 0.14 12 -0.78 0.15 12 -0.98 0.17 9 -0.76 0.21 7 -0.75 0.26 4
LAOS LAO -1.12 0.17 11 -1.11 0.17 9 -1.13 0.18 8 -0.99 0.19 8 -1.05 0.23 7 -1.14 0.28 4 -1.42 0.34 3
LATVIA LVA 0.43 0.13 14 0.45 0.12 14 0.49 0.13 13 0.36 0.13 13 0.09 0.15 10 -0.04 0.19 9 0.14 0.17 6
LEBANON LBN -0.36 0.15 11 -0.32 0.14 11 -0.35 0.15 10 -0.33 0.14 11 -0.22 0.19 9 0.05 0.22 7 -0.32 0.19 6
LESOTHO LSO -0.19 0.19 8 -0.04 0.17 8 -0.21 0.18 8 -0.08 0.19 7 -0.26 0.25 5 -0.26 0.30 4 -0.36 0.50 2
LIBERIA LBR -1.60 0.26 5 -1.68 0.25 5 -1.62 0.27 4 -1.76 0.26 6 -1.60 0.29 5 -1.87 0.37 3 -2.22 0.59 2
LIBYA LBY -0.73 0.16 11 -0.60 0.15 10 -0.75 0.15 8 -0.87 0.16 8 -1.01 0.22 6 -1.19 0.24 6 -1.05 0.19 6
LIECHTENSTEIN LIE 1.03 0.33 2 1.27 0.32 2 1.20 0.32 1 1.47 0.33 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
LITHUANIA LTU 0.46 0.13 14 0.53 0.12 15 0.52 0.13 14 0.41 0.13 14 0.18 0.14 13 0.07 0.19 9 -0.19 0.17 6
LUXEMBOURG LUX 1.96 0.18 8 2.00 0.18 8 1.98 0.19 7 2.01 0.21 7 1.95 0.31 5 1.82 0.31 5 1.75 0.28 5
MACAO MAC 0.78 0.34 2 1.37 0.33 1 1.20 0.32 1 0.68 0.33 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
MACEDONIA MKD -0.38 0.14 12 -0.37 0.13 12 -0.34 0.14 11 -0.46 0.15 10 -0.40 0.21 6 -0.43 0.23 5 -0.62 0.20 3
MADAGASCAR MDG -0.15 0.17 11 -0.29 0.17 10 -0.25 0.19 9 -0.30 0.22 6 -0.75 0.25 7 -1.11 0.29 5 -0.90 0.44 3
MALAWI MWI -0.35 0.14 13 -0.31 0.14 13 -0.33 0.15 12 -0.40 0.15 11 -0.59 0.18 10 -0.70 0.21 8 -0.25 0.20 5
MALAYSIA MYS 0.58 0.13 14 0.55 0.12 16 0.48 0.13 14 0.48 0.13 15 0.39 0.15 14 0.57 0.18 11 0.80 0.16 9
MALDIVES MDV 0.33 0.26 4 0.14 0.25 4 0.24 0.24 3 0.23 0.25 3 -0.72 0.39 2 -0.75 0.44 1 .. .. ..
MALI MLI -0.12 0.17 11 -0.19 0.16 12 -0.19 0.18 11 -0.51 0.20 9 -0.69 0.23 8 -0.67 0.29 5 -0.83 0.44 3
MALTA MLT 1.38 0.20 7 1.22 0.20 6 1.37 0.22 5 1.03 0.25 3 0.63 0.42 2 0.59 0.46 2 0.00 0.47 2
MARSHALL ISLANDS MHL -0.27 0.38 3 -0.22 0.34 3 -0.29 0.34 2 -0.10 0.37 2 -0.67 0.39 2 -0.44 0.44 1 .. .. ..
MARTINIQUE MTQ 0.88 0.35 1 0.97 0.33 1 0.94 0.32 1 1.21 0.33 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
MAURITANIA MRT -0.54 0.20 8 -0.54 0.20 7 -0.44 0.21 7 -0.42 0.23 5 -0.61 0.27 5 -0.57 0.34 3 -0.66 0.50 2
MAURITIUS MUS 0.79 0.15 10 0.82 0.15 9 0.98 0.16 9 0.84 0.15 9 0.75 0.18 8 0.72 0.21 7 0.67 0.21 3
MEXICO MEX -0.48 0.13 15 -0.38 0.12 16 -0.32 0.13 15 -0.38 0.13 16 -0.45 0.15 15 -0.48 0.18 12 -0.17 0.16 10
MICRONESIA FSM 0.72 0.26 4 0.44 0.25 4 -0.37 0.34 2 -0.26 0.37 2 -0.63 0.39 2 -0.44 0.44 1 .. .. ..
MOLDOVA MDA -0.59 0.13 14 -0.63 0.13 13 -0.60 0.14 12 -0.58 0.14 11 -0.61 0.16 11 -0.16 0.19 9 -0.25 0.17 6
M O N A C O  M C O 0 . 8 3 0 . 7 6 1 0 . 7 7 0 . 7 4 1. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .
MONGOLIA MNG -0.26 0.17 10 0.02 0.18 10 0.11 0.19 8 0.24 0.21 7 0.12 0.27 6 -0.08 0.25 5 0.43 0.44 3
MOROCCO MAR -0.10 0.14 13 0.00 0.13 15 -0.01 0.14 13 0.06 0.14 13 0.18 0.19 9 0.37 0.20 9 0.14 0.18 7
MOZAMBIQUE MOZ -0.72 0.15 14 -0.69 0.14 14 -0.71 0.15 13 -0.61 0.18 11 -0.71 0.22 7 -1.00 0.23 7 -1.29 0.32 4
MYANMAR MMR -1.56 0.17 9 -1.63 0.16 10 -1.73 0.16 9 -1.67 0.17 9 -1.25 0.24 7 -1.14 0.28 5 -1.38 0.21 5
NAMIBIA NAM -0.01 0.14 12 0.10 0.14 13 0.19 0.14 12 0.29 0.14 12 0.82 0.20 9 0.63 0.24 6 0.32 0.23 3
NAURU NRU 0.83 0.76 1 0.77 0.74 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
NEPAL NPL -0.81 0.15 11 -0.74 0.14 12 -0.66 0.15 10 -0.46 0.19 9 -0.44 0.23 7 -0.34 0.28 4 -0.41 0.34 3
NETHERLANDS NLD 1.78 0.14 12 1.78 0.13 12 1.78 0.14 12 1.76 0.14 13 1.89 0.16 12 1.97 0.20 9 1.91 0.16 9
NETHERLANDS ANTILLES ANT 0.88 0.35 1 0.91 0.33 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
NEW ZEALAND NZL 1.95 0.14 11 1.93 0.14 11 1.92 0.14 11 1.82 0.14 9 1.89 0.17 9 2.09 0.21 8 2.05 0.17 8
NICARAGUA NIC -0.70 0.15 11 -0.72 0.15 13 -0.56 0.16 11 -0.72 0.16 11 -1.01 0.20 9 -0.92 0.24 7 -0.73 0.21 6
NIGER NER -0.82 0.19 9 -0.93 0.18 9 -0.81 0.20 8 -0.83 0.22 7 -0.90 0.26 6 -0.79 0.32 4 -1.31 0.44 3















































TABLE C5: Rule of Law (cont.)
2005 2004 2003 2002 2000 1998 1996
Country Code Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N.
NORWAY NOR 1.99 0.14 12 1.97 0.13 12 1.96 0.14 12 1.88 0.14 12 1.90 0.17 10 2.12 0.20 9 2.07 0.16 9
OMAN OMN 0.72 0.16 9 0.94 0.15 10 0.86 0.15 9 0.77 0.15 10 1.09 0.21 7 1.11 0.24 6 1.08 0.19 6
PALAU PCI -0.07 0.76 1 0.77 0.74 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
PAKISTAN PAK -0.81 0.13 14 -0.83 0.13 15 -0.69 0.13 13 -0.75 0.14 13 -0.75 0.17 12 -0.79 0.20 9 -0.49 0.18 7
PANAMA PAN -0.11 0.14 13 -0.08 0.14 13 -0.09 0.14 13 -0.10 0.14 13 -0.14 0.17 11 -0.15 0.21 8 0.21 0.19 7
PAPUA NEW GUINEA PNG -0.92 0.16 10 -0.76 0.14 11 -1.04 0.15 10 -1.03 0.16 9 -0.49 0.19 9 -0.41 0.23 6 -0.38 0.21 4
PARAGUAY PRY -1.00 0.14 13 -1.16 0.14 13 -1.12 0.15 12 -1.14 0.15 10 -0.93 0.18 9 -0.86 0.22 8 -0.56 0.20 6
PERU PER -0.77 0.13 15 -0.65 0.13 15 -0.55 0.13 14 -0.56 0.14 14 -0.60 0.16 13 -0.63 0.19 11 -0.40 0.17 9
PHILIPPINES PHL -0.52 0.13 15 -0.67 0.12 15 -0.65 0.13 14 -0.59 0.13 13 -0.55 0.15 14 -0.10 0.19 10 -0.16 0.16 9
POLAND POL 0.32 0.12 16 0.41 0.11 17 0.51 0.12 16 0.51 0.12 17 0.54 0.13 15 0.49 0.17 12 0.42 0.15 10
PORTUGAL PRT 1.10 0.14 12 1.16 0.13 12 1.27 0.14 12 1.23 0.14 12 1.07 0.16 10 1.24 0.20 10 1.32 0.16 9
PUERTO RICO PRI 0.62 0.28 3 0.73 0.24 3 0.74 0.24 3 1.06 0.26 2 0.97 0.45 10 . 7 8 0.57 1 0.71 0.64 1
QATAR QAT 0.87 0.16 9 0.70 0.17 9 0.76 0.17 7 0.76 0.16 7 0.89 0.25 61 . 0 6 0 . 2 9 40 . 9 1 0 . 2 33
REUNION REU 1.15 0.35 1 1.07 0.33 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
ROMANIA ROM -0.29 0.12 16 -0.23 0.12 16 -0.22 0.13 15 -0.23 0.13 15 -0.32 0.14 13 -0.35 0.19 8 -0.34 0.17 7
RUSSIA RUS -0.84 0.12 17 -0.81 0.11 17 -0.86 0.12 16 -0.90 0.12 17 -0.99 0.13 15 -0.90 0.17 12 -0.90 0.15 10
RWANDA RWA -1.00 0.20 8 -0.77 0.19 8 -0.85 0.21 7 -0.92 0.22 7 -0.90 0.27 5 -1.27 0.34 3 -0.24 0.79 1
SAMOA SAM 1.09 0.26 4 0.84 0.25 4 0.91 0.24 3 1.00 0.25 3 -0.10 0.31 3 -1.06 0.44 1 .. .. ..
SAN MARINO SMR 0.83 0.76 1 0.77 0.74 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE STP -0.63 0.26 4 -0.43 0.25 4 -0.56 0.26 3 -0.56 0.27 3 -0.77 0.35 2 -1.06 0.44 1 .. .. ..
SAUDI ARABIA SAU 0.20 0.15 11 0.20 0.14 12 0.33 0.14 11 0.32 0.14 12 0.37 0.19 9 0.60 0.23 7 0.71 0.18 7
SENEGAL SEN -0.26 0.15 12 -0.22 0.14 13 -0.23 0.14 13 -0.28 0.15 12 -0.36 0.19 9 -0.28 0.22 7 -0.22 0.20 5
SEYCHELLES SYC 0.21 0.24 5 -0.03 0.24 5 0.25 0.25 4 0.44 0.27 3 -0.53 0.35 2 -0.44 0.44 1 .. .. ..
SIERRA LEONE SLE -1.12 0.20 8 -1.11 0.18 10 -1.27 0.20 8 -1.27 0.24 7 -0.95 0.25 7- 0 . 7 9 0.32 4 -1.08 0.44 3
SINGAPORE SGP 1.83 0.13 13 1.83 0.13 13 1.83 0.14 12 1.67 0.14 11 1.91 0.16 12 2.04 0.20 10 2.10 0.16 9
SLOVAK REPUBLIC SVK 0.41 0.12 15 0.44 0.12 15 0.31 0.13 14 0.29 0.13 14 0.23 0.14 12 0.07 0.18 10 0.07 0.16 8
SLOVENIA SVN 0.79 0.13 14 0.83 0.12 15 0.95 0.13 15 1.00 0.13 15 0.81 0.14 13 0.86 0.19 8 0.47 0.17 6
SOLOMON ISLANDS SLB -0.90 0.26 4 -1.01 0.25 4- 1 . 5 8 0.34 2 -1.59 0.37 2 -1.41 0.39 2 -0.75 0.44 1 .. .. ..
SOMALIA SOM -2.36 0.26 5 -2.29 0.25 5 -2.11 0.27 4 -2.07 0.29 4 -1.78 0.28 5 -1.88 0.32 4 -1.75 0.59 2
SOUTH AFRICA ZAF 0.19 0.12 16 0.19 0.12 17 0.07 0.12 16 0.04 0.13 17 0.15 0.14 16 0.21 0.18 11 0.31 0.16 9
SPAIN ESP 1.13 0.14 12 1.17 0.13 13 1.22 0.13 13 1.11 0.13 14 1.29 0.16 13 1.33 0.20 10 1.19 0.16 9
SRI LANKA LKA 0.00 0.14 13 0.02 0.13 15 0.07 0.13 13 0.17 0.14 13 -0.26 0.17 11 -0.21 0.22 70 . 2 4 0 . 1 9 6
ST. KITTS AND NEVIS KNA 0.82 0.28 30 . 7 2 0.26 3 0.24 0.46 1 0.26 0.51 1 0.29 0.41 1 -0.44 0.44 1 .. .. ..
ST. LUCIA LCA 0.82 0.28 3 0.67 0.26 3 0.24 0.46 1 0.26 0.51 1 0.29 0.41 1 -0.44 0.44 1 .. .. ..
ST. VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES VCT 0.82 0.28 30 . 7 2 0.26 3 0.24 0.46 1 0.58 0.51 1 0.29 0.41 1 -0.44 0.44 1 .. .. ..
SUDAN SDN -1.48 0.17 10 -1.47 0.16 11 -1.57 0.16 10 -1.36 0.17 10 -1.19 0.20 9 -1.39 0.26 5 -1.52 0.22 4
SURINAME SUR -0.15 0.22 6 -0.44 0.22 6- 0 . 3 5 0.23 5 -0.46 0.25 4 -0.70 0.42 2 -0.82 0.46 2 -0.88 0.47 2
SWAZILAND SWZ -0.75 0.19 8 -0.84 0.18 7 -0.80 0.19 7 -0.70 0.20 6 -0.17 0.28 4 -0.36 0.30 4 0.35 0.50 2
SWEDEN SWE 1.84 0.14 12 1.86 0.13 13 1.91 0.13 13 1.82 0.14 13 1.87 0.16 13 1.89 0.20 9 2.00 0.16 9
SWITZERLAND CHE 2.02 0.14 12 1.99 0.13 12 2.01 0.14 12 1.95 0.14 12 2.11 0.16 12 2.27 0.20 10 2.14 0.16 9
SYRIA SYR -0.42 0.16 11 -0.36 0.14 11 -0.47 0.15 9 -0.35 0.16 9 -0.48 0.21 7 -0.42 0.24 6 -0.58 0.19 6
TAIWAN TWN 0.83 0.13 13 0.82 0.13 14 0.87 0.13 13 0.83 0.14 13 0.76 0.16 12 1.02 0.20 9 0.98 0.16 9
TAJIKISTAN TJK -0.99 0.15 13 -1.14 0.15 12 -1.11 0.15 11 -1.32 0.16 11 -1.38 0.19 7 -1.53 0.25 5 -1.47 0.31 3
TANZANIA TZA -0.47 0.14 14 -0.48 0.13 15 -0.50 0.13 14 -0.54 0.14 13 -0.26 0.17 11 -0.34 0.20 9 -0.75 0.19 6
THAILAND THA 0.10 0.13 15 0.00 0.12 15 0.04 0.13 14 0.18 0.13 14 0.30 0.15 13 0.30 0.18 11 0.45 0.16 9
TIMOR, EAST TMP -0.55 0.26 4 -0.69 0.28 5 -1.08 0.27 2 -1.17 0.33 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
TOGO TGO -1.07 0.19 9 -1.14 0.18 9 -0.99 0.20 8 -0.72 0.22 7 -0.99 0.27 6 -0.91 0.29 5 -1.29 0.59 2
TONGA TON 0.45 0.26 4 0.18 0.25 4- 0 . 0 8 0.34 2 0.00 0.37 2 -0.48 0.39 2 -0.75 0.44 1 .. .. ..
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO TTO -0.07 0.15 10 -0.05 0.15 9 0.12 0.15 9 0.25 0.16 8 0.38 0.18 8 0.30 0.23 6 0.31 0.20 5
TUNISIA TUN 0.21 0.14 14 0.20 0.13 13 0.16 0.14 12 0.28 0.14 12 0.30 0.18 10 0.27 0.20 8 0.02 0.19 6
TURKEY TUR 0.07 0.13 16 0.02 0.12 16 0.02 0.13 15 -0.15 0.13 16 -0.07 0.15 14 -0.01 0.18 11 -0.02 0.16 9
TURKMENISTAN TKM -1.41 0.15 9 -1.45 0.14 9 -1.37 0.16 8 -1.20 0.16 8 -1.22 0.18 6- 1 . 2 8 0.22 6 -1.26 0.26 4
TUVALU TUV 1.20 0.33 2 0.85 0.29 31 . 3 5 0.46 1 1.74 0.47 1 1.38 0.75 1. .. .. .. .. .. .
UGANDA UGA -0.74 0.14 14 -0.77 0.13 16 -0.68 0.13 14 -0.82 0.14 13 -0.62 0.17 12 -0.30 0.20 9 -0.93 0.19 6
UKRAINE UKR -0.60 0.12 15 -0.83 0.12 17 -0.84 0.13 15 -0.87 0.13 15 -0.80 0.14 13 -0.88 0.17 11 -0.73 0.16 8
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES ARE 0.58 0.15 11 0.83 0.15 10 0.90 0.15 9 0.94 0.15 10 1.34 0.22 70 . 9 9 0.24 6 0.74 0.19 6
UNITED KINGDOM GBR 1.69 0.14 12 1.74 0.13 13 1.79 0.13 13 1.74 0.13 14 1.80 0.16 13 1.97 0.20 10 1.91 0.16 9
UNITED STATES USA 1.59 0.14 11 1.52 0.13 11 1.61 0.14 11 1.58 0.14 12 1.79 0.16 11 1.66 0.20 10 1.76 0.16 9
URUGUAY URY 0.43 0.14 13 0.40 0.13 13 0.50 0.14 11 0.49 0.14 11 0.46 0.17 11 0.44 0.21 8 0.49 0.19 7
UZBEKISTAN UZB -1.31 0.14 13 -1.32 0.13 15 -1.19 0.13 13 -1.31 0.13 13 -1.03 0.16 10 -1.13 0.19 8 -1.08 0.18 5
VANUATU VUT 0.53 0.26 4 0.00 0.25 4 -0.53 0.34 2 -0.26 0.37 2 -0.36 0.39 2 -0.75 0.44 1 .. .. ..
VENEZUELA VEN -1.22 0.13 15 -1.12 0.12 17 -1.16 0.13 15 -1.14 0.13 15 -0.93 0.15 12 -0.75 0.18 12 -0.72 0.16 10
VIETNAM VNM -0.45 0.13 14 -0.60 0.13 16 -0.47 0.13 14 -0.47 0.13 14 -0.77 0.16 12 -0.94 0.20 9 -0.55 0.17 8
VIRGIN ISLANDS (U.S.) VIR 1.15 0.35 11 . 1 9 0 . 3 3 1. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .
WEST BANK WBG -0.52 0.31 2 -0.40 0.30 2 -0.31 0.29 2 -0.36 0.31 2 0.23 0.72 1 1.24 0.63 1 .. .. ..
YEMEN YEM -1.10 0.15 10 -1.06 0.15 12 -1.06 0.16 9 -1.29 0.16 9 -1.00 0.21 7 -0.72 0.23 6 -1.10 0.20 5
YUGOSLAVIA YUG -0.81 0.15 12 -0.78 0.14 12 -0.97 0.15 11 -0.99 0.15 11 -1.14 0.22 5 -1.06 0.27 4 -1.26 0.23 3
ZAMBIA ZMB -0.62 0.14 14 -0.61 0.13 15 -0.61 0.13 14 -0.56 0.14 13 -0.55 0.17 11 -0.49 0.20 9 -0.40 0.19 6
















































TABLE C6: Control of Corruption
2005 2004 2003 2002 2000 1998 1996
Country Code Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N.
AFGHANISTAN AFG -1.37 0.23 3 -1.38 0.21 6 -1.30 0.22 4 -1.34 0.28 3 -1.64 0.48 1 .. .. .. .. .. ..
ALBANIA ALB -0.76 0.15 7 -0.81 0.16 7 -0.71 0.16 6 -0.86 0.18 6 -0.68 0.19 7 -0.99 0.23 5 0.07 0.49 2
ALGERIA DZA -0.43 0.15 10 -0.50 0.15 10 -0.65 0.16 10 -0.76 0.17 9 -0.69 0.22 7 -0.77 0.25 5 -0.35 0.28 4
AMERICAN SAMOA ASM 0.78 0.34 1 0.75 0.40 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
ANDORRA ADO 1.25 0.34 1 1.06 0.40 1 1.28 0.39 1 1.31 0.40 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
ANGOLA AGO -1.09 0.16 9 -1.20 0.16 9 -1.21 0.16 9 -1.19 0.17 9 -1.52 0.22 7 -1.16 0.22 6 -1.06 0.28 4
A N G U I L L A A I A 1 . 2 5 0 . 3 4 1 0 . 8 0 0 . 4 0 1 . . . . . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .
ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA ATG 0.78 0.34 1 0.89 0.40 1 0.81 0.39 1 0.85 0.40 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
ARGENTINA ARG -0.44 0.14 12 -0.50 0.14 13 -0.46 0.15 12 -0.81 0.15 12 -0.40 0.17 12 -0.29 0.19 10 -0.12 0.20 7
ARMENIA ARM -0.64 0.14 9 -0.70 0.15 9 -0.64 0.14 8 -0.69 0.16 8 -0.81 0.20 7 -0.78 0.21 6 -0.69 0.43 2
ARUBA ABW 1.25 0.34 1 1.11 0.40 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
AUSTRALIA AUS 1.95 0.15 9 2.02 0.13 11 1.97 0.14 11 1.90 0.15 10 2.00 0.20 8 2.14 0.22 7 2.02 0.20 7
AUSTRIA AUT 1.99 0.15 10 2.13 0.15 10 2.11 0.16 9 1.87 0.17 8 1.88 0.21 8 1.96 0.21 9 1.81 0.20 7
AZERBAIJAN AZE -1.01 0.13 11 -1.21 0.13 12 -1.08 0.13 11 -1.07 0.13 11 -1.13 0.15 10 -1.08 0.20 7 -1.03 0.29 3
BAHAMAS BHS 1.32 0.30 2 1.36 0.35 2 1.37 0.35 2 1.43 0.35 2 0.80 0.73 1 0.60 0.90 1 0.41 0.71 1
BAHRAIN BHR 0.64 0.17 7 0.73 0.17 8 0.75 0.19 6 0.95 0.18 7 0.31 0.24 5 0.34 0.30 4 0.10 0.28 4
BANGLADESH BGD -1.18 0.16 10 -1.29 0.15 10 -1.16 0.15 10 -1.02 0.15 10 -0.68 0.17 8 -0.47 0.25 5 -0.49 0.28 4
BARBADOS BRB 1.17 0.31 2 1.17 0.34 2 1.20 0.33 2 1.31 0.40 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
BELARUS BLR -0.90 0.16 7 -0.97 0.16 8 -0.87 0.15 8 -0.76 0.18 7 -0.12 0.20 7 -0.66 0.23 6 -0.99 0.58 1
BELGIUM BEL 1.45 0.15 9 1.51 0.15 9 1.58 0.16 9 1.63 0.17 9 1.32 0.21 8 1.17 0.22 8 1.23 0.20 7
BELIZE BLZ -0.22 0.26 3 -0.22 0.27 3 -0.08 0.27 3 -0.24 0.32 2 0.11 0.39 2 -0.36 0.43 1 .. .. ..
BENIN BEN -1.00 0.21 6 -0.50 0.24 5 -0.42 0.24 5 -0.50 0.26 4 -0.07 0.46 2 -0.82 0.36 2 .. .. ..
BERMUDA BMU 1.25 0.34 1 1.24 0.40 1 1.28 0.39 1 1.31 0.40 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
BHUTAN BTN 0.84 0.25 5 0.75 0.26 4 0.87 0.23 4 0.52 0.23 3 0.48 0.27 2 0.40 0.43 1 .. .. ..
BOLIVIA BOL -0.81 0.15 11 -0.86 0.16 10 -0.68 0.16 9 -0.86 0.16 9 -0.73 0.19 9 -0.48 0.22 8 -0.93 0.28 4
BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA BIH -0.32 0.15 8 -0.54 0.15 9 -0.53 0.15 7 -0.63 0.18 7 -0.55 0.24 4 -0.41 0.28 2 .. .. ..
BOTSWANA BWA 1.10 0.17 9 0.93 0.17 10 0.98 0.17 10 0.78 0.17 10 0.95 0.22 8 0.67 0.24 5 0.45 0.31 3
BRAZIL BRA -0.28 0.14 11 -0.05 0.14 13 0.03 0.15 12 -0.10 0.15 12 -0.01 0.17 11 0.03 0.19 11 -0.10 0.20 7
BRUNEI BRN 0.25 0.30 2 0.37 0.35 2 0.28 0.35 2 0.32 0.35 2 -0.19 0.73 1 0.00 0.90 1 0.41 0.71 1
BULGARIA BGR -0.05 0.13 11 -0.03 0.13 12 -0.09 0.13 11 -0.19 0.14 11 -0.20 0.16 11 -0.56 0.19 8 -0.71 0.28 4
BURKINA FASO BFA 0.06 0.22 6 -0.03 0.24 5 0.04 0.24 5 0.11 0.27 4 -0.76 0.34 4 -0.54 0.30 3 -0.32 0.71 1
BURUNDI BDI -0.86 0.24 4 -0.84 0.26 4 -0.94 0.26 4 -0.94 0.29 3 -1.35 0.29 4 -0.86 0.43 1 .. .. ..
CAMBODIA KHM -1.12 0.18 7 -0.98 0.21 6 -0.89 0.20 5 -0.94 0.19 5 -0.79 0.22 4 -1.34 0.33 2 -1.00 0.55 1
CAMEROON CMR -1.15 0.16 9 -0.84 0.18 8 -1.00 0.18 8 -1.06 0.20 7 -1.12 0.24 7 -1.27 0.23 6 -1.17 0.31 3
CANADA CAN 1.92 0.15 10 1.96 0.15 11 2.08 0.16 10 2.08 0.16 10 2.25 0.19 10 2.44 0.21 8 2.34 0.20 7
CAPE VERDE CPV 0.21 0.24 4 0.30 0.27 4 0.31 0.27 4 0.42 0.29 4 0.25 0.46 2 -0.36 0.43 1 .. .. ..
CAYMAN ISLANDS CYM 1.25 0.34 1 1.20 0.40 1 1.28 0.39 1 1.31 0.40 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLICCAF -1.08 0.24 4 -1.18 0.26 4 -1.18 0.26 4 -1.13 0.29 3 -1.10 0.46 2 -0.61 0.43 1 .. .. ..
CHAD TCD -1.22 0.21 5 -1.24 0.23 5 -1.12 0.23 5 -0.91 0.28 4 -0.65 0.46 2 -0.90 0.36 2 .. .. ..
CHILE CHL 1.34 0.14 12 1.39 0.14 12 1.23 0.15 12 1.51 0.15 12 1.50 0.17 12 1.13 0.19 10 1.40 0.20 7
CHINA CHN -0.69 0.12 12 -0.59 0.13 12 -0.51 0.13 12 -0.40 0.14 12 -0.38 0.17 11 -0.20 0.17 9 0.00 0.20 7
COLOMBIA COL -0.22 0.14 13 -0.28 0.14 11 -0.46 0.15 11 -0.55 0.15 11 -0.51 0.17 12 -0.67 0.19 11 -0.45 0.20 7
COMOROS COM -0.93 0.25 3 -0.77 0.28 3 -0.88 0.28 3 -0.89 0.29 3 -1.04 0.46 2 -0.86 0.43 1 .. .. ..
CONGO COG -1.01 0.18 7 -0.99 0.19 7 -1.02 0.19 7 -1.04 0.20 7 -1.05 0.28 5 -1.06 0.29 4 -0.86 0.47 2
Congo, Dem. Rep. (Zaire) ZAR -1.34 0.16 8 -1.39 0.16 9 -1.36 0.16 9 -1.42 0.19 8 -1.56 0.25 6 -1.65 0.29 4 -2.13 0.38 3
COOK ISLANDS COK .. .. .. 0.07 0.73 1 -0.24 0.42 1 -0.25 0.31 1 -0.29 0.30 1 .. .. .. .. .. ..
COSTA RICA CRI 0.38 0.15 10 0.55 0.15 11 0.84 0.16 10 0.86 0.16 10 0.98 0.18 9 0.63 0.20 9 0.84 0.26 5
CROATIA HRV 0.07 0.13 11 0.06 0.13 11 0.03 0.13 10 0.23 0.14 10 -0.03 0.17 9 -0.39 0.21 6 -0.51 0.29 3
CUBA CUB -0.26 0.18 6 -0.32 0.18 7 -0.32 0.18 7 -0.17 0.18 7 -0.39 0.24 5 -0.35 0.30 4 0.03 0.28 4
CYPRUS CYP 0.69 0.17 6 0.73 0.17 7 0.94 0.19 6 0.90 0.19 6 1.04 0.27 4 1.32 0.30 4 1.72 0.28 4
CZECH REPUBLIC CZE 0.42 0.12 12 0.33 0.12 13 0.38 0.12 12 0.33 0.14 12 0.39 0.16 12 0.29 0.17 10 0.65 0.20 7
DENMARK DNK 2.23 0.15 10 2.38 0.15 11 2.33 0.16 10 2.29 0.16 9 2.31 0.20 9 2.51 0.22 8 2.44 0.20 7
DJIBOUTI DJI -0.64 0.25 3 -0.74 0.28 3 -0.88 0.28 3 -0.69 0.29 3 -1.23 0.46 2 -0.86 0.43 1 .. .. ..
DOMINICA DMA 0.68 0.29 2 0.57 0.30 2 0.41 0.29 2 0.51 0.32 2 -0.27 0.51 1 -0.36 0.43 1 .. .. ..
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC DOM -0.66 0.15 10 -0.53 0.16 9 -0.40 0.16 8 -0.43 0.17 8 -0.37 0.20 8 -0.59 0.28 4 -0.34 0.31 3
ECUADOR ECU -0.81 0.15 11 -0.79 0.16 11 -0.82 0.16 10 -1.04 0.16 10 -1.05 0.19 10 -0.81 0.23 8 -0.79 0.27 5
EGYPT EGY -0.42 0.15 11 -0.22 0.15 12 -0.41 0.15 11 -0.30 0.16 11 -0.36 0.19 10 -0.23 0.21 7 0.14 0.25 6
EL SALVADOR SLV -0.39 0.18 7 -0.32 0.19 7 -0.34 0.20 7 -0.53 0.19 7 -0.24 0.21 7 -0.34 0.26 5 -0.80 0.31 3
EQUATORIAL GUINEA GNQ -1.79 0.24 4 -1.72 0.26 4 -1.73 0.26 4 -1.75 0.28 4 -2.13 0.46 2 -0.86 0.43 1 .. .. ..
ERITREA ERI -0.37 0.24 5 -0.54 0.24 5 -0.30 0.24 5 -0.18 0.26 4 0.01 0.36 3 0.40 0.43 1 .. .. ..
ESTONIA EST 0.88 0.12 11 0.86 0.12 13 0.79 0.12 12 0.70 0.13 12 0.71 0.15 12 0.43 0.19 8 0.07 0.29 3
ETHIOPIA ETH -0.79 0.17 9 -0.84 0.18 8 -0.78 0.18 8 -0.37 0.24 6 -0.01 0.30 5 -0.25 0.30 3 -1.05 0.71 1
FIJI FJI -0.60 0.29 2 0.02 0.27 3 -0.17 0.27 3 0.16 0.28 3 0.46 0.38 2 0.14 0.36 2 .. .. ..
FINLAND FIN 2.39 0.15 10 2.51 0.15 10 2.46 0.16 9 2.50 0.17 9 2.49 0.20 9 2.49 0.22 8 2.43 0.20 7
FRANCE FRA 1.40 0.15 10 1.40 0.15 11 1.47 0.16 10 1.39 0.16 10 1.41 0.19 9 1.69 0.21 8 1.53 0.20 7
FRENCH GUIANA GUF 0.78 0.34 1 0.75 0.40 1 0.81 0.39 1 0.85 0.40 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
GABON GAB -0.61 0.16 8 -0.64 0.17 8 -0.53 0.17 8 -0.55 0.18 8 -0.81 0.22 7 -0.96 0.28 4 -1.32 0.31 3
















































TABLE C6: Control of Corruption (cont.)
2005 2004 2003 2002 2000 1998 1996
Country Code Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N.
GEORGIA GEO -0.57 0.14 9 -0.88 0.14 11 -0.95 0.14 8 -1.07 0.16 8 -0.78 0.18 8 -0.71 0.21 5 -1.12 0.43 2
GERMANY DEU 1.92 0.15 10 1.92 0.15 11 2.02 0.16 10 1.83 0.16 10 1.67 0.19 9 2.15 0.21 9 1.92 0.20 7
GHANA GHA -0.38 0.15 11 -0.33 0.15 12 -0.27 0.15 11 -0.33 0.17 10 -0.56 0.21 9 -0.48 0.21 7 -0.49 0.28 4
GREECE GRC 0.40 0.15 10 0.53 0.15 10 0.57 0.16 9 0.57 0.17 9 0.84 0.21 7 0.78 0.22 8 0.42 0.20 7
GRENADA GRD 0.68 0.29 2 0.57 0.30 2 0.59 0.29 2 0.68 0.32 2 0.12 0.51 1 -0.10 0.43 1 .. .. ..
G U A M G U M 0 . 7 8 0 . 3 4 1 0 . 3 5 0 . 4 0 1. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .
GUATEMALA GTM -0.98 0.16 9 -0.70 0.16 11 -0.78 0.17 9 -0.76 0.16 9 -0.70 0.19 8 -0.71 0.23 6 -1.02 0.28 4
GUINEA GIN -0.84 0.22 5 -1.07 0.24 5 -0.83 0.24 5 -0.65 0.26 5 -0.48 0.42 3 -0.88 0.35 30 . 4 1 0 . 7 11
GUINEA-BISSAU GNB -1.08 0.23 4 -0.74 0.24 5 -0.74 0.24 5 -0.54 0.24 5 -0.60 0.34 4 -0.64 0.35 3 -1.05 0.71 1
GUYANA GUY -0.58 0.22 5 -0.47 0.25 4 -0.41 0.25 4 -0.45 0.29 3 -0.44 0.36 3 -0.33 0.41 2 -0.32 0.71 1
HAITI HTI -1.45 0.24 4 -1.39 0.23 6 -1.71 0.22 6 -1.65 0.23 5 -1.07 0.31 4 -0.91 0.41 2 -1.05 0.71 1
HONDURAS HND -0.67 0.16 9 -0.76 0.16 9 -0.74 0.17 9 -0.80 0.16 9 -0.71 0.19 8 -0.82 0.23 6 -1.03 0.28 4
HONG KONG HKG 1.68 0.13 10 1.56 0.13 10 1.49 0.14 9 1.45 0.15 9 1.43 0.19 8 1.67 0.17 9 1.64 0.20 6
HUNGARY HUN 0.63 0.12 12 0.63 0.12 13 0.63 0.12 13 0.56 0.13 13 0.71 0.15 13 0.63 0.17 11 0.70 0.20 7
ICELAND ISL 2.49 0.17 7 2.36 0.18 7 2.40 0.20 6 2.22 0.21 5 2.42 0.26 5 2.25 0.27 4 1.93 0.25 4
INDIA IND -0.31 0.12 12 -0.38 0.13 13 -0.39 0.13 12 -0.41 0.14 12 -0.31 0.17 11 -0.24 0.16 11 -0.32 0.20 7
INDONESIA IDN -0.86 0.12 13 -0.96 0.12 15 -1.01 0.13 13 -1.19 0.13 13 -1.05 0.15 12 -1.03 0.17 9 -0.49 0.20 7
IRAN IRN -0.47 0.17 9 -0.59 0.16 9 -0.45 0.16 9 -0.40 0.17 9 -0.67 0.24 6 -0.70 0.30 5 -0.88 0.27 5
IRAQ IRQ -1.27 0.18 6 -1.47 0.18 6 -0.95 0.19 6 -1.50 0.19 6 -1.25 0.24 5 -1.43 0.30 4 -1.45 0.28 4
IRELAND IRL 1.70 0.15 10 1.54 0.15 11 1.58 0.16 10 1.69 0.16 9 1.50 0.20 9 2.09 0.21 9 2.01 0.20 7
ISRAEL ISR 0.76 0.15 9 0 . 7 8 0 . 1 51 00 . 9 5 0.16 9 1.02 0.16 9 1.11 0.20 7 1.34 0.22 7 1.62 0.20 7
ITALY ITA 0.41 0.15 10 0.55 0.15 10 0.75 0.16 9 0.78 0.17 9 0.79 0.19 10 0.93 0.21 9 0.52 0.20 7
IVORY COAST CIV -1.23 0.18 7 -1.15 0.18 8 -1.08 0.18 8 -0.95 0.19 8 -0.68 0.25 6 -0.40 0.23 6 0.46 0.31 3
JAMAICA JAM -0.50 0.16 7 -0.55 0.17 7 -0.56 0.17 7 -0.49 0.18 7 -0.24 0.24 5 -0.33 0.26 5 -0.34 0.31 3
JAPAN JPN 1.24 0.13 11 1.22 0.13 12 1.14 0.14 11 1.21 0.14 11 1.28 0.18 10 1.10 0.17 9 1.34 0.20 7
JORDAN JOR 0.33 0.14 9 0.40 0.15 10 0.28 0.15 9 0.02 0.17 8 0.08 0.20 7 0.15 0.21 7 -0.09 0.26 5
KAZAKHSTAN KAZ -0.94 0.13 11 -1.16 0.13 12 -1.08 0.13 11 -1.08 0.14 11 -0.92 0.17 10 -0.93 0.20 8 -0.90 0.28 4
KENYA KEN -1.01 0.15 11 -0.88 0.15 13 -0.94 0.15 11 -1.09 0.17 10 -1.14 0.21 8 -1.03 0.21 7 -1.12 0.28 4
KIRIBATI KIR 0.22 0.27 3 0.28 0.28 3 0.09 0.31 2 -0.09 0.27 2 -0.29 0.27 2 -0.61 0.43 1 .. .. ..
KOREA, NORTH PRK -1.32 0.23 3 -1.50 0.24 4 -1.57 0.24 4 -1.22 0.30 3 -1.01 0.45 2 -0.61 0.90 1 -0.32 0.71 1
KOREA, SOUTH KOR 0.47 0.12 12 0.12 0.13 13 0.30 0.13 12 0.33 0.14 11 0.33 0.17 11 0.04 0.16 11 0.61 0.20 7
K O S O V O L W I - 0 . 6 7 0 . 2 1 2. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .
KUWAIT KWT 0.84 0.17 7 0.79 0.18 7 0.83 0.18 7 0.99 0.17 8 0.84 0.27 4 1.01 0.30 4 0.70 0.28 4
KYRGYZ REPUBLIC KGZ -1.06 0.14 9 -1.00 0.14 10 -0.89 0.14 9 -0.86 0.15 9 -0.93 0.17 7 -0.76 0.21 5 -0.84 0.43 2
LAOS LAO -1.10 0.20 7 -1.04 0.21 5 -1.01 0.20 5 -0.94 0.19 5 -0.88 0.22 4 -0.77 0.33 2 -1.00 0.55 1
LATVIA LVA 0.33 0.13 10 0.22 0.13 11 0.36 0.13 10 0.06 0.14 10 -0.04 0.17 9 -0.17 0.19 8 -0.59 0.29 3
LEBANON LBN -0.39 0.17 7 -0.51 0.17 7 -0.50 0.17 7 -0.40 0.17 8 -0.57 0.22 6 -0.39 0.25 5 -0.18 0.28 4
LESOTHO LSO -0.15 0.22 6 -0.16 0.22 6 -0.31 0.22 6 -0.28 0.25 5 0.54 0.39 3 0.14 0.30 2 .. .. ..
LIBERIA LBR -1.08 0.26 3 -1.04 0.30 3 -1.11 0.30 3 -1.32 0.28 4 -1.36 0.34 4 -1.50 0.41 2 -1.78 0.71 1
LIBYA LBY -0.89 0.18 7 -0.82 0.18 6 -0.84 0.19 6 -0.83 0.19 6 -0.99 0.27 4 -0.97 0.30 4 -0.95 0.28 4
LIECHTENSTEIN LIE 1.25 0.34 1 1.29 0.40 1 1.28 0.39 1 1.31 0.40 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
LITHUANIA LTU 0.26 0.13 11 0.36 0.13 12 0.38 0.13 11 0.24 0.14 11 0.22 0.16 11 0.01 0.20 7 -0.12 0.29 3
LUXEMBOURG LUX 1.84 0.19 6 2.02 0.20 6 1.91 0.23 5 2.21 0.27 4 2.01 0.39 3 2.10 0.30 4 1.97 0.27 3
MACAO MAC 0.55 0.20 2 1.33 0.40 1 0.81 0.39 1 -0.07 0.40 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
MACEDONIA MKD -0.50 0.14 9 -0.56 0.14 9 -0.73 0.14 8 -0.75 0.17 6 -0.52 0.23 4 -0.36 0.23 4 -1.06 0.38 1
MADAGASCAR MDG 0.00 0.20 7 -0.06 0.22 6 0.07 0.22 6 0.03 0.27 4 -0.83 0.30 5 -0.86 0.35 30 . 4 1 0 . 7 11
MALAWI MWI -0.85 0.15 9 -0.84 0.16 9 -0.84 0.17 9 -0.94 0.18 8 -0.23 0.21 8 -0.55 0.22 6 -1.05 0.31 3
MALAYSIA MYS 0.27 0.12 12 0.29 0.13 14 0.36 0.13 12 0.33 0.14 12 0.21 0.17 11 0.67 0.16 10 0.57 0.20 7
MALDIVES MDV -0.28 0.27 3 -0.17 0.28 3 0.02 0.25 3 -0.18 0.23 3 -0.53 0.27 2 -0.61 0.43 1 .. .. ..
MALI MLI -0.29 0.20 7 -0.32 0.20 8 -0.35 0.21 8 -0.17 0.23 7 -0.45 0.31 5 -0.64 0.35 3 -0.32 0.71 1
MALTA MLT 1.04 0.24 4 1.20 0.26 4 1.24 0.27 4 0.80 0.35 2 0.14 0.73 1 0.60 0.90 1 0.41 0.71 1
MARSHALL ISLANDS MHL -0.43 0.42 2 -0.57 0.38 2 -0.87 0.31 2 -0.96 0.27 2 -0.80 0.27 2 -0.61 0.43 1 .. .. ..
M A R T I N I Q U E M T Q 0 . 7 8 0 . 3 4 1 0 . 8 4 0 . 4 0 1 0 . 8 1 0 . 3 9 1 0 . 8 5 0 . 4 0 1. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .
MAURITANIA MRT -0.26 0.24 5 -0.04 0.26 4 0.25 0.26 4 0.15 0.29 3 -0.73 0.36 3 -0.36 0.43 1 .. .. ..
MAURITIUS MUS 0.32 0.17 6 0.30 0.18 6 0.36 0.18 6 0.43 0.18 6 0.52 0.22 6 0.24 0.22 5 0.54 0.33 2
MEXICO MEX -0.41 0.14 12 -0.28 0.14 13 -0.16 0.15 12 -0.25 0.15 12 -0.49 0.17 12 -0.46 0.19 10 -0.35 0.20 7
MICRONESIA FSM -0.28 0.42 2 -0.08 0.28 3 -0.39 0.31 2 -0.42 0.27 2 -0.42 0.27 2 -0.36 0.43 1 .. .. ..
MOLDOVA MDA -0.76 0.13 11 -0.95 0.14 10 -0.92 0.13 9 -0.92 0.15 8 -0.92 0.17 9 -0.57 0.20 7 -0.21 0.29 3
MONGOLIA MNG -0.55 0.21 6 -0.52 0.23 6 -0.28 0.21 6 -0.08 0.20 5 -0.28 0.23 4 -0.34 0.27 3 0.41 0.71 1
MOROCCO MAR -0.09 0.15 9 -0.04 0.15 11 -0.07 0.16 10 -0.09 0.17 9 0.30 0.24 6 -0.11 0.21 7 0.26 0.27 5
MOZAMBIQUE MOZ -0.68 0.16 10 -0.81 0.16 10 -0.80 0.17 10 -0.83 0.20 8 -0.39 0.28 5 -0.87 0.24 5 -0.54 0.47 2
MYANMAR MMR -1.44 0.20 5 -1.60 0.20 6 -1.44 0.20 6 -1.43 0.21 6 -1.30 0.28 4 -1.37 0.38 3 -1.25 0.31 3
NAMIBIA NAM 0.06 0.17 9 0.05 0.17 10 0.10 0.17 10 0.11 0.17 10 1.10 0.24 7 0.33 0.26 4 0.85 0.35 2
NEPAL NPL -0.71 0.17 7 -0.70 0.18 8 -0.51 0.17 7 -0.44 0.18 6 -0.63 0.22 4 -0.66 0.33 2 -0.29 0.55 1
NETHERLANDS NLD 1.99 0.15 10 2.04 0.15 10 2.10 0.16 9 2.20 0.17 9 2.30 0.20 9 2.42 0.22 8 2.33 0.20 7
NETHERLANDS ANTILLES ANT 1.25 0.34 1 0.57 0.40 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
NEW ZEALAND NZL 2.24 0.15 8 2.40 0.15 8 2.36 0.16 8 2.31 0.17 7 2.31 0.20 7 2.48 0.22 7 2.42 0.20 6
NICARAGUA NIC -0.62 0.18 8 -0.37 0.18 9 -0.49 0.19 8 -0.49 0.18 8 -0.96 0.21 7 -0.83 0.26 5 -0.14 0.31 3











































TABLE C6: Control of Corruption (cont.)
2005 2004 2003 2002 2000 1998 1996
Country Code Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N. Est. S.E. N.
NIGERIA NGA -1.22 0.15 11 -1.30 0.15 13 -1.27 0.15 11 -1.36 0.16 11 -1.16 0.18 11 -1.13 0.20 8 -1.28 0.27 5
NORWAY NOR 2.04 0.15 10 2.08 0.15 10 2.00 0.16 9 2.01 0.17 8 2.07 0.21 8 2.29 0.22 8 2.19 0.20 7
OMAN OMN 0.69 0.18 6 0.84 0.18 7 0.68 0.18 7 1.01 0.17 8 0.68 0.24 5 0.83 0.30 4 0.15 0.28 4
PAKISTAN PAK -1.01 0.15 11 -1.06 0.15 12 -0.76 0.15 10 -0.85 0.16 9 -0.94 0.18 8 -0.82 0.21 8 -1.04 0.27 5
PANAMA PAN -0.27 0.15 10 -0.15 0.15 10 -0.22 0.16 10 -0.27 0.16 10 -0.40 0.18 9 -0.34 0.25 6 -0.53 0.28 4
PAPUA NEW GUINEA PNG -1.08 0.17 8 -0.94 0.16 9 -0.94 0.16 9 -0.82 0.16 8 -0.92 0.18 7 -0.77 0.28 4 -0.27 0.31 3
PARAGUAY PRY -1.19 0.16 10 -1.18 0.16 9 -1.29 0.17 9 -1.25 0.16 9 -1.08 0.21 7 -1.03 0.25 6 -0.52 0.31 3
PERU PER -0.49 0.15 12 -0.38 0.15 12 -0.30 0.16 11 -0.27 0.16 11 -0.16 0.18 11 -0.24 0.20 9 -0.09 0.25 6
PHILIPPINES PHL -0.58 0.12 13 -0.58 0.13 13 -0.46 0.13 12 -0.55 0.14 12 -0.53 0.17 12 -0.34 0.17 9 -0.41 0.20 7
POLAND POL 0.19 0.12 13 0.15 0.12 14 0.39 0.12 13 0.37 0.13 13 0.48 0.15 13 0.43 0.17 10 0.46 0.20 7
PORTUGAL PRT 1.13 0.15 10 1.20 0.15 10 1.30 0.16 9 1.33 0.17 8 1.37 0.20 8 1.49 0.21 9 1.34 0.20 7
PUERTO RICO PRI 1.10 0.28 3 0.94 0.27 3 0.98 0.27 3 1.20 0.32 2 1.34 0.48 1 1.41 0.57 1 1.29 0.58 1
QATAR QAT 0.82 0.19 6 0.68 0.21 6 0.69 0.21 5 0.91 0.21 5 0.67 0.28 4 0.75 0.38 3 -0.05 0.31 3
REUNION REU 0.78 0.34 1 0.93 0.40 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
ROMANIA ROM -0.23 0.12 13 -0.29 0.12 13 -0.29 0.12 12 -0.35 0.14 11 -0.50 0.16 11 -0.44 0.20 7 -0.18 0.28 4
RUSSIA RUS -0.74 0.12 14 -0.81 0.12 14 -0.82 0.12 13 -0.96 0.13 13 -1.04 0.15 13 -0.76 0.17 11 -0.78 0.20 7
RWANDA RWA -0.81 0.25 4 -0.40 0.25 4- 0 . 4 7 0.26 4 -0.32 0.26 4 -0.01 0.36 3 -0.61 0.43 1 .. .. ..
SAMOA SAM 0.17 0.27 3 0.15 0.28 3 0.10 0.25 3 -0.01 0.23 3 -0.20 0.27 2 -0.36 0.43 1 .. .. ..
SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE STP -0.77 0.25 3 -0.59 0.28 3 -0.60 0.28 3 -0.32 0.29 3 -0.01 0.46 2 -0.86 0.43 1 .. .. ..
SAUDI ARABIA SAU 0.23 0.17 7 0.18 0.17 8 0.29 0.18 8 0.48 0.17 9 0.03 0.24 6 0.28 0.30 5 -0.33 0.27 5
SENEGAL SEN -0.23 0.16 9 -0.39 0.17 9 -0.42 0.16 10 -0.22 0.18 9 -0.45 0.22 7 -0.51 0.26 5 -0.40 0.31 3
SEYCHELLES SYC 0.01 0.24 4 0.15 0.26 4 0.18 0.26 4 0.29 0.29 3 0.12 0.46 2 -0.36 0.43 1 .. .. ..
SIERRA LEONE SLE -0.99 0.23 4 -0.80 0.24 6 -0.88 0.24 5 -0.77 0.24 5 -0.87 0.34 4 -0.79 0.41 2 -1.78 0.71 1
SINGAPORE SGP 2.24 0.13 11 2.42 0.13 11 2.39 0.14 10 2.35 0.15 10 2.44 0.18 10 2.43 0.17 9 2.38 0.20 7
SLOVAK REPUBLIC SVK 0.43 0.12 11 0.37 0.12 11 0.34 0.13 11 0.26 0.14 11 0.20 0.16 11 -0.15 0.18 8 0.46 0.26 5
SLOVENIA SVN 0.88 0.12 10 1.00 0.13 11 1.01 0.12 12 0.90 0.13 12 1.03 0.15 11 0.77 0.21 6 1.15 0.29 3
SOLOMON ISLANDS SLB 0.02 0.27 3 -0.55 0.28 3 -1.30 0.31 2 -1.35 0.27 2 -1.02 0.27 2 -0.61 0.43 1 .. .. ..
SOMALIA SOM -1.74 0.26 3 -1.68 0.30 3 -1.57 0.30 3 -1.24 0.30 3 -1.68 0.36 3 -1.50 0.41 2 -1.78 0.71 1
SOUTH AFRICA ZAF 0.54 0.14 13 0.41 0.14 14 0.33 0.15 13 0.34 0.15 13 0.49 0.17 13 0.49 0.19 10 0.70 0.20 7
SPAIN ESP 1.34 0.15 10 1.41 0.15 11 1.47 0.16 10 1.45 0.16 10 1.62 0.19 10 1.52 0.21 9 0.85 0.20 7
SRI LANKA LKA -0.31 0.16 9 -0.17 0.15 11 -0.21 0.15 10 -0.20 0.15 10 -0.16 0.17 8 -0.30 0.25 5 -0.23 0.28 4
ST. KITTS AND NEVIS KNA 1.00 0.29 2 0.23 0.30 2 0.24 0.41 1 0.30 0.48 1 0.12 0.51 1 -0.10 0.43 1 .. .. ..
ST. LUCIA LCA 1.15 0.29 2 0.28 0.30 2 0.24 0.41 1 0.30 0.48 1 0.51 0.51 1 -0.10 0.43 1 .. .. ..
ST. VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES VCT 1.00 0.29 2 0.28 0.30 2 0.24 0.41 1 0.30 0.48 1 0.12 0.51 1 -0.10 0.43 1 .. .. ..
SUDAN SDN -1.40 0.18 7 -1.35 0.18 8 -1.32 0.18 8 -1.05 0.19 8 -1.15 0.24 6 -0.81 0.33 3 -1.16 0.35 2
SURINAME SUR 0.05 0.27 3 0.33 0.31 3 0.35 0.31 3 0.18 0.35 2 0.14 0.73 1 0.00 0.90 1 -0.32 0.71 1
SWAZILAND SWZ -0.60 0.22 6 -0.70 0.23 5 -0.55 0.23 5 -0.32 0.25 4 -0.20 0.46 2 -0.13 0 . 3 0 2. .. .. .
SWEDEN SWE 2.10 0.15 9 2.18 0.15 10 2.24 0.16 10 2.28 0.16 9 2.43 0.19 10 2.48 0.22 8 2.38 0.20 7
SWITZERLAND CHE 2.12 0.15 10 2.13 0.15 10 2.19 0.16 9 2.20 0.17 8 2.17 0.20 9 2.52 0.21 9 2.30 0.20 7
SYRIA SYR -0.59 0.18 7 -0.58 0.18 7 -0.52 0.18 7 -0.31 0.18 7 -0.79 0.24 5 -0.64 0.30 4 -0.75 0.28 4
TAIWAN TWN 0.63 0.13 11 0.63 0.13 12 0.65 0.14 11 0.71 0.14 11 0.63 0.18 10 0.80 0.17 9 0.82 0.20 7
TAJIKISTAN TJK -1.08 0.15 9 -1.20 0.16 8 -1.06 0.15 8 -1.08 0.16 8 -1.12 0.18 5 -1.18 0.25 3 -1.76 0.58 1
TANZANIA TZA -0.73 0.15 10 -0.67 0.15 11 -0.73 0.15 11 -0.96 0.17 10 -1.06 0.20 9 -1.04 0.21 7 -1.10 0.28 4
THAILAND THA -0.24 0.12 13 -0.30 0.13 12 -0.35 0.13 12 -0.32 0.14 12 -0.37 0.17 11 -0.32 0.16 10 -0.33 0.20 7
TIMOR, EAST TMP -0.77 0.28 2 -0.47 0.37 3 -0.52 0.30 2 -0.53 0 . 4 0 1. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .
TOGO TGO -0.70 0.21 6 -0.88 0.24 5 -0.87 0.24 5 -0.66 0.27 4 -0.70 0.42 3 -0.51 0.35 3 -1.05 0.71 1
TONGA TON -1.28 0.27 3 -0.47 0.28 3 -0.65 0.31 2 -0.75 0.27 2 -0.66 0.27 2 -0.36 0.43 1 .. .. ..
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO TTO 0.01 0.16 8 -0.05 0.17 7 0.04 0.17 7 -0.06 0.18 6 0.31 0.22 6 0.06 0.28 4 0.37 0.31 3
TUNISIA TUN 0.13 0.15 10 0.26 0.15 10 0.36 0.16 10 0.41 0.16 10 0.63 0.21 8 0.15 0.22 6 -0.03 0.28 4
TURKEY TUR 0.08 0.14 13 -0.25 0.14 13 -0.27 0.15 12 -0.45 0.15 12 -0.36 0.18 11 -0.07 0.19 10 0.10 0.20 7
TURKMENISTAN TKM -1.30 0.15 6 -1.36 0.15 6- 1 . 1 9 0.15 6 -1.21 0.17 6 -1.19 0.22 4 -1.19 0.23 4 -1.54 0.43 2
TUVALU TUV -0.15 0.34 1 0.52 0.37 2- 0 . 7 7 0.42 1 0.06 0.31 1 -0.14 0.30 1 .. .. .. .. .. ..
UGANDA UGA -0.87 0.15 10 -0.85 0.15 12 -0.81 0.15 11 -0.98 0.17 10 -0.88 0.20 9 -0.69 0.21 7 -0.54 0.28 4
UKRAINE UKR -0.63 0.12 12 -0.96 0.13 14 -0.94 0.13 12 -1.01 0.14 12 -1.03 0.16 11 -0.97 0.17 10 -0.79 0.26 5
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES ARE 1.13 0.17 7 1.32 0.17 7 1.17 0.19 6 1.17 0.18 7 0.62 0.27 4 0.72 0.30 4 0.22 0.28 4
UNITED KINGDOM GBR 1.94 0.15 10 2.03 0.15 11 2.11 0.16 10 1.96 0.16 10 2.10 0.19 10 2.26 0.21 9 2.08 0.20 7
UNITED STATES USA 1.56 0.15 10 1.78 0.13 11 1.76 0.14 10 1.76 0.15 10 1.73 0.20 9 1.89 0.21 8 1.87 0.20 7
URUGUAY URY 0.78 0.15 10 0.63 0.16 10 0.71 0.16 9 0.79 0.16 9 0.72 0.19 9 0.36 0.24 7 0.50 0.28 4
UZBEKISTAN UZB -1.07 0.13 9 -1.16 0.14 11 -1.11 0.13 10 -1.04 0.14 10 -0.87 0.16 8 -1.04 0.20 6 -1.05 0.29 3
VANUATU VUT 0.26 0.27 3 -0.49 0.28 3 -0.67 0.31 2 -0.81 0.27 2 -0.90 0.27 2 -0.36 0.43 1 .. .. ..
VENEZUELA VEN -1.00 0.14 12 -1.00 0.14 14 -1.09 0.15 12 -0.97 0.15 12 -0.71 0.18 10 -0.84 0.19 10 -0.76 0.20 7
VIETNAM VNM -0.76 0.13 11 -0.81 0.13 13 -0.68 0.13 12 -0.71 0.13 12 -0.78 0.16 10 -0.67 0.17 8 -0.68 0.25 6
VIRGIN ISLANDS (U.S.) VIR 0.78 0.34 1 0.62 0.40 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
WEST BANK WBG -1.09 0.31 2 -0.61 0.34 2 -0.95 0.33 2 -0.93 0.37 2 0.72 0.54 1 0.43 0.58 1 .. .. ..
YEMEN YEM -0.63 0.17 6 -0.83 0.17 8 -0.72 0.18 7 -0.74 0.18 7 -0.75 0.25 5 -0.64 0.28 4 -0.25 0.31 3
YUGOSLAVIA YUG -0.55 0.13 10 -0.55 0.14 9 -0.55 0.14 9 -0.77 0.16 8 -1.13 0.25 3 -1.03 0.27 4 -0.98 0.35 2
ZAMBIA ZMB -0.82 0.16 10 -0.81 0.15 11 -0.85 0.15 11 -0.92 0.17 10 -0.84 0.20 9 -0.61 0.21 7 -1.04 0.28 4





  The assumptions in the text imply the following moment conditions: 
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where Vj and Cjk represent the observed variances and covariances of the data.  We can 
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Substituting these into the variance equations and rearranging gives: 
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where Rjk represent the observed sample correlations.  Note that we have an 
overidentified system since we have three equations in two unknowns, λ and σ.  Next let 
R13=R23=R and R12=R* as defined in the text.  Then we are left with just two equations in 
two unknowns: 
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Solving these gives the expressions for λ and σ given in the text. 
 
  To arrive at the consequences for the weights assigned to individual sources in 
the aggregate indicator, note that our assumptions imply that the joint distribution of 
unobserved governance and the observed data is: 
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where yj is a 3x1 vector with the 3 data points for country j; ι is a 3x1 vector of ones; α 
and β are 3x1 vectors containing the parameters αk, βk; and B is a 3x3 diagonal matrix 
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We base our inferences about governance in country j on the distribution of g conditional 
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, with weights 
given by the elements of the row vector ι'Ω
-1.     